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J’entre  en  matière  sans  prouver  l’importance  de  mon 
sujet.  On me demandera si je suis prince ou législateur 
pour écrire sur la Politique? Je réponds que non, et que 
c’est  pour  cela  que  j’écris  sur  la  Politique.  Si  j’étais 
prince ou législateur, je ne perdrais pas mon temps à dire 
ce qu’il faut faire; je le ferais, ou je me tairais.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social.
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Constructivism: Metaphysical Not Political
Introduction
1. The Constructivist View
All of us, or at least most of us, have moral convictions. But some of us, maybe 
most of us, are not as confident about our moral convictions as we are about some 
other kinds of convictions; for instance, convictions about the existence of empirical 
objects.  Somebody would  hardly  deny that  there  are  things  like  mountains.  There 
seems  to  be  less  confidence,  instead,  about  which  moral  norms  should  guide  our 
behaviors  or  which  principles  should  model  our  social  institutions.  This  might  be 
because the subject matter of moral theory is different in kind from the subject matter 
of empirical  sciences.  Can claims about  moral  issues be as objective as claims  on 
empirical ones? The simple answer is that moral claims can be objective, but that they 
are objective in a different way. A philosophical account of this difference, however, is 
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a more complex task.
Many of our everyday moral evaluations claim objectivity. When someone says 
that an action is morally  wrong, sometimes she is just presenting a personal opinion, 
but  often  she  is  claiming  that  the  action  in  question  is  objectively  wrong. Ceteris  
paribus, anyone who performed that action would, be doing something morally wrong. 
At least,  the judgment that something is morally  wrong makes a stronger claim of 
intersubjective acceptability than other kinds of evaluation.1 But what makes an action 
morally wrong for everyone and not just for someone? Is it the mere capacity to think 
about it? Or is it something different, something independent of our capacity to think 
about questions of moral right and wrong?
In the history of thought, philosophers have provided different answers to these 
questions.  Some  have  opted  for  a  robust  form  of  justification  that  derives  the 
objectivity  of  moral  claims  from moral  values  or  moral  facts,  that  is,  from moral 
‘entities’ provided of a peculiar worldly existence. On this view, there are facts those 
instantiate moral properties such as being right or good of an action or just of a social 
institution. These moral properties could be natural (they can be accounted for as other 
natural properties are) or non-natural (i.e. sui generis). Both approaches see the subject 
matter of ethics as independent of us, or of our thinking.
Some other philosophers think that this way to approach moral theory requires 
excessively  strong  ontological  commitments.  Constructivism  –  the  view  I  am 
presenting and defending in this dissertation – aims at providing a different notion of 
objectivity  in  moral  theory.  On this  interpretation,  a  moral  claim is  objective  if  it 
provides  the  correct  solution  to  a  practical  problem and  is  able  to  motivate  us  to 
1 The question of objectivity covers a broad range of philosophical issue. In this dissertation I 
limit my analysis to the case of moral objectivity.
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behave accordingly.  Thus,  the objectivity  of  moral claims is  not  derived  from any 
independent order of truths or facts. This “practical turn” in moral theory leaves all 
metaphysical issues aside. So, what could an appropriate account of moral objectivity 
without ontology possibly be?
Objectivity might mean more things. It has to do with truth of our statements 
and beliefs, with the correctness or justification of the method by which we know what 
we know and with more complex question about the nature of what there is in the 
world or we believe to exist. These are three levels of inquiry that provides different 
notion of objectivity. These are the semantic, epistemological and ontological levels of 
objectivity. Anytime I use the world objectivity I specify to which level I refer.
Our commonsense conception of objectivity is, without a doubt, influenced by 
the scientific view of the world: everything that exists belongs to the empirical world. 
According to this view, a judgment has to report or describe facts and properties of 
facts in the world outside of us. For example, “there is a pencil holder on my desk” is 
objective if there really is an object on the table and that object happens to be a pencil 
holder. However, there are disciplines where the same intuitive line of reasoning does 
not apply. The subject matter of moral theory, for instance, might be not be considered 
as real as the objects on my desk are. Thus, one might think, a strong conception of 
objectivity could be applied to ethics only if there were either moral facts or moral 
properties of facts tracked by the content of moral claims. The problem here is not 
finding a conception of objectivity that would fit this framework, but how could there 
be such entities and how one could possibly be in touch with those queer abstract 
entities that moral claims allegedly refer to.2
2 These objections are presented by John L. Mackie in his Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, 
Oxford: Penguin Books, 1977, chapter 1. I develop this argument in Chapter One.
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Many philosophers accept the claim that there are objects in the world outside 
us whose existence does not depend on our thinking about them.3 For instance, I would 
not  say something bizarre by affirming that  there is  an object  on my desk and its 
existence does not depend upon my cognitive activity. Thus, I can say that it is  true 
that “there is  an object  on my desk” (i.e.,  it  is  not a matter  of my opinion).  That 
statement reports a fact of the world. Now, some people might question my saying that 
the object on my desk is a pencil holder. Somebody might protest that the proposition 
“there is a  pencil holder on my desk” is as true as “there is  something on my desk”. 
Indeed, for someone that thing could be a container for drinks. Ascription of a specific 
property (to be a container for drinks rather than to be a pencil holder) could be a 
function of the attitude that I form towards the object in front of me. And the fact that 
other people have my same attitude towards this specific object does not prove that the 
property of being a pencil holder shows the same kind of mind-independence as other 
physical properties do.
 Some people, like realists, would look for some property (something like its 
shape, or the material from which it is made) that makes this object either a container 
for drinks or a pencil holder. If the object on my desk is made from leather, it is a pen-
cil holder rather than a container for drinks. So, claimants of a realist conception of the 
world would say that there are some facts about this object, something like the fact that 
it is made from leather, or it is round. Those facts, which are true of the object on my 
desk, give me a reason to believe that it  is a pencil  holder and not a container for 
3 The problem here is to understand what the existence of objects implies for our discourse 
about objects in the world (at the semantic level), their nature (at the ontological level) and our 
way of knowing them (at the epistemological level). On the notion of objectivity and its con-
structivist understanding see Chapter Two.
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drinks.4 Properties such as ‘being made from leather’ or ‘being round,’ realists argue, 
do not depend on one’s conceiving of the object on my desk. This object is ‘round’ and 
‘made from leather,’ whether or not one develops any attitude towards it. Therefore, 
we can conclude that “there is a pencil holder on my desk” is an objective statement, 
since it does not depend on my subjective attitudes (like my believing it).
One  may  wonder  how  judgments  can  be  objective  without  referring  to 
something real. If we enter the realm of moral and political theorizing, we can still talk 
about facts, properties etc., but – on the epistemological level – ethical-political claims 
cannot be as objective as the empirical ones, simply because moral facts and moral 
properties of facts do not exist – on the ontological level – as other facts and properties 
in the world outside of us. However, there are fields of study where a strong concep-
tion of objectivity holds even though their subject matter is different from the subject 
matter of empirical sciences. One may say that this difference in the subject matter 
make moral theory open to a certain degree of relativity,5 and therefore not objective, 
at least in the strong sense as its surface grammar appears. Even if our common con-
ception of morality can admit a certain degree of relativity, it is not easy to make the 
same admission about the objectivity of judgments such as “two and two are four.” It 
is usually said that mathematics cannot be dependent on our opinions, even if it is a 
matter of convention. According to the intuitionist conception of mathematical reason-
4 One might say that ‘being round’ or ‘being made from leather’ are not brute facts, since they 
can be explained by some other facts. True: These properties can be explained in terms of their 
atomic structures. But, once we arrive to some subatomic particle, we need to stop to some 
true propositions that, through reasoning, provide me with reasons for defining that object a 
pencil holder.
5 Here, I take “relativity” to mean that standards of right and wrong (or good and bad) can vary 
according to the moral or political communities we take into account.  Further distinctions, 
even if important, are not needed here.
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ing, for example, the objectivity of mathematical judgments depends not on the ontolo-
gical reality of numbers (or the alleged existence of any other mathematical objects), 
but upon the possibility of getting a correct result by correctly applying a procedure of 
calculation.6 If a calculation allows us to get the result ‘four units’ by adding two units 
to two units, the correctness of that result depends neither on the nature of what we are 
summing, nor on the existence of entities such as numbers. Rather, it depends on the 
existence of a procedure that allows us to perform such a calculation. The judgment 
“two and two are four” is objective if a procedure of calculation (i.e. a piece of math-
ematical reasoning) has been correctly applied to what one is summing, leaving aside 
the issue of what one is summing.
Does the same argument apply in moral and political theory? If it does – as 
constructivists think – then the claim would be that the notion of objectivity in this do-
main, like in mathematics, does not depend upon the ontology of its subject matter. 
Ethical objects, like values or reasons, are products of our mind. Possibly, for an action 
to be right or for a social institution to be just is not a matter of moral properties some-
how possessed by the objects we are evaluating; rather it is one’s intentional conceiv-
ing of them, through a process of reasoning under certain constraints, that makes that 
action right, that social institution unjust.7 My aim in this dissertation is to show that 
we can construct moral entities (as moral subjectivists might do) but this “construc-
6 See Paul Benaceraff, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” in Paul Benaceraff and Hilary Putnam 
(eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983.
7 One way to read the possible application of that way of reasoning in mathematics to the ques-
tion of objectivity in moral theory is to think that constructing moral entities makes them real. 
But this formulation, even if consistent with my understanding of constructivism, can be inter-
preted in a subjectivist way, according to which whatever is constructed is real. Accepting this 
formulation could imply that any value constructed by a moral agent is valid for her. But this is 
not my view.
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tion” does not undermine  the objectivity  of moral  claims such as “the action X is 
right.” Its objectivity is warranted by the correct application of a suitably specified pro-
cedure of reasoning, which gives a reason for conceiving of a plain fact as a morally or 
politically relevant fact. This is the idea held by constructivists.
2. Constructivist Views: Gauthier, Rawls, Scanlon and Dworkin
Constructivism is a new and promising approach to moral and political theory. 
Nevertheless  there  are  no  precise  statements  of  it.  Many  theories  are  defined  as 
constructivist or attacked for being constructivist. But most of the time, those theories 
are so different from one another that it is not clear whether there is a unified approach 
that can actually be labeled ‘constructivism.’ As a result, in the contemporary debate, 
one can find different kinds of constructivism. Neo-Hobbesians like David P. Gauthier, 
Kantian  theorists  such  as  John  Rawls,  non-naturalist  realists  such  as  Thomas  M. 
Scanlon  and  also  liberal  legal  theorists  such  as  Ronald  Dworkin  are  considered 
constructivists. These philosophers hold different views. Nevertheless, they share some 
basic constructivist tenets. Basically, they share the view that moral claims are truth-
apt  (they  can  be  true  and  false)  but  not  because  of  certain  moral  facts  or  moral 
properties  of  facts.  Moral  claims  do not  track  properties  of  moral  facts.  Secondly, 
moral  claims  can  be  objective  and  their  objectivity  is  not  derived  from  any 
independent order of moral values, but from their capacity to be practical (namely, 
their capacity to give us reasons for actions).
Of  course,  constructivists  differ  in  many respects.  A first,  broad  distinction 
might be drawn on the way in which they conceive of the procedure of construction. It 
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is  possible  to  distinguish  a  Hobbesian constructivism,  according  to  which  the 
procedure of construction has to be understood in terms or rational choice theory and 
utility maximization. Gauthier in Morals By Agreement lays out this view.8 Views such 
as the ones defended by Rawls,9 Scanlon10 and Dworkin,11 represent non-Hobbesian, 
but rather Kantian, forms of constructivism, that leave individual preferences aside and 
focus more on criteria of public justification of moral and political claims. In the next 
8 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986. For an introduction 
to Gauthier’s moral philosophy see Margaret Moore, “Gauthier Contractarian Morality”, in 
David Boucher, and Paul Kelly (eds.), The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, New York: 
Routledge, 1994. Gauthier is the most representative Hobbesian constructivist. Kurt Baier and 
Robert Nozick might be interpreted as Hobbesian constructivist as well. See Kurt Baier,  The 
Moral Point of View: A Rational Basis for Ethics, New York: Ithaca, 1958; Robert Nozick, An-
archy, State, and Utopia, New York: New York : Basic Books, 1974.
9 Rawls’s reading of  constructivism can be found in all  his  works  and especially  in John 
Rawls,  A Theory  of  Justice,  rev.  ed.,  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1999; 
“Kantian  Constructivism in  Moral  Theory”,  in  Journal  of  Philosophy,  77,  1980;  Political  
Liberalism,  New York:  Columbia University Press 1996,  Lecture  III.  On Rawls’ view see 
Samuel Freeman, “Kantian Constructivism and the Transition to Political Liberalism”, in Id., 
Rawls, London: Routledge 2008; S. Freeman, “The Burdens of Public Justification”, Politics,  
Philosophy and Economics, 6, 2007; Ronald Milo, “Contractarian Constructivism”, in Journal  
of Philosophy ,99, 1995; Larry Krasnoff, “How Kantian is Constructivism?”, in Kant~Studien, 
n. 90, 1999; Onora O’Neill, “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” in S. Freeman (ed.),  The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003.
10 On Scanlon’s view see Thomas M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in A. Sen e 
B. Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1982; 
What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998; “Metaphysics 
and Morals,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 77, 2003. 
On Scanlon’s contractualist  view see Onora O’Neill,  “Constructivism VS. Contractualism”, 
Ratio, 16, 2003; Mark Timmons, “The Limits of Moral Constructivism.” Ratio, 16, 2003.
11 Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” Philosophy & Public Af-
fairs, 25, 1996;  “The Original Position”, in N. Daniels (ed.),  Reading Rawls, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1975. On Dworkin’s view see Larry Krasnoff, “How Kantian is Constructivism?”.
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paragraphs, I briefly introduce those views, focusing on their constructivist features. 
The critical discussion about them is postponed to Chapter Four, once a more detailed 
analysis of constructivism is laid out.
According to Gauthier, the procedure of construction is to be modeled not on 
the  basis  of  some  moral  considerations,  but  rather  on  some  notion  of  individual 
advantage. Gauthier believes there is a link between rationality and morality. This is 
shown by the connection between practical reason and interest, and expressed by the 
idea of maximizing individual utility. Even if the “language of interests” is different 
from the  “language  of  duties,”  Gauthier  thinks  it  is  possible  to  justify  the  second 
starting  from  the  first.  So  people  have  reasons  for  (or  against)  something  when 
principles issue by a certain procedure able to improve their position.
The foundations of Gauthier’s ethics rule out ex ante moral requirements; their 
inclusion would require further justification. What validate moral claims are principles 
issued  by  a  procedure  that  tends  to  increase  individual  utility.  This  view  can  be 
considered  a  constructivist  one  since  there  is  no  appeal  to  moral  entities  that  are 
independent of people’s attitude toward a given state of affairs. Gauthier argues that 
[v]alue  is  not  an  inherent  characteristic  of  things  or  state  of  affairs,  not  something 
existing,  as  part  of  the  ontological  furniture  of  the  universe  in  a  manner  quite 
independent  of  persons  and  their  activities.  Rather,  value  is  created  or  determined 
through preference. Values are products of our affections.12
Gauthier’s  procedure  of  construction  is  a  process  of  bargaining  among 
individuals.  He  calls  this  procedure  the  rule  of  “minimax  relative  concession,” 
12 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement. p. 47.
15
following which “the equal rationality of the bargainers leads to the requirement that 
the greatest concession, measured as a proportion of the conceder’s stake, be as small 
as possible.”13 The bargainers look for an equilibrium point between claims and gains, 
which is reached when the ratio between initially expected utility, on the one hand, and 
finally  achieved utility,  on the other,  is maximized.  The capacity  of increasing this 
ratio depends upon individuals’ bargaining powers.
Now, leaving any issue of distributive justice aside,  let  us see what are the 
premises of this position. Gauthier represents human beings as purely  a-social,  self-
interested and non-cooperating when they see themselves as totally free to pursue their 
own aims,  like  in  Hobbes’s  state  of  nature.  Then human beings  are  rational.  The 
concept  of  rationality  here  involved  is  taken  from  the  social  sciences.  Roughly 
speaking, it corresponds to an agent’s capacity to identify the most effective means to 
achieve a given end. This end is the maximization of utility. Thus, principles of justice 
are a rational, objective means if they can increase individual utility. People see that 
sharing benefits and redistributing costs upon society, rather than to fight for bettering 
one’s position, is more advantageous. Therefore, in order to move from the state of 
nature into the cooperative society, agents make a general agreement, bargaining the 
terms of their cooperation.
On the Kantian interpretation of constructivism, instead, individual preferences 
and desirers are ruled out, leaving the place to a moralized interpretation of person. In 
A Theory of Justice Rawls introduces his constructivist view claiming that “the moral 
facts are determined by the principles which would be chosen in the original position. 
These  principles  specify  which  considerations  are  relevant  from the  standpoint  of 
13 Ibid., p. 14.
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social justice.”14 Rawls defines his theory as “constructivist” in opposition to the so-
called  rational  intuitionism.  He  grounds  his  theory  in  a  practical  conception  of 
objectivity.  For  a  theoretical  conception  of  objectivity  like  the  one  endorsed  by 
philosophers  such as  Plato,15 Gottfried  Leibniz,16 Samuel  Clarke,17 Richard  Price,18 
Henry Sidgwick,19 William D. Ross,20 George E. Moore21 (the rational intuitionists)22 
and,  more  recently,  Gerald  A.  Cohen,23 moral  norms  or  principles  of  justice  are 
objective if they refer to some moral facts, which are independent of moral agents and 
prior  to  social  institutions.  For  constructivists,  instead,  normative  principles  are 
objective if they can be accounted for as outcomes of a procedure of construction.
In  order  to  yield  objective  normative  principles,  a  procedure  has  to  match 
certain  requirements  of  practical  reasoning.  Famously,  Rawls  thought  that  the 
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 40.
15 Plato, The Republic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Gorgias, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1994.
16 Gottfried Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Hackett Publishing, 1989.
17 Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion,  
and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation: The Boy Lectures 1705.
18 Richard Price,  A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,  Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1948.
19 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of  Ethics, first edition 1874, London: Macmillan 1907, 7th 
ed., (reprinted by Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis 1981).
20 William D. Ross, The Right and The Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1930.
21 George E.  Moore,  “The  Conception  of  Intrinsic  Value,”  Philosophical  Studies,  London: 
Kegan Paul,  1922;  Principia Ethica,  first  edition 1903,  Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 2000.
22 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism”, p. 557. For a historical discussion on the relation 
between rational intuitionism and constructivism see Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of  
Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, Lecture 1.
23 Gerald A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice And Equality, Harvard University Press, 2008; “Facts and 
Principles”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31,  2003.
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principles  governing  the basic  institutions  of  a  society  are best  accounted  for as a 
choice of hypothetical agents under the suitably specified constraints of the so-called 
“original  position.”24 This  procedure  of  construction  has  to  embed both theoretical 
considerations  (the veil  of  ignorance,  formal  constraints  on the concept  of  right,  a 
concept  of rationality,  an ideal  of person)  and practical  considerations  (the role  of 
morality  in  society).  Moreover,  the  procedure  has  to  respond  to  certain  factual 
considerations, what Rawls called “Humean circumstances of justice” (namely, limited 
altruism of people and moderate scarcity of resources).25
The denizens of this initial choice situation are deprived of the knowledge of 
their social status and natural abilities. Thus, being equally situated, they can choose 
those principles that could be hypothetically accepted by all. The original position is an 
ideal situation where a veil of ignorance hides both social and economic differences, 
since factors such as the social class one belongs to or family’s wealth depend on mere 
social luck, and so they are irrelevant from a moral point of view. Under these con-
straints, Rawls argues, moral agents would choose principles guaranteeing equal basic 
liberties and equality of opportunity, and a principle that allows for inequalities only if 
they are to the benefit for the worst off in society.
Rawls’s view of constructivism is very problematic,  because one might find 
more than one understanding of it. In A Theory of Justice, he labels as “constructive” 
different  ethical  positions,  such  as  utilitarianism  and  his  own  interpretation  of 
contractualism.26 The  distinctive  feature  of  these  positions  is  the  use  of  some 
procedure  to  solve  moral  problems.  Indeed,  in  adjudicating  claims  of  justice 
24 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, § 4.
25 Ibid., § 22.
26 Ibid., § 7.
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utilitarians apply a formula that allow to maximize some conception of general utility, 
while contractualists rely on a collective choice situation as the suitably social point 
view.  On  Rawls’s  account  here,  constructive  theories  oppose  approaches  such  as 
intuitionism,  understood as an approach that  provides  only a plurality  of unranked 
principles, and therefore it is not able to resolve moral problems.
Later on, Rawls puts forward a narrower and more specific understanding of 
constructivism in moral theory (in “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”) and, 
then,  in  political  theory  (the  latter  stated  in  Political  Liberalism).  In  these  cases, 
constructivism refers to a method for justifying substantive principles, which does not 
appeal to people’s desires or preferences. So, views that prioritize the good over the 
right are not defined as constructivist any longer. But, while the moral interpretation 
touches upon some ontological questions, Rawls’s political reading of constructivism 
seems to be a form of metaphysical quietism. In his later works, Rawls deliberately 
leaves the metanormative debate aside. In the attempt to redefine his view in political 
terms, Rawls writes:
We try, then, to leave aside philosophical controversies whenever possible, and look for 
ways to avoid philosophy’s longstanding problems. Thus, in what I have called “Kantian 
constructivism,”  we  try  to  avoid  the  problem of  truth  and  the  controversy  between 
realism and subjectivism about the status of moral and political values. This form of 
constructivism neither asserts nor denies these doctrines. 27
I  tend  to  disagree  with  Rawls  on  this  point.  I  think  that,  on  its  political 
understanding, constructivism leaves open too many philosophical issues on the nature 
27 John Rawls, “Justice As Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical”,  Philosophy and Public Af-
fairs, 14, 1985, p. 395).
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of moral claims.  Rawls possible reply to this could be that metaphysical issues are 
pointlessly conflict-ridden. For this reason, Rawls rules out the notion of moral truth 
from the political  domain.28 I  think that  stepping back from troublesome questions 
about the nature of morality is not the best philosophical strategy for finding a solution 
to practical problems. When we try to resolve a moral or political problem, usually we 
want to find the right solution, not a quite-right or all-satisfying solution. There still 
might be some space for a justificatory strategy that provides right answers, but does 
not  commit  to  a  bizarre  metaphysics:  a  genuinely  philosophical  interpretation  of 
constructivism. So while later Rawls’s motto was “Justice as Fairness: Political Not 
Metaphysical,” I titled my dissertation  Constructivism: Metaphysical Not Political. I 
think,  indeed,  that  a  political  reading  of  constructivism might  be  better  suited  for 
solving  problems such as  living  together  in  a  peaceful  way,  ruling  out  those deep 
reasons according to which one is actually abiding by some share norms. Nevertheless, 
if asked, one will still defend his or her own reasons for abiding by. By this one will 
still  have to face those same deep questions that  political  constructivism rules out, 
while moral constructivism rules in.
Scanlon and Dworkin are strongly influenced by Rawls. Defending his view of 
reasons  and  moral  obligations,  Scanlon  writes  that  “[a]n  act  is  wrong  if  its 
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for 
the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for 
28 “Once we accept the fact that reasonable pluralism is a permanent condition of public culture 
under free institutions, the idea of the reasonable is more suitable as part of the basis of public 
justification for a constitutional regime than the idea of moral truth. Holding a political con-
ception as true, and for that reason alone the one suitable basis for public reason, is exclusive, 
even sectarian, and so likely to foster political division.” John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 
129.
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informed, unforced general agreement.”29 On Scanlon’s view, this is the procedure out 
of which the various principles of the morality of what we owe to each other issue. The 
idea  of  “reasonable  rejectability”  expresses  Scanlon’s  central  idea.  He grounds his 
moral view of morality on a classical liberal tenet: an action is morally wrong if it 
would be reasonably rejected by those affect by that action. The justifiability to others 
defines  the  content  of  the  morality  of  right  and  wrong.  There  are  no  interesting 
metaphysical issues about which moral principles ought to regulate our conducts.30
On Dworkin’s view, instead, moral claims have to withstand a procedure of 
scrutiny from the standpoint of public discussion.31 In his review of Rawls’s A Theory 
of Justice,  Dworkin clearly  illustrates  two possible ways of theorizing:  natural  and 
constructive.32 According to the natural model, our moral intuitions about a particular 
case are to be considered evidence of a more general truth. Philosophers have to dis-
cover this truth starting from the available evidence. On the constructive model, theor-
ists have to work out a conception of justice that best fits our considered convictions of 
justice. Dworkin makes this example: imagine we have a pile of bones from a prehis-
toric animal. While a natural historian would try to reconstruct the animal as it really 
was, a constructivist will create out of those bones the animal whose shape would res-
ult most appealing to people, even if that animal never existed. To set metaphor aside, 
natural theorists aim at truth; constructivists aim at the acceptability of norms from a 
29 Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 153.
30 Ibid., Chapter 1, § 11.
31 Sharon  Street  formulates  constructivism  in  a  similar  way  in  “Constructivism  About 
Reasons” (in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 3, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2008.
32 Ronald Dworkin, “The Original Position”, in Normal Daniels (ed.),  Reading Rawls, Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press 1989.
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public standpoint. Moral theory does not have to account for truth or explain why we 
have the moral intuitions we have. Rather, being practical, it has to shape our first or-
der convictions so that  they can be presented and defended in a public discussion. 
Moral theory provides a general framework for justification.
This is just a concise overview of what are considered the classical constructiv-
ist views in the contemporary moral and political philosophy. Much more could, and 
probably should, be said. But this is not the place for a full-fledged introduction to the 
thought of these constructivist theorists. Rather, this dissertation concerns criteria of 
justification of moral norms and principles of justice. That is, it focuses on conditions 
of  justifiability  in  moral  and  political  theorizing,  rather  than  on  substantive  moral 
norms or principles of justice. The topic of my dissertation is a rather vexata quaestio 
for philosophers: the question of objectivity of moral and political claims. My aim is to 
(try to) show that, in moral and political theorizing, constructivism can provide a ro-
bust notion of objectivity. Put in other words, constructivism can support the universal-
ity of certain moral and political claims. My project consists in defining constructivism 
in such a way that it could be possible to provide a robust conception of objectivity, 
which does not ground moral claims on the existence of ethical objects that are inde-
pendent of us, but rather on a specific response of agents to plain facts of the world 
(even though without reducing moral facts to plain facts).
3. Constructivism and Objectivity
Constructivists  claim  that  moral  norms  or  principles  of  justice  are  justified 
(namely, there are reasons for endorsing those principles as guidelines and employing 
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them in our normative evaluations) when they are issued by a suitably specified pro-
cedure of construction. This procedure is thought as a device that allows for the selec-
tion of valid normative principles.
Constructivists share moral realism’s aim of producing a robust notion of ob-
jectivity: both the constructivist and the realist admit the possibility of objective moral 
norms or principles of justice. But the realist and the constructivist disagree about the 
kind of mind-independence the subject matter of moral and political theorizing has, 
and about what makes objective our moral claims. While realism requires strong com-
mitments to an order of moral facts or properties that exists independently of us, con-
structivism aims at ontological parsimony about these facts or properties. Constructiv-
ists claim that moral facts or properties exist, but they depend on our conception of 
them. In this sense, constructivism amounts to an anti-realist position.
Many non-cognitivist approaches to normative theory raise the same objection 
against the metaphysical commitments that realism implies. Consider theories that op-
pose realism like moral expressivism33 or error theory.34 Expressivists claim that our 
moral evaluations are expressions of some non-cognitive attitudes. Different people 
might have different attitudes towards the same object. And they might as well have 
different  attitudes  towards the same action or political  institution.  Accordingly,  the 
same action can be considered right for some and wrong for others. What makes things 
33 Contemporary views of this kind include Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism and Allan Gib-
bard’s norm-expressivism. Simon Blackburn,  Spreading the Word,  New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press,  1984;  Ruling Passions,  Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1998. Allan Gibbard,  Wise 
Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
34 John Mackie and Richard Joyce are the two main error theorists in moral philosophy. John L. 
Mackie, Ethics: Inventing right and wrong, Oxford: Penguin Books, 1977. Richard Joyce, The 
Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
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right and wrong, or just and unjust, depends upon processes of attitudes formation, in-
fluenced in their turn by processes of socialization, cultural elements, geographical cir-
cumstances and so on. Error theorists, on the other hand, claim that even if our moral 
discourse  has  some  realist  pretensions,  these  are  just  an  illusion.  If  there  were 
something like moral facts or properties they would be of a kind really different from 
other more familiar objects in the world. Realists have to prove how it is possible for 
such bizarre ethical entities to exist.
Constructivists share expressivists’ anti-realist worries about the metaphysical 
extravagance of moral realism. They agree with expressivists on the fact that judg-
ments do not refer to a pre-given order of moral properties. But constructivists do not 
renounce to the project of a cognitivist-objectivist account of moral and political theor-
izing. Constructivism represents an intermediate position since it partly accepts a real-
ist claim (there are facts of the matter about morality) and an anti-realist claim (facts of 
the matter about morality are worked out by a function of our practical reasoning) at 
the same time. Constructivism, then, is a form of irrealist cognitivism.35
Whether or not it is possible to keep these two claims together depends upon 
the definition of the procedure of construction and its criteria of objectivity. Here, the 
problem does not consist in defining what makes certain moral principles correct ones. 
As already said, it is the procedure that makes certain judgments correct. Rather, the is-
sues are, first, how a procedure is able to yield justified moral principles, and, second, 
what makes a procedure the correct one for yielding justified moral principles. They 
are different problems, even if they are related.
The selection of a procedure has a bearing on the kind of principles we get, 
35 For a discussion of cognitivism and irrealism see John Skorupski, “Irrealist Cognitivism,” 
Ratio 12, 1999
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and, consequently, on the objective status of the claims we are going to make. Prin-
ciples are valid if yielded by a correct procedure. There are different strategies to justi-
fy procedure of construction, as well as different forms of constructivism. We can have 
procedures embedding theoretical  considerations (such as the coherence among the 
elements of an overall system of thoughts), empirical considerations (such as the factu-
al circumstances in which agents perform morally relevant actions), or a combination 
of them. In this  dissertation,  I  will  take into consideration the most prominent  ex-
amples of constructivist theory – or those so considered. My intention is not to provide 
a full analysis of all the possible constructivist theories, but rather to argue that con-
structivism is the most tenable strategy for justifying our normative claims in moral 
and political theorizing.
4. Some Caveat
It might be helpful to clarify some points in order to prevent misunderstandings 
about the kind of approach I am presenting and the way I use certain philosophical 
terms.
First of all, I take “constructivism” to be a theory about the foundations of mor-
al and political theorizing. I do not provide any substantive normative theory. In this 
sense, my aim is quite narrow in scope: I claim that constructivism is a theory about 
the way we should think about the nature of claims and principles in moral and politic-
al theorizing, and not a theory about what one ought or ought not to do.
Second, my reading of constructivism is not to be associated with any relativist 
or  skeptic  view  of  morality.  Such  a  joining  would  produce  social  constructivism, 
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namely the claim that moral norms or principles of justice are social conventions or 
something similar to norms of etiquette. On the contrary, I claim that the version of 
constructivism here defended can account for the objectivity of normative claims, but 
without commitments to any moral realist or platonic view of the foundations of eth-
ics.
Third, for those who think that there is a distinction to be made between moral 
and political theory, I need to add the following caveat: I am well aware that moral the-
ory and political theory constitute two different realms. Moral theory is concerned with 
what is right and wrong, or just and unjust. For simplicity we can think of moral theory 
as having two branches. On one side there is  ethical theory, where questions of right 
and wrong apply to actions (behaviors performed on a particular occasion) and prac-
tices (behaviors done repeatedly over time) performed by individual agents. On the 
other side, there is  political morality  that I take to be concerned with the moral per-
missibility of political, legal and social structures, namely with the norms that regulate 
our public affairs, our living together as members of a society. I accept the idea that 
principles of justice apply to the basic structure of a society, while moral principles ap-
ply to individuals. But this kind of considerations, I believe, does not have any bearing 
on the foundations of both moral and political theorizing. My point here is a methodo-
logical one: I am concerned with the way in which we should think about what one 
ought to do, either at the social or individual level. So, I will keep referring to moral 
norms and principles of justice in order to account for the distinction.
Fourth, note that when I use the world “normativity”, and the correspondent 
adjective “normative”, I am not referring to any general theory of the practical reasons 
that people have for doing what they do, or to any general view. I limit my inquiry to 
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moral and political realm. Therefore, in the following pages, normative principles are 
guidelines for regulating our behavior on matters of social justice or general morally, 
while normative reasons are either moral reasons or reasons of justice, namely normat-
ive considerations in favor of action, respectively at the individual level and at the so-
cial level.
Fifth,  other labels  often associated to constructivism, namely  contractualism 
and  proceduralism,  might  be  misleading.  Constructivism  is  usually  defined  as  a 
method that specifies in which conditions moral agents can work out justified moral 
norms  and  principles  of  justice.  In  some cases  it  is  assimilated  to  social  contract 
theories, in others it is used to qualify as ‘procedural’ a kind a practical reasoning. I do 
not deny these two options. Indeed, it is possible to find plausible theories that take 
constructivism in  one  or  both  of  these  interpretations.  Contractualism is  a  type  of 
ethical or political view that tries to justify moral norms and principles by some appeal 
to a rational or reasonable agreement among moral agents in suitable circumstances. 
The  outcome  of  the  agreement  so  achieved  provides  criteria  of  justification  and 
hypothetical  acceptance  for  moral  norms  and  principles  of  justice.  Forms  of 
contractualism  vary  depending  on  the  way  the  agreement  is  defined  and  the 
philosophical  aims it  has.36 The focus of contractualism,  then,  is on what moral or 
political principles are or on whether they can be proved to be objective. The kind of 
constructivism I want to defend, instead, is a broader view. Not only it addresses the 
epistemological  question  about  the  justification  of  moral  norms  and  political 
36 A taxonomy of the varieties of contractualism is not required in order to distinguish this view 
from the constructivist view I shall present. For a general discussion on this issue, see Geof-
frey Sayre-McCord, “Contractarianism” in Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Eth-
ical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
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principles; it also aims at providing an ontological view about the existence and the 
nature of moral properties and facts, and about the related semantic issue concerning 
the  moral  discourse.  Contractualists,  instead,  seem to  remain  silent  on  ontological 
questions.
Proceduralism, on the other hand, is a normative thesis about the content of 
principles of justice: moral agents elaborate principles that all can accept through an 
appropriate device of deliberation that minimizes the normative load of its premises.37 
Can constructivism be reduced to one or both of these substantive theories? Or, does 
constructivism constitute an independent position? Moreover, are there constructivist 
theories that do not necessarily endorse either contractualism or proceduralism?
Here,  it  suffices  to  say  that,  as  far  as  I  see,  constructivism  is  a  form  of 
proceduralism: there are no constructivist theories that do not involve some procedure 
of construction. Some contractualists, then, are constructivist insofar as they rely on 
some procedure for finding an agreement  on a set of principles.  But not all  of the 
contractarians  are  constructivist:  for  instance,  John  Locke  holds  that  social  and 
political institutions are created by an agreement,  but the agreement itself  does not 
fully  justify  institutions  so constructed.  On Locke’s  account,  human beings  have a 
special commitment to God to be taken into account for assessing the justice of social 
and  political  institutions.38 This  view  might  be  defined  as  a  combination  of  a 
contractualist  epistemology  with  a  realist  metaphysics.  On  the  other  hand,  not  all 
constructivists  are contractarian.  Immanuel  Kant, assuming he was a constructivist, 
37 On minimalism in proceduralism moral and political theorizing, see Emanuela Ceva, “Plural 
Values and Heterogeneous Situation” European Journal of Political Theory, 6, 2007.
38 John Locke, Two Treaties on Government, 1690, in Political Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997.
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does not ground his view on a notion of agreement or contract in his a priori account of 
morality.39
A  last  point.  I  must  warn  those  political  philosophers  who  think  that 
metanormative questions are irrelevant for normative theorizing. In this dissertation I 
will enter what Gerald A. Cohen has sarcastically defined “realism/anti-realism/quasi-
realism/a-little-bit-of-realism-here-not-so-much-of-realism-there  controversy.”40 I  fail 
to  see  why  political  philosophers  should  remain  silent  on  questions  about  the 
foundations  of  their  conceptions,  hiding  themselves  behind  philosophically  bizarre 
expressions such as “this is common sense” or “that is a shared intuition about justice” 
or “this conclusion would be counterintuitive”. Whose common sense is this? Shared 
by whom? For whom is it counterintuitive? Unfortunately, there are not plain vanilla 
thoughts or assumptions that cannot be challenged. I could probably fail in my attempt 
to establish firm grounds for moral and political theorizing, but at least I would not be 
embarrassed when somebody asked me why I think that what I think about morality is 
right.
5. Plan of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided in six parts. Chapter One and Chapter Three are 
supposed to set the theoretical devices for the discussion that follows in Chapter Three 
and  Chapter  Four.  Chapter  One  discusses  two  basic  concepts,  namely  norms  and 
reasons, and their constructivist understanding. Once provided these interpretations, it 
39 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysical of Morals, 1785, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998.
40 Gerald Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 212.
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is  then  possible  to  address  one  of  the main  points  of  this  dissertation,  that  is,  the 
question of objectivity (Chapter Two). Chapter Three presents a rough definition of 
constructivism and presents the materials out of which it is possible to construct moral 
norms  and  principles  of  justice.  Chapter  Four  presents  some criticism to  classical 
constructivist  views.  Finally,  in  Chapter  Five,  I  present  a  re-definition  of 
constructivism  and  a  possible  argument  supporting  this  view.  In  the  Appendix,  I 
defend  constructivism  from  a  new  criticism  pressed  by  Gerald  A.  Cohen  against 
constructivism.
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Chapter One
Norms, Reasons and 
Constructivism
1. Norms
Most of the people abide by some moral norms. Usually, we do not flip a coin 
when we make decisions about how to behave towards others. What we usually do is 
to take into account some general rule that guides our choices. This kind of rules plays 
a  function  similar  to  language’s  rules:  they  provide  standard  of  grammatical 
correctness for sentences. All those speaking a certain language conform to its rules for 
holding  a  meaningful  conversation.  However,  the  rules  that  regulating  our  moral 
conducts do not seem to be as restricted in scope as rules of language: the grammatical 
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rules of a language X hold for the X-speakers and do not hold for the speakers whose 
mother tongue is not X. Nevertheless, the grammatical rules of the language X would 
hold for all if they were speaking in X. This means that the grammatical correctness of 
a sentence, for instance, does not refer to an ‘absolute’ truth, since it always depends 
on the language we are considering. Nevertheless, its correctness might be said to be 
invariant with respect to the speaker’s mother tongue or speaker’s attitudes.
Does the same apply to moral  norms? Most  of the people,  if  asked,  would 
probably say that the rules of language are anything but a matter of convention created 
for practical tasks (such as communication). However, some of the people would be 
less inclined to think the same about rules that regulate our behaviors, namely moral 
norms. And the same argument can be made for those norms that regulate our affairs at 
the  social  level,  namely  principles  of  justice.  Both  moral  norms  and principles  of 
justice seem to impact on people’s life in a way that other kinds of rules do not. Moral 
norms and principles  of justice seem to claim a kind of authority  and a degree of 
intersubjective  validity  that  other  standards of evaluation  do not claim.  What  is  so 
special about them?
Some people think that moral norms are as conventional as norms of etiquette 
or game’s rules:41 they are a product of socialization, culture, historical events and the 
like. On this view, one might say that people generally disapprove of a certain action in 
a  given community,  while  would approve of  it  were they belonging  to  a  different 
culture. Therefore, the fact that certain moral or political norms are universally valid is 
anything but an illusion. Accordingly, on this view to say that something is objective 
hold just within the context we are referring to when we affirm that something is right 
41 Philippa Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,”  The Philosophical Re-
view, 81, 1972, pp. 305-316.
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or wrong.
However, this seems to contradict  our intuitive understanding of the bearing 
that these kinds of norms have on us. In everyday evaluation we show ourselves to be 
confident in the principles adopted as general standard of evaluation, as if they were, 
without doubt, the most reliable. When we say that an action is  wrong  or a political 
institution is  unjust, sometimes we are just presenting a personal opinion, but we are 
often  claiming  that  the  action  in  question  is  objectively  wrong, or  the  political 
institution  is  really  unjust. Ceteris  paribus,  anyone  who performed  that  action,  or 
support that political institution, would be doing something wrong.  Thus to say that 
something is morally  objective  seems to be a matter of fact rather than opinion. At 
least, the judgment that something is morally wrong makes a stronger claim than other 
kinds of value judgments. Moral norms seem to be universal in application. But, what 
makes an action objectively wrong, wrong for everyone and not just for someone?
Showing up in shorts to a formal dinner; touching the ball with a hand for a 
striker in a soccer game; misspelling a word: they are all forms of violation of some 
rule. Thus, it could be said that I am behaving inappropriately, I made a foul or I am 
not competent doing this kind of things. Even if I am doing something wrong, these 
wrongs, arguably, will never be considered as bad as moral wrongs. If I punched the 
person with whom I am discussing because she disagrees with what I am saying, my 
action  would  not  be  just  inappropriate,  a  foul  or  a  matter  of  incompetence.  The 
performance of such an action would be considered morally wrong.42 In other words, it 
would be something wrong from a general, moral point of view. At least intuitively, 
42 Here I am assuming that the act of punching somebody is not an act of self-defense or aimed 
at preventing worse consequences. I take the action of punching my opponent as a deliberate 
piece of cruelty.
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this  seems to be something more serious and important  than a matter  of etiquette, 
game’s rules or grammar competence. If somebody misspelled my name I would just 
think: “Come on! That’s just a mistake…”. But if somebody punched me in the face, 
or somebody enters my private residence, I would rather think: “This aggression will 
not stand… will not stand!” – unless I am a nihilist and I believe in nothing. Moral 
norms seem to be overriding with respect to other (non-moral) considerations. What 
makes some wrongs more wrong than others?
Probably, it is the fact that, if asked, I would not be able to justify my behavior 
to others; at best, I could come up with something like an explanation of what I have 
done, but this would not account for the justification of my behavior: the fact that I 
was really upset and angry with that person, for instance, could provide an explanation 
of why I did what I have done, but it would not account for the moral rightness or 
permissibility of resorting to violence toward that person who is disagreeing with what 
I am saying. I would not be able to offer any reason that makes my action morally 
acceptable or permissible. Put in other terms, the fact that somebody is disagreeing 
with what I am saying is not a good kind of consideration – the reason – that makes 
my punching her morally right or permissible. Moral norms seem to have a broader 
scope of application than other conventional rules. Everyone able to understand what 
morality requires her would be justified in affirming or believing it or acting on that 
norm and, if she does not, she would betray some confusion. Like in the language case, 
the objectivity of a moral claim can be considered as invariant with respect to, say, the 
moral agent’s geographical origins or moral agent’s attitudes. Thus to punch somebody 
in the face is morally wrong here as well as everywhere else.
Moral norms seem to be justifiable through certain moral reasons that make 
34
them universally applicable (they apply to all that are able to understand the supporting 
reasons for a rule of conduct) and prevailing on other kind of norms (moral norms are 
seen as important when there are strong reasons for their endorsement). What are these 
moral reasons about?
2. Reasons
Consider again the judgment “to punch those who disagree with me is morally 
wrong.” Most of the people accept this judgment as correct independently of who is 
asserting it and of the circumstances in which the action is performed. What makes the 
case that to punch one’s opponents is to be judged as morally wrong by everybody?
One way to address this question is to formulate a general principle that univer-
sally applies to agents and from which to draw the conclusion that to punch those who 
disagree with me is wrong. So, Kantian-inspired deontological theories, for instance, 
would consider whether all rational persons could endorse this judgment, or whether to 
respect one’s humanity could require not harming people. Consequentialist theorists 
like utilitarians, instead, would judge whether actions such as harming people would 
make them happier or improve people’s wellbeing. And the fact that different sorts of 
theorists (except nihilism) converge on the same conclusion will not be surprising: to 
punch one’s opponents is morally wrong. Yet, the question of why things can be right 
and wrong seems to remain unresolved. Indeed, one can push further the question and 
ask: why to respect one’s humanity or to promote people’s happiness is right or mor-
ally  required? Why is  the adopted normative  criterion  the right  one? Someone in-
trigued to know why these things are wrong, might keep asking: what is constitutive of 
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that action that makes it unacceptable from a moral point of view? Is it the mere capa-
city to think about it? Or something different, something independent of our capacity 
to think about questions of right and wrong, or just and unjust?
In order to address this question, we have to look for what Christine Korsgaard 
calls “the sources of normativity.”43 Korsgaard’s philosophical inquiry moves from the 
“normative question:”44 why must one do what moral norms prescribe? Why ought I to 
abstain from punching the person who is disagreeing with me if I can get better of her? 
This question is twofold. On the one hand, the normative question is concerned with 
motivation a person has for being moral. On the other hand, it can be a deeper question 
about the reason why moral norms hold for a person independently of what her motiv-
ations (for or against behaving morally) are. The normative question arises when one 
sees the objectivity of a moral norm, but fails to conform her behavior to that norm. 
On Korsgaard’s view, it is necessary to understand what makes a norm a moral norm. 
Or, in more Korsgaardian terms, we need to account for the authority of moral norms, 
inquiring the sources of normativity. We have to see how something, whatever it is, 
can become what one ought (or ought not) to do, namely the reason why something is 
morally  right  (or  wrong).  For  instance,  unless  they  are  nihilists  (and so,  for  them 
everything goes), people would say that there are no moral reasons whatsoever for 
punching those who disagree with me. What does “there are no moral reasons” mean 
though?
When something is morally right (or wrong) it means that there are moral reas-
ons to do (or not to do) it. To say that there are moral reasons to do (or not to do) 
43 Christine  M.  Korsgaard,  The Sources  of  Normativity,  Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1996.
44 Ibidem, p. 10-21.
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something it simply means that there are (or would be) certain facts of the matter about 
morality that provide an agent with moral reasons for (or against) it. One might think 
that what is in need of explanation here is what is like for a plain fact to count as a 
moral reason (or as a reason of justice), that is, how something can be the relevant kind 
of consideration for or against something in the moral (or political) domain. What is 
problematic here is the same idea of a reason, which, as Thomas Scanlon argues, is a 
primitive, since it cannot be explained in any further terms, besides saying that it is a 
kind of considerations that counts for and against what we ought to do. And if one 
keeps asking, “how does a reason counts for something”, there is anything to say but 
invoking more reasons.45 What might be in need of explanation is how a reason can be 
generated and when a reason can be a good reason.
One might think that reflecting upon all relevant available information about 
ourselves and the circumstances in which we are, and taking our reasoning to be – at 
least hypothetically – faultless, we should be able to recognize what moral reasons we 
have. But this might not be enough for an account of good reasons, namely those reas-
ons that really count and count for all. After all, coming to see that I have a reason for 
doing something does not necessarily entails that I am acting on and from a good reas-
on. But this way of proceeding, then, tends to conflict two related but different ques-
tions, namely justification and motivation. One thing is a consideration that shows the 
moral rightness or permissibility of an action (or the political rightness or acceptability 
of a political institution). Another thing is to be moved to act (or to abide by the terms 
of a political institution). And it might not be the case that justification and motivation 
45 Thomas M. Scanlon,  What We Owe To Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1998, p. 2.
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rely on the same set of reasons.46 To see that I have a reason to do something, namely 
to recognize the normative force of a particular consideration, does not explain why the 
normative force arises from that specific consideration at all. Indeed, I might fail to see 
that I have a reason not to punch those who disagree with what I am saying simply be-
cause I grew up in a very violent environment, where rhetorical skills and the force of 
the better argument are overruled by physical endowments. Thus, failing in being mo-
tivated by moral reasons because of bad up-bringing or because of other kind of non-
moral considerations (like overwhelming subjective preferences), does not defeat the 
normative force of the reasons I was supposed to act upon in order to behave morally. 
The normative force is not a question of motivation, rather of justification, namely of 
what makes things right and wrong, and makes them so in an objective way. Again, 
what sort of reasons makes things objectively right and wrong? From where do these 
reasons come? How can they justify anything? In order to address these questions we 
have to understand how something can be a reason, whether what counts as a reason is 
some fact that belongs to the fabric of the world, and so independent of human beings, 
or whether a reason is a sort of consideration that depends on us, on our cognitive ca-
pacity to figure out what one ought to do. In more philosophical terms, we have to see 
what are the metaphysical commitments and the practical implications of the idea of a 
reason.
The capacity to resolve practical problems through reasoning is generally known as 
practical reason. “Practical” here refers to the fact that the cognitive process aims at 
work out what one ought to do, a form of reasoning that weights moral reasons for and 
against a certain action. Practical reason is used in opposition to  theoretical reason, 
46 I will not address this point here.
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which is a form of reasoning deputed to explain what happened and foresee what is 
going to happen. While theoretical reason is concerned with matters of fact and their 
explanation and the reasons we have for believing, practical reason is concerned with 
matters of value and the reasons we have to act. Both reasoning capacities can produce 
objective outcomes, but the reasons that make a belief true are not the same kind of 
reasons that make an action right. Both theoretical and practical reason are attitudes, 
but while theoretical reason relies on an impersonal point of view about how the world 
is (and it produces changes in our beliefs), practical reason endorses a first-personal 
point  of  view about  how the  world  ought  to  be  (and  it  produces  changes  in  our 
intentions).47
What provides practical reasons though? Reasons for beliefs are given by facts 
of the matter about how the world is. If practical reasons are different from reasons for 
believing, it might be the case that there is a set of facts (or some set of properties of 
plain  facts)  which  are  different  from plain  facts  as  we  ordinary  conceive  of  and 
empirically know them, and provide this special class of normative considerations. On 
this view, our theorizing about what we ought to do should discover these facts and 
their properties, and so account for the objectivity of our moral judgment in the same 
way  we  account  for  the  objectivity  of  judgments  about  the  empirical  world. 
Nevertheless,  our  empirically  informed  view  of  the  world  would  push  us  in  the 
direction of ruling out everything that cannot be empirically explained and known. So, 
we  have  to  face  these  two  strains  of  our  theorizing:  on  the  one  hand,  moral 
appearances show objective pretensions; on the other hand, they cannot go against our 
general empirical understanding of the world. So we need both internal (relative to 
47 Gilbert Harman, Change in View, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1986, p. 74-78.
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moral domain) and external (relative to the world) accommodation for accounting for 
those reasons that make our moral claims objective.
Moral reasons make moral claims objective. In other words, what is prescribed 
or judged by the content of moral claims is made objective – the thing that ought to be  
done  – by normative considerations,  that is,  reasons.  There is an intuitive sense of 
reasons that refers to the one’s interests in performing an action. In this sense, reasons 
are called hypothetical reasons, that is, reasons that depend upon what one wants. For 
instance, if you want to buy luxury goods do not study philosophy (your desire for 
luxury goods gives you a reason not to dedicate your life to a non lucrative activity). 
But there is another,  more stringent sense of reasons that has to do with the moral 
domain.  On this interpretation,  reasons are categorical reasons, that is,  reasons that 
hold independently of what one wants. For instance you ought not to punch those who 
disagree with what you are saying, even if you get better of them. The latter reading 
conveys the kind of authoritative, good, objective moral reasons we are looking for. 
Constructivists claim to provide a tenable account of the generation of moral reasons.
 
3. Constructivism
The historical roots of constructivism can be found in Kant’s philosophy of 
mathematics.  On Kant’s  view,  mathematical  truths  are mental  constructions.  In his 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant faces the question of the nature of these truths by asking 
how we can know them only thinking about them and, nonetheless, correctly apply 
them to the world. Moreover, we cannot do without them in order to grasp reality. His 
solution  is  notorious.  First,  all  our  experiences  are  possible  in  virtue  of  a  priori 
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categories, namely space and time. This is not a fact of the matter about experience; 
rather it is a pre-condition for having any experience of the physical world, which is 
made  up of  facts  and properties  of  facts  whose existence  does  not  depend on  us. 
Second, while geometric laws structure the space, arithmetic laws structure the time. 
These laws are derived from the very nature of our thought. Therefore, they are a priori 
laws,  and experience  has to  conform to them.  Kant’s  view was famously defeated 
when  Albert  Einstein  applied  Bernhard  Riemann’s  mathematics  to  the  theory  of 
general  relativity.  This  proved  not  only  that  the  physical  world  could  be  better 
described by non-Euclidean mathematics, but also, and more importantly, that we are 
capable  of  more  than  one  pure  geometry.  Thus  we  are  capable  of  different 
“constructions” of the world, reading Kant’s a priori categories as examples of possible 
constructions.
The same problem applies to moral and political theorizing when we endorse a 
constructivist view. Now, it is not the aim of this dissertation to discuss whether Kant 
actually held a constructivist view in ethics.48 To be true, constructivists of all kinds 
share Kant’s autonomy ideal,  namely that free and rational people are able to give 
norms to themselves and to regulate their behavior accordingly. Obviously, this is not 
enough for making the case for a constructivist view. The problem is, rather, how to 
account for the objectivity of moral claims on constructivist grounds.
Objectivity in moral and political theorizing has more than one meaning in the 
philosophical debate. In its intuitive sense, objectivity means non-subjective. When I 
say “x is objectively so and so”, I mean that being so and so of x does not depend on 
my personal way of seeing things. Objectivity does not mean that merely “agreement.” 
48 On this point see Larry Krasnoff,  How Kantian is constructivism?, “How Kantian is Con-
structivism?”, in Kant~Studien, 90, 1999, 385-409.
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People might agree on something, but this is not enough to make objective the object 
of their agreement. For instance, many persons dislike Pasolini’s movies, judging those 
movies absurd. Notwithstanding a large number of people think so, this is not enough 
to make their judgment objective. Indeed, some others think that Pasolini’s movies are 
extraordinary, but inaccessible for those not competent about that kind of sophisticated 
movies. One may conclude that on this kind of evaluations objectivity is simply not 
achievable: “the beauty is in the eyes of the beholder”.  This might be the case for 
moral evaluations as well.
Moral non-cognitivists support the view that moral claims are not objective, 
because, similarly at other kind of evaluation they do not report facts but expressions 
of one’s attitude of approval and disapproval.49 Some philosophers might concede that 
moral claims are - in some narrow sense – objective. But they ground objectivity on 
facts  about  subjective  desires  or  inclinations.50 Quietists  think  that  there  are  no 
interesting  ways  of  distinguishing  discourses  in  point  of  objective  status. 
Constructivists deny all these positions.
Constructivists  are  concerned  with  the  problem  of  what  makes  something 
objective, whether it is a matter of fact (if there is something in the world, somehow 
independent  of us, that makes things right and wrong) or a valid method of moral 
thinking (the way we come to know when things are right and wrong). The first one 
might imply an ontological reading of the question of objectivity, whether the question 
of rightness and wrongness depends on moral facts or moral properties of facts whose 
49 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1936. Simon Blackburn, 
Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt  
Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
50 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem. Maldon, MA: Blackwell, 1994.
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existence does not depend on one’s conceiving about them. The second question focus 
on an epistemological sense of objectivity, whether the way we assess what counts as 
moral facts is not influenced by one’s feelings and opinions. As I shall show in the 
next  Chapter,  the  constructivist  follows  the  second  line  of  reasoning:  there  are 
objective moral facts and what makes them objective is a valid procedure of reasoning. 
On  this  interpretation,  moral  claims  (things  like  judgments,  utterances,  beliefs,  or 
propositions) are objective when they are advanced at the light of a general principle 
issued when issued by a suitably specified procedure of construction. And one is said 
to  be  justified  in  holding  the  principles  she  holds  if  the  procedure  working  out 
principles  is  a valid one. What makes valid  a procedure of construction is  a more 
complex problem that I address in the next chapters.
In ethical and political theorizing, constructivists oppose both the ontological 
commitments of moral realism and the non-cognitivist pessimism about moral know-
ledge. Constructivism is the claim that the objectivity of moral claims is based on cer-
tain procedures of practical reasoning, which derive from our reason. According to 
constructivists, moral claims are about moral facts. These facts provide reasons for the 
objectivity of moral claims not because they are already moral, but because of a certain 
procedure. As a preliminary, constructivism is the claim that 
some facts provide moral reasons or reasons of justice because certain  
principles,  which are worked out by a suitably specified  procedure  of  
construction, confer reason-giving status to those facts.
The constructivist can introduce a conception of moral facts that is less com-
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mittal from an ontological point of view than realism, without involving strange onto-
logical assumptions or obscure accounts of properties. On the epistemological level, it 
provides a better ground for justifying moral claims, trough a different conception of 
objectivity. Realists think that judging things right and wrong consists in describing or 
representing a moral reality. Accordingly, things are right or wrong independently of 
our thinking about them. So, the subject matter  of ethics is independent of us, and 
claims about it are objective, in a quite strong sense. Anti-realists believe that such 
moral judgments are worked out by some function of our reasoning; they are expres-
sion of our attitudes towards a factual reality. Accordingly, the way in which things can 
be right or wrong depends on our thinking about them. So, the subject matter of ethics 
is dependent on us, and claims about it are objective, only in a minimal sense. On my 
interpretation, constructivism represents the view claiming that the subject matter of 
ethics does depend on us and on the kind of inquiry we are pursuing, but claims about 
it are objective in quite a strong sense. For this reason, constructivism is considered a 
very instable position.
Constructivism denies that there exist a pre-given moral reality but claims the 
possibility of an objective ethical procedure of justification. Constructivism represents 
a cognitivist position in ethics (since it claims that moral claims can be true and false 
and, more generally, that there is moral knowledge), but does not endorse any meta-
physical commitment to a peculiar moral ontology. What constructivists are looking 
for is a single body of moral facts, worked out by some function of our reasoning. This 
function creates moral reality. And moral reality exists as far as agents of construction 
(reasoning creatures) exist. Put in other words, there are facts of the matter about mor-
ality, but these facts are not prior to, and independent of, our enquiring about them. 
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Thus, constructivism claims that there are moral facts, and they are the product of our 
functional reasoning for solving practical problems. In this way, constructivism tends 
to collapse the ontological question onto the epistemological one. Indeed, constructiv-
ists are objectivist on both the semantic and the epistemological levels, but not on the 
strong, ontological sense implied by ontological moral realism. This makes of con-
structivism a very problematic position.
Ontological  and epistemological  questions are detachable.  Ontological  ques-
tions regard the existence of moral facts, while epistemological questions are about 
what justifies moral claims. Indeed, one might affirm that justified moral claims are 
about moral facts whose existence does not depend on our knowledge. Realists claim 
that  normative principles refer to real,  non-constructed moral entities,  properties or 
facts. Constructivists deny this and claim that principles have normative significance 
for us because they are the product of our reasoning about practical problems. 51 
Stated in this way, constructivism could represent a genuine and independent 
position in the metaethical debate. Obviously, its independence is given by the way the 
procedure of construction or the pattern of practical reasoning is defined. Rawls, the 
most prominent constructivist  in the contemporary debate, defines the procedure of 
construction in terms of an “original position,” where the denizens of this initial choice 
situation are deprived of knowledge of their social status and natural abilities, hence 
equally situated in order to choose first principles of justice that could be accepted by 
51 Samuel Freeman argues that “[a]ccording to constructivism, objectivity of judgment [...] pre-
cedes the notion of moral validity or truth. Moral statements are sound or true, not it represent-
ing a prior order of moral facts but when they accord with principles that could or would be ac-
cepted by fully rational persons in an objective procedure of practical reasoning.” S. Freeman, 
“Introduction”, in  The Cambridge Companion to Rawls,  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003, p. 28.
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all.52 Unfortunately, Rawls is not clear on the metaethical view to which he is commit-
ted.53 It is sometimes claimed that constructivism is a form of realism; sometimes it is 
associated with anti-realism.  Korsgaard,  for instance,  defines her Rawlsian-inspired 
view as a “procedural realism.”54 Ronald Dworkin reads Rawls’s constructive method 
as anti-realist.55 Thomas Nagel discusses a form of normative realism often associate 
with constructivism.56 Also, non-natural moral realists like Scanlon are often associ-
ated with constructivism. Other constructivists lie in between these views.57 And there 
are other philosophers who present views similar to constructivism.58
In order to unpack these rough statements about a constructivist view, we need 
52 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, § 4.
53 Rawls does not define his theory as constructivist until his “Kantian Constructivism in Moral 
Theory” (Journal of Philosophy, LXXVII, 1980); later on, in Political Liberalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press 1996) he distinguishes between a moral and a political understand-
ings of constructivism, claiming that the latter is independent of the metaethical view that one 
endorses. Whether his moral interpretation of constructivism constitute a metaethical view is 
matter of discussion.
54 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 10-21.
55 R. Dworkin, “The Original Position”, in N. Daniels (ed.),  Reading Rawls,  Stanford Uni-
versity Press, Stanford, 1989.
56 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970, chapter 8.
57 See,  among  others,  Ronald  Milo,  “Contractarian  Constructivism”,  in  Journal  of  
Philosophy ,99, 1995. Onora O'Neill, “Constructivism VS. Contractualism”,  Ratio, 16, 2003; 
“Constructivism in Rawls and Kant,” in S.  Freeman,  (ed.),  The Cambridge Companion to  
Rawls,  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2003.  A  new  constructivist  wave  is 
rapresented  by  Aaron  James  (“Constructivism  about  Practical  Reasons,”  Philosophy  & 
Phenomenological  Research  74  (2007),  pp.  302–325)  and  Sharon  Street  (“Constructivism 
about Reasons” in Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics,  Vol.  3,  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2008).
58 Take, for instance, John Skorupski, “Irrealist Cognitivism,” Ratio, 12, 1999. See also, John 
Skorupski, “Reason and Reasons” in B. Gaut and G. Cullity (eds.),  Morality and Practical  
Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.
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to have a better definition of what constructivism is about and its relations to other 
metaethical positions.  In the next chapter I discuss the notion of objectivity  a con-
structivist view can aspire at. Then I address the difficulties related to formulate a pre-
cise definition of constructivism as a genuine and independent view.
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Chapter Two
Constructivism and Objectivity
1. The Question of Objectivity
The notion of objectivity  in moral theory concerns the nature of our moral 
evaluations. When we say that moral claims (things like moral judgments, utterances, 
beliefs,  or  propositions)  are  objective  usually  we  mean  that  they  are  unbiased  or 
impartial. Notwithstanding its intuitive understanding, the notion of moral objectivity 
can assume three different senses, according to the level of inquiry we are pursuing. 
First, in the semantic sense, moral objectivity is concerned with the function of moral 
discourse, whether it states moral facts or it has some other non-descriptive role. On 
this  level,  objectivity  is  about  the  truth-aptness  of  moral  claims.  Second,  in  the 
ontological sense, moral objectivity is about the question of existence of moral facts, 
or moral properties of non-moral facts, namely those things that make a moral claims 
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objective in the semantic sense. Third, in the epistemological sense, moral objectivity 
is related to the method of justification of moral claims. On this level, objectivity is 
about the validity of our method for judging, affirming or believing something as right 
and wrong. Depending on the way we address the question of objectivity on one or 
more of these three levels, we define our view of the objectivity of a moral claim. Let 
us  see  how  these  notions  apply  in  moral  theory,  following  some  of  the  classical 
approaches.59
Suppose, for instance, that our ordinary moral claims state moral facts. On the 
semantic understanding, a moral judgment can be objective if it describes or represents 
some moral facts or some moral properties of facts. So judgments of the kind “x is F” 
(where ‘x’ is either a person or an action,  and ‘F’ is an evaluative predicate – like 
‘good’ – or a normative conclusion – like ‘ought to be done’) are objective depending 
on what ‘x,’ ‘F,’ and ‘is’ mean and whether, as a matter of fact, ‘x’ has the property of 
being  F. For instance, judgments like “to punch those who disagree with what I am 
saying is wrong” state moral facts. In the case at hand, the propositional content of the 
judgment refers to a moral property, the one of being wrong, that is exemplified by the 
action of punching those who disagree with what I am saying. This thesis is usually 
labeled as semantic moral realism. But whether or not there is such a property, whether 
‘F’ exists, and whether its existence is independent of the way we conceive of such a 
property, are questions that cannot be solved by semantic analysis. The question of 
59 In the following paragraphs, my aim is not to provide a complete and satisfactory summary 
of the contemporary metaethical debate. In the last years, the approaches that have been dis-
cussed are so many that is quite impossible to come up even with a rough overview. My aim is 
just to give some example of what (I think) are classical understanding of the notion of ob-
jectivity in moral theory. This will hopefully provide the basis for a better understanding of the 
constructivist view.
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existence  of  moral  facts  and  moral  properties  is  a  metaphysical  or  an  ontological 
question.
Suppose, then, that there exist a pre-given moral reality. On this view, the way 
in which things can be right and wrong does not depend upon our thinking about them, 
or upon the attitudes that we form towards them. This view is generally labeled as 
ontological moral realism. Moral realists of this sort claim that there are moral entities 
(reasons), properties (rightness or goodness), and facts, and they are independent of 
people’s evidence for them, that is, their existence does not depend upon the way we 
know them.60 These moral facts make things right and wrong, and so provide agents 
with the justificatory reasons we are looking for. Moral facts constitute a single body 
of truths of the matter about morality. They are similar to the material objects of the 
outside world, as described by the fundamental laws of physics, i.e. something that 
cannot depend on one’s conceiving of them. And the propositions that report those 
facts are fundamental because their validity is not derived from any other truths or any 
logically prior elements. If there are indisputable facts of the matter about morality, 
and they are independent of our conceiving of them, judgments will be objective when 
they  track  these  pre-given  (i.e.  conceiving-independent)  moral  facts.  Accordingly, 
moral facts are not the product of construction or social conventions; rather, they are 
discovered by moral agents and serve as moral constraints on one’s possible actions.
All moral realists claim that there are moral facts, which are state of affairs 
where moral properties are instantiated. But they disagree about whether these facts 
60 There are many versions of moral realism. See Richard Boyd, “Hot to Be a Moral Realist”, 
in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.),  Essays in Moral Realism, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1988. David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity  Press,  1989.  Russ  Shafer-Landau,  Moral  Realism:  A Defense,  Oxford,  2003.  Peter 
Railton, “Moral Realism”, Philosophical Review, 95, 1986.
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are either  natural  or non-natural.  While the so-called naturalist  realists  believe that 
moral facts  can be known by means of scientific inquiry (in other terms, there are 
moral properties and they are part of the fabric of world), non-naturalist realists claim 
that moral facts cannot be reduced to natural ones (so they are sui generis). In the first 
case,  moral  facts  are  the  subject  matter  of  a  posteriori  investigation:  they  can  be 
discovered by the means of empirical analysis. In the second case, moral facts can be 
inquired a priori: they are analytical truths, known by conceptual analysis. Whatever 
these moral facts could possibly be, on this account the way in which something can 
count as a reason can be expressed by the following claim: some facts provide moral  
reasons (or reasons of justice) because some basic moral properties confer a reason 
giving status to those facts.
A  strong  form  of  moral  realism  reduces  the  third  level  of  philosophical 
analysis,  the  epistemological  one,  to  the  ontological  question.  In  other  words,  the 
epistemological  question  of  the  justification  of  moral  claims  and  the  kind  of 
knowledge we can  have  of  them is  accounted  for  by the  ontology of  morals.  For 
instance, on an ontological realist account of morality, a moral judgment is objectively 
justified if and only if there is some relation between a moral judgment and the moral 
independent reality that that judgment is supposed to represent or describe. Also, the 
semantic function of moral discourse is accounted for by the ontological question. The 
truth-aptness of our moral claims is made possible by the existence of moral facts and 
their properties tracked by moral claims. Thus, “x is F”, assuming that ‘F’ exists (in 
some sense), is true and we are justified in affirming and believing that “x is F.”
One  worry  about  this  view  concerns  its  commitment  to  the  existence  of 
inexplicable metaphysical entities. The existence of moral entities is so peculiar as to 
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be  quite  obscure.  John  Mackie,  for  example,  in  his  Ethics:  Inventing  Right  and 
Wrong,61 argues powerfully against the “queerness” of entities such as objective moral 
values. “If there were objective values, they would be entities or qualities or relations 
of  a  very  strange  sort,  utterly  different  from  anything  else  in  the  universe”,  and 
knowable  through  “some  special  faculty  of  moral  perception  or  intuition,  utterly 
different from our ordinary ways of knowing anything else.”62 Moral claims, he argues, 
do not describe or report moral facts. If they were, this would give rise to a double 
error:  a  conceptual  error  looking  at  plain  facts  as  objectively  prescriptive;  and  an 
ontological error thinking that such moral entities actually exist.63 Mackie, then, argues 
that a realist view of morality is not able to account for the relation between facts and 
moral norms without commitments to an extravagant metaphysics:
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a deliberate piece of 
cruelty – say, causing pain just for fun – and the moral fact that is wrong? It cannot be 
an entailment,  a logical  or semantic necessity.  Yet it  is  not merely that  two features 
occur together. The wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is 
wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified 
by this ‘because’?64
In order to explain the meaning of the “because” in the above passage, moral 
realists needs to commit themselves to the existence of queer entities and mysterious 
61 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Oxford: Penguin Books 1977, especially 
Chapter 1.
62 John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 38.
63 According to Michael Smith, arguments such as Mackie’s can be understood as a conjunc-
tion of different claims, a conceptual one and an ontological one. See Michael Smith,  The 
Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p. 63-66.
64 John L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 41.
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properties.  Suppose that  we can describe the world as  made from a set  of natural 
properties. For simplicity, suppose that there are a finite number of properties {x, y, z}, 
and all the possible combinations of them. In order to account for moral norms, realists 
postulate the existence of moral properties; call them “m.” So, the moral realist world 
would be like this: {x, y, z, m}. These “m-properties” are different by definition from 
all the other properties. Error theorists argue that this just inflates ontology: if a certain 
state  of  affair  is  explained  by some natural  properties  that  can  know by scientific 
inquiry, then it is not clear why one should add elements that do not exist, like other 
properties. The error-theorist’s world, then, does not contain any fact that is ultimately 
moral. Moral claims are a sophisticated manifestation of human beings’ capacity to 
articulate  their  non-cognitive  attitudes  and to  project  them onto  natural  facts.  This 
projection  creates  the  mirage  of  an  objectivist  account  of  morality  through  what 
Mackie calls “patterns of objectification” and leading us to make something similar to 
the so-called “pathetic fallacy,” (namely, the inclination to attribute human feelings to 
inanimate objects).65 One could mitigate the pessimism of this view by admitting the 
possibility  to  talk  about  moral  facts  on  the  semantic  level.  But  since  there  is  no 
evidence for moral claims as we have for scientific ones, we have to conclude that 
moral  claims  are  nothing  more  than  the  speaker’s  attitudes  of  approval  and 
disapproval. The origin of these attitudes is at least partly found in the social pressures, 
internalized by people.
Moral  facts  might  not  even  have  the  explanatory  function  that  some moral 
65 John L. Mackie,  Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 42. On this point, Mackie recalls 
Hume on the mind’s “propensity to spread itself on external objects.” (David Hume, Treatise 
of Human Nature, I. iii. XIV).
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naturalists ascribe to them.66 Some realists think that moral facts and properties play a 
significant role in the explanation of our experience, as physical facts do in scientific 
explanation. Gilbert Harman, argues that
observation plays a role in science that it does not seem to play in ethics […] you need 
to  make  assumptions  about  certain  physical  facts  to  explain  the  occurrence  of  the 
observations  that  support  a  scientific  theory,  but  you do not  seem to need  to  make 
assumptions about any moral  facts  to  explain the occurrence  of  the so-called moral 
observations  [...]  In  the  moral  case,  it  would  seem  that  you  need  only  to  make 
assumptions about the psychology or the moral  sensibility of the person making the 
moral observation67
Harman shows that when one see a deliberate piece of cruelty (like torturing an 
animal) we do not point at any property in order to account for the moral wrongness of 
the action  at  hand. Not figuring in the explanation of our moral  conduct  or moral 
beliefs, there is no reason for thinking that there are moral facts and properties at all.68
Non-cognitivists theorists share a worry about an inflated ontology similar to 
error theorists’ one. Expressivists, for instance, do not believe in the existence of moral 
properties  ontologically  exemplified  in  moral  facts.69 But  they  do  not  share  error 
66 See, for example, naturalist like Nicholas Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” in David Copp 
and David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Freedom, and Truth, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allen-
held, 1985.
67 Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 6.
68 I do not enter in the detais of the argument here. My aim is just to point at the variuos objec-
tion pressed against moral realism. For Sturgeon’ reply see “Moral Explanations,” in Geoffrey 
Sayre McCord (ed.), Essays on Moral Realism.
69 See Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, London: Gollancz, 1936. Simon Blackburn, 
Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford 1984; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt  
Feelings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
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theorists’ pessimism about morality. Moral expressivists claim that even if the moral 
discourse shows objectivist pretensions, beyond the surface grammar there is anything 
but expressions of ones’ attitude towards a state of affairs. To say of something that it 
is right or wrong, it is just to express one’s approval or disapproval of it. There is, of 
course, more than one form of expressivism. But most of the expressivists would agree 
with the claim that there are no facts of the matter about morality as realists conceive 
of  them.  All  there  is  about  morality  are  expressions  of  attitudes  of  endorsement, 
approval and disapproval shown by an individual towards a state of affairs (which is 
not itself a moral fact). All moral claims can do, therefore, is to express one’s non-
cognitive state (things like desires, sentiments,  pro-attitudes) and project them onto 
plain facts.
Assertion of the kind “x is F” do not need to presuppose an independent realm 
of moral facts. Thus, on this account, moral claims cannot be true or false. And the 
possibility of genuine ethical knowledge is anything but an illusion. This approach is 
not as metaphysically committed as realist theories. Nevertheless, if somebody does 
not form the same attitude of others toward the same state of affairs, for instance, if 
one approves of an action while others disapprove of it,  and there is not definitive 
answer to the disagreement, this approach will not get us to a robust conception of 
objectivity of an moral or political view.
Now, it would be hard for somebody to deny that ordinary moral appearances 
are  objectivist.  Moral  non-cognitivism  goes  against  this  intuition.  Nevertheless,  it 
seems  very  demanding  to  postulate  a  realm  of  moral  facts  that  moral  claims  are 
supposed to refer to. So, on the one side people like moral realists seem to be wrong. 
The only way to account for a cognitivist ethical view without a demanding ontology 
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of  morals  seems to  be  error  theory.  Error  theorists  like  Mackie  or  Richard  Joyce 
provide quite a pessimistic way to address the question of how things can be right and 
wrong.70 They claim that when we judge things as right or wrong, we are talking about 
something  (i.e.  moral  reality)  that  does  not  exist.  Even  if  moral  discourse  shows 
objectivist pretensions (it aims at describing the world as it is), this is just an illusion. 
When someone says that “murder is wrong”, she is not pointing at a property (either 
natural or non-natural) of that action as realists think; all she is doing might simply be 
a projection of her emotions onto that fact. If we think that moral judgments describe 
moral facts, we are just making a mistake. Moreover, the fact that postulating a moral 
reality helps us to explain why people behave respecting certain rules does not account 
for the moral rightness of their actions. However, there should be less pessimistic ways 
to account for a moral view.
Is there a way to accommodate a robust, realist-like conception of objectivity 
while holding the ontological parsimony similar to non-cognitivist positions? The aim 
of this thesis is to prove that a constructivist approach to moral and political theorizing 
can achieve this aim. In order to do this, constructivism should be able to prove that 
moral claims do not point at intrinsically action-guiding moral facts or properties, but 
to ordinary facts that become relevant via categorically binding demands.
2. Objectivity in Moral and Political Theorizing
In order to address the question of objectivity on constructivist grounds, let us 
consider  a  comparison  with  its  scientific  understanding.  Take,  for  instance,  this 
70 Richard Joyce, The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
56
statement: “Jupiter has 63 moons.” We can say that this statement is objective. Indeed, 
on the intuitive understanding, it  is not a matter  of opinion whether Jupiter  has 63 
moons; rather, it is as a matter of fact. But, as said, “objective” can mean different 
things.
On the  semantic  level, this statement has a propositional content that can be 
assessed  as  true  or  false.  The  propositional  content  specifies  how  the  world  is 
according to the statement: how the world would have to be if the statement were true. 
Thus, the statement “Jupiter has 63 moons” is true (or objective on the semantic level) 
when it reports a fact of the matter about Jupiter (Jupiter’s having 63 moons). This fact 
is the truth-maker: it makes that statement true. On the epistemological level we can 
know that Jupiter has indeed 63 moons in many ways, for example, by observing them 
with a telescope,  by means of astronomic calculation and so on.  Note that,  on the 
epistemological level, the objectivity of a statement does not depend necessarily on the 
same considerations that make it objective on the ontological level. One might believe 
that Jupiter has four moons only (the major ones), simply because he could see just the 
main ones given the limited power of the telescope’s lenses. In this case, one might be 
justified in affirming or believing that Jupiter has 4 moons. Nevertheless, this is not 
objective from an ontological point of view. Among the considerations that make a 
statement epistemologically objective we have to add the way we know things (in the 
case at hand the reliability of the device for observing Jupiter’s moons).
Now, when the corresponding event obtains, one might say that the statement is 
objectively independent of whether one believes, sees or thinks about it. In science, if a 
fact had obtained even if no human being had ever existed, that fact would be mind-
independent.  Mind-independence  (whether  something  is  ontologically  objective 
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independently of our thinking about it) is a fundamental aspect of objectivity.
What about moral theory then? Take, for instance, this statement: “Murder is 
wrong.”  We  can  say  that  this  statement  is  objective.  Indeed,  on  the  intuitive 
understanding, it is not a matter of opinion whether murder is wrong. But, the moral 
case  seems  to  be  different  from  the  scientific  one.  Sometimes  philosophers  take 
morality and moral facts in similar way natural scientists take natural facts. But moral 
facts  and properties are not,  at  least  intuitively,  as real  as other properties like the 
physical ones. Properties that make the case for facts to be objectively moral, like the 
willfulness of a murder, do not have a spatial-temporal collocation, for instance: they 
exist in thought but they do not have a physical or concrete existence. Or, in other 
terms, they exist but are not ontologically instantiated like other physical properties 
are. Therefore, they do not show the same mind-independency of physical properties. 
If we ask people whether they believe in something like moral values, they will answer 
in the affirmative (at least most of them will do); but it would have been odd if we 
further asked them whether they believe in the existence of moral values in the same 
way they believe in the existence of physical objects. But this does not mean they are 
not real.
Moral claims are cognitive propositions; they can be true or false. A possible 
objection  goes like this:  how can they be true or false if  they do not  describe the 
world? This question, with its positivist nuance, is in a way “odd,” since it presupposes 
a purely scientific-like view of the world. Most of us are inclined to hold a scientific or 
realist view about physical objects and their natural properties. Beliefs about physical 
objects  depend  on  empirical  observations.  But  can  we  say  the  same  about  moral 
claims? To talk about abstract moral entities  and to think of them as provided of a 
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special  form of existence,  could sound like a form of Platonism. Moral values,  for 
instance, could be considered as Plato’s Forms.71 So ethical Platonism would be the 
claims that moral entities exist independently of our thoughts. This view deals with 
moral  facts  and properties  in a similar  way physical  science deals  with its  subject 
matter. Now, this view is vulnerable to all the objections moved by error theorist about 
the queerness of these moral facts and properties. Moreover, on the epistemological 
level, some special cognitive faculty is required in order to know these facts. Indeed, it 
is not clear how we can be in touch with such facts, so different from anything else in 
the world.
Not having a spatial-temporal dimension for moral facts or properties does not 
necessarily involve any form of Platonism or bizarre ontology. To talk about properties 
and state of affairs that do not have a spatial-temporal collocation is not something 
special about morality. We use numbers and complex mathematical constructions like 
sets without questioning their existence.72 We say that it is a mathematical truth that 
“two and two are four”, but we do not look for the occurrence of a fact, besides the fact 
that “two and two are four”, if this is a fact at all. We can read novels without thinking 
that their characters are real. We are able to evaluate the soundness of mathematical 
reasoning, the quality of a novel or the cogency of a moral claim without committing 
our theorizing to, say, ontology of numbers, characters or values. Being non-concrete 
of subject matters of mathematics, literature or morality could constitute a problem if 
we believed that we hold a causal interaction with their subject matter as we do with 
the subject matter of empirical science. But this is an epistemological problem (how 
71 Plato, Republic, Book VI.
72 See Paul Benaceraff, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” in Paul Benaceraff and Hilary Putnam 
(eds.), Philosophy of Mathematics.
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we deal  with  non-concrete  subject  matter),  not  an  ontological  one  (whether  non-
concrete facts exist in the same way concrete facts exist).
One way to address the question of objectivity in moral and political theory 
could be to identify some facts of the matter about morality that make a certain state of 
affair morally right (or wrong) or politically just (or unjust). On this account we try to 
deal  with  the  subject  matter  of  morality  in  a  similar  way we deal  with  empirical 
sciences. Nevertheless, the question concerning moral facts – what they are, whether 
they exist  and how we come to know them – represents a  rather  difficult  issue in 
philosophy.
Few of us would say that murder’s being wrong and Jupiter’s having 63 moons 
are the same kind of facts. What makes the case for the objectivity of the statement 
about Jupiter is an empirical consideration about how the universe is. We can grant the 
objectivity of that statement on the basis of the evidence we have for it (for instance, 
by observing  Jupiter’s  moons).  One might  think  that  what  makes  the case  for  the 
objectivity  of  the  claim that  murder  is  wrong is  somehow similar  to  the scientific 
inquiry. The statement “murder is wrong” reports a fact of the matter about morality. 
Moral claims like this have as well a propositional content that can be assessed as true 
or  false.  The  propositional  content  specifies  how  the  world  is  according  to  the 
statement:  how the  world  would  have  to  be  if  the  statement  were  true.  Thus,  the 
statement “murder is wrong” is objective, on the semantic level, when it reports a fact 
of  the  matter  about  murder.  On the  ontological  level,  there  might  be  some moral 
properties instantiated in that fact that makes it objectively right or wrong. In the case 
of a murder, there should be some property about murder, like being an act of wanton 
killing, which can make performing it an indisputable moral fact. This fact makes the 
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statement “murder is wrong” objective on the semantic level.
But,  contrary  to  the  scientific  understanding  of  objectivity,  in  moral  and 
political theorizing the notion of  mind-independency  is more problematic. Indeed, to 
say that moral  facts  are as mind-independent  as other kinds of facts  sounds pretty 
bizarre.  And the evidence  that  we have for the objectivity  of  moral  claims  would 
hardly be considered as independent of our conceiving of them, unless one accepts an 
extravagant metaphysics as moral realists – especially of the non-naturalist stripe – do.
Constructivists claim that there are moral facts and moral properties, but these 
facts are not independent of our thinking about them. What we call moral facts are a 
principled account of our ideal responses to non-moral features of an action or a trait 
of character and so on. The fact that the evidence we have for the objectivity of moral 
claims is not as mind independent as Jupiter having 63 moons does not constitute a 
problem.  Moral  claims  can  be  objective  in  their  own  right.  On  the  constructivist 
interpretation, a moral claim is objective when it is deduced from a general principle 
issued  by  a  suitably  specified  procedure  of  construction.  If  the  procedure  of 
construction work out a general principle that prohibit killing people, then we can say 
that  we  ought  not  to  kill  people,  or  there  are  no  reasons  to  kill  people.  This 
constructivist interpretation of objectivity need a revision of the notion of objectivity 
so far presented, and a clarification of its relation with the notion of truth.
3. Redefining Objectivity
Within  the context  of  normative  theorizing  the  concept  of  objectivity has  a 
specific meaning. Unlike in empirical science, in morality objectivity
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consists not in an accurate representation of an independent metaphysical order, but in 
universal demands imposed within an agent’s practical reasoning. By insisting, on the 
one hand, that  morality must be grounded in practical  rather  than theoretical  reason, 
these views have stressed a discontinuity with science […] By arguing, on the other 
hand, that there is such a thing as practical reason in which ethics can be grounded, they 
have  tried  to  assure  its  objectivity.  […]  What  constrains  our  choice  (insofar  as  we 
imaginatively adopt the point of view of the hypothetical constructors) is the necessity 
of adopting an objective (that is, impartial) point of view. Instead of allowing our beliefs 
to be constrained by an objective reality, we allow our will (and, through it, our moral 
beliefs) to be constrained by an objective point of view.73
From the  philosophical  standpoint,  scientific  understanding  of  objectivity  is 
achieved in a similar way. But while in science the adoption of an impersonal point of 
view is needed in order to figure out how the world is, in normative theorizing we are 
assessing how the world ought to be. Simply, objectivity in ethics means to abandon a 
parochial  point  of view in judging things as right  and wrong. In the constructivist 
terminology this equals to endorse a procedure of  impartial (that is, not subjective) 
practical reasoning. So in normative theorizing “objectivity is advanced when we step 
back, detach from our earlier point of view toward something, and arrive at a new view 
of the whole that is formed by including ourselves and our earlier viewpoint in what is 
to be understood.”74 But this might not be enough. This position, objectivity as non-
subjectivity, might not be able to guarantee that what I have reason to do is really what 
everyone would have reasons to do if he or she were in my shoes. In other words, 
73 Steven Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton “Toward a  Fin de Siècle  Ethics: Some 
Trends”, in Philosophical Review 101, n. 1 (1992), reprinted in Moral Discourse and Practice 
– Some Philosophical Approaches, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.
74 Thomas Nagel, “Value,” in James Rachel, Ethical Theory 1. The Question of Objectivity, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 109.
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whether the reasons one has are genuine reasons. Note that the question is not whether 
the  kind  of  considerations  for  doing  or  not  doing  something  is  relative  to  some 
particular agents.75 Rather, the question concerns the fact that the invoked reasons keep 
their  normative  significance  whether  or  not  a  change  in  one’s  individual  attitudes 
(beliefs,  preferences,  ends  and  the  like)  occurs  or  would  occur.  The  idea  is  quite 
simple: one might have a reason for white wine simply because she prefers it; if she 
changes her minds and desires beer, she will have a reason for having beer instead of 
wine. This kind of reasons, reasons of taste, is usually considered subjective because it 
varies  depending  on  one’s  attitudes.  Moral  reasons  or  reasons  of  justice,  on  the 
contrary, are usually taken to be objective in this sense, that is, because they do not 
depends on one’s actual attitudes.76 There must be some sort of consensus (at least at 
the theoretical level) on what counts as a reason. Here I am not invoking the role of an 
actual  consensus,  but  the  possibility  for  each  and  every  human  being,  capable  of 
practical reasoning, to come to see what really matters, that is, to understand what are, 
and to be responsive to, reasons.
This  idea  is  similar  to  Hilary  Putnam’s  idea  of  objectivity  as  “rational 
justification” as in  Reason, Truth and History.77 Putnam holds that what truths and 
facts  are  not  independent  of  is  one’s  conceiving  of  them  in  ideal,  counterfactual 
situation. Indeed, it is meaningless to think and talk about an external world that exists 
75 I do not mean agent-relative reasons are not genuine reasons.
76 See on this point Ronald Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It,” Philo-
sophy & Public Affairs 25, no. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 80-2
77 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
For the analysis of Putnam’s argument and its application I am indebted to Lillehammer’s es-
say and to Harry Adamson who drew my attention to it. See Hallvard Lillehammer, Compan-
ions in Guilt, New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
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independently  of  some  method  of  inquiry.  By  opposing  metaphysical  realist 
approaches, which involve a “God’s Eye point of view,” he defends the view that 
‘[t]ruth’ is some sort of (idealized) rational acceptability – some sort of ideal coherence 
of  our  beliefs  with  each  other  and  with  our  experiences  as  those  experiences  are  
themselves  represented  in  our  beliefs  system  –  and  not  correspondence  with  mind-
independent or discourse-independent ‘state of affairs.’78
On this  reading,  truth is  a function of claims  made in  ideal  condition:  true 
means  rationally  justified.  Putnam’s  view goes  against  a  widespread distinction  in 
metaphysics  between  the  ontological  question  (about  what  there  is)  and  the 
epistemological question (about justification). Now, his point on metaphysics has been 
largely criticized.79 And in his later works, he himself rejects this claim.80  Indeed, the 
kind  of  metaphysical  anti-realism  maintained  in  Reason,  Truth  and  History was 
probably excessive. It is difficult to reject the same idea of a mind independent reality, 
as  Putnam seems to do.81 But it  is  possible to maintain it  in moral theory.  In  The 
Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction, Putnam suggests the idea that in order to hold a 
strong  conception  of  objectivity  in  ethics  “we  need  not  entertain  the  idea  that 
something could be a good solution although human beings are in principle unable to  
recognize that it is. The sort of rampant Platonism is incoherent.”82 In order to avoid 
78 Ibid., p. 49-50, his italics.
79 See, among others, Ernest Sosa, “Putnam’s Pragmatic Realism”, The Journal of Philosophy 
110, 1993; Simon Blackburn, “Enchanting Views”, in P. Clark and B. Hale (eds.),  Reading 
Putnam, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.
80 Hilary Putnam,  Realism With a Human Face, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1990, especially Chapter 11.
81 See the above quoted passage, footnote 17.
82 Hirlary Putnam,  The Collapse of the Fact/Value Distinction, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
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Platonic-like or bizarre metaphysics, Putnam takes the idea of objectivity in ethics in a 
practical  sense,  namely  as  the  correct  solution  to  a  moral  problem,  following  the 
American pragmatist tradition. So, he keeps the same metaphysical view he had for the 
ethical  case, rejecting the more general implications  for non-ethical  subject matter. 
Thus,  he weakens the first  condition of his  metaphysical  view according to which 
“truth  is  independent  of  justification  here  and  now,  but  not  independent  of  all  
justification”,  while  keeping  the  idea  that  “truth  is  expected  to  be  stable  or 
‘convergent’;  if  both  a  statement  and  its  negation  could  be  ‘justified’,  even  if 
conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is not sense in thinking 
of the statement as having a truth-value”83 As Putnam recognizes, “this may mean to 
giving up a certain metaphysical view of objectivity, but it does not mean giving up 
the  idea  that  there  are  what  Dewey  called  ‘objective  resolutions  of  problematical 
situations.’”84
My idea is to tackle the question of objectivity on Putnam’s line, where the test 
for the convergence is a procedure offered by a moral constructivist view. We have to 
note that the notion of objectivity we are looking for is not related with the explanation 
of moral phenomena (like the fact that people follow certain moral codes), as science 
does for physical phenomena. We are looking for the way in which moral reasons, 
considerations for and against the performance of certain actions, are generated and 
how they could really be the right sorts of considerations for all. Thus the question is 
not what is a reason, but how a reason can be generated and when it is a genuine 
University Press, 2002, p. 109.
83 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 56. For the relation between truth and objectiv-
ity see Ibid., p. X.
84 Hilary Putnam, Realism With a Human Face, p. 178.
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reason.
4. Constructivist Objectivity
The  constructivist  looks  at  the  problem  of  objectivity  in  terms  of  a  valid 
method of moral thinking. When one says that a moral claim is objective she might 
mean two things. First, that the claim is impartial or unbiased. Second, that is a matter 
of fact.85 In the first case the objectivity of that claim is achieved because of a valid 
method of reasoning. In the second case, we judge the claim as objective depending on 
its  reference  to  a  given  reality.  But,  what  makes  a  moral  claim  objective  on 
constructivist  ground? The constructivist  solution is  to read the second question in 
terms of the first one. This collapse of ontology upon epistemology is necessary in 
order to avoid what Putnam calls “a magical theory of reference.”86
The problem of the objectivity of moral claims does not concern their lack of 
spatial-temporal dimension. The real issue, I think, is about what makes a method of 
moral reasoning valid. The ontological question about the existence of moral entities, 
properties  and facts  as  independent  of  us  has  to  be interpreted  on epistemological 
grounds: whether the way in which we think about them is valid.
From a  constructivist  standpoint,  the  existence  of  moral  facts  is  not  to  be 
interpreted as realists do. The existence of moral facts is relevant for moral theorizing 
in a normative way. Moral facts exist because there are moral agents who create them. 
Constructivism  provides  a  philosophical  account  of  this  creation.  In  this  sense, 
85 I take this point from Aaron James, The Objectivity of Values: Invariance without Explana-
tion, Southern Journal of Philosophy 2006, XLIV, p. 584.
86 Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 51. 
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constructivism  could  be  called  “normative  realism.”87 On  a  constructivist  account, 
objectivity is not derived from some external entity; it is shaped as a social creation. 
Intuitionists  claim that we know principles through intuition,  and emotivists reduce 
them  to  the  speaker’s  feelings  and  attitudes;  constructivists,  on  the  other  hand, 
construct practical reasoning under different kinds of constraints.
The idea of constructivism is that in order to make moral claims we need some 
epistemological handle to their subject matter.88 In the moral case, like in mathematics, 
this tool is a method of reasoning, able to make moral facts and properties real. Their 
reality, in a constructivist framework, is constituted by their relevance for us. So, for 
example, when we claim that “x is a reason to do y,” the objectivity of this judgment 
depends upon the possibility to find a process of reasoning that yields a principle P 
able to make ‘x’ a  relevant  consideration to  perform the action ‘y.’ What  makes  a 
factual consideration a moral reason to perform an action or to bring about a state of 
affairs,  the  right-maker  of  the  normative  statement  “x  is  a  reason to  do y”  is  not 
already contained in ‘x;’ there is  nothing intrinsically  right  or good in  ‘x.’ This is 
possible not because of an external reality but through of a valid method of reasoning, 
which works out P.
A procedure represents the formalization of a method of practical reasoning. 
The employment of a procedure is  aimed to  avoid any appeal  to a  peculiar  moral 
ontology and to guarantee moral knowledge (against strong realist and non-cognitivist 
positions). Nevertheless, is not clear what objectivity means here. Indeed, one could 
end up with some sort of subjectivist view. For instance, we might take the procedure 
87 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere,  chapter 8.
88 I take this idea from Thomas Scanlon, “Constructivism: What? And Why?”, unpublished 
manuscript. 
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to  be an  individual-based process  of  reasoning,  which  carries  to  a  higher  level  of 
generalization one’s subjective moral convictions. These moral convictions might be 
as well other-regarding. But there is still a puzzlement about the kind of independence 
norms so conceived can achieve.  What is objective might be just in my mind; how can 
it  be  in  yours?  If  it  can  be  in  everybody’s  minds,  then  it  means  that  morality  is 
somehow  independent  of  us.  In  what  sense  though?  The  role  of  a  constructivist 
procedure is to work out principles that make a plain fact a moral fact. Later on, I will 
address how this is possible. For the moment it might suffice to say that a principle 
(and, as a consequence, a judgment about reasons made on the basis of that principle) 
is objective because of the method of reasoning and not because of something else.
The subject matter of morality can be independent of us, and claims about it 
can be objective in at least three different ways.89 In a first and trivial sense, moral 
claims can be objective if it is possible for us (at least individually) to be mistaken in 
our judgments about the subject matter.90 In this sense, moral claims can be minimally 
objective. There is a more demanding notion of independence of us, which takes moral 
claims as objective if they are minimally objective and if the standards for assessing 
such judgments do not depend on what we have done, chosen, or adopted (and would 
be different had we done, chosen, or adopted something else). One might think that 
89 The three definitions are taken from Scanlon’s unpublished manuscript. To be true, in his pa-
per Scanlon is discussing the question of how the subject matter of mathematics can be inde-
pendent of us. I take his point about mathematics and apply it to moral theory. At the end of 
the paper, Scanlon does apply it to moral theory but he defends his non-naturalist view. On 
Scanlon’s view of morality see Chapter ???.
90 “Minimal objectivity (judgment-independence) is not just a matter of  de facto agreement, 
but the tendency of the judgments of different competent judges to converge, and the stability 
of  our  own  judgments,  supports  our  confidence  that  they  concern  judgment-independent 
truths.” From Thomas M. Scanlon, “Constructivism: What? And Why?”.
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moral claims can be objective in an even more robust way: moral claims are objective 
if they are minimally objective,  choice-independent and also independent of human 
nature, of what we are like.
As far as the last sense of objectivity is concerned, a constructivist would say 
that it is not relevant for moral reasoning from a practical point of view. If the subject 
matter of morality were independent of us in this sense, moral claims would refer to 
some Platonic-like entities. As said, the objectivity of moral claims depends not on an 
ontological  reality,  but  upon the  possibility  of  getting  a  correct  result  by correctly 
applying a procedure of moral reasoning. Similarly to the mathematical case, whether 
a calculation allows us to get the result “four units” by adding two units to two units, 
the correctness of that result depends neither on the nature of what we are summing, 
nor on the existence of entities such as numbers. It depends on the possibility of a valid 
method of mathematical reasoning that allows us to perform such a calculation. The 
judgment “two and two are four” is objective if a procedure of calculation (a piece of 
mathematical reasoning) has been correctly applied to what one is summing, leaving 
aside metaphysical issues about what is summed.
Moral  constructivism  faces  the  question  of  objectivity  in  a  way  similar  to 
mathematical constructivism.91 On a constructivist account, the notion of objectivity in 
ethics, like in mathematics, does not depend upon the ontology of its subject matter. 
91 Roughly, mathematical constructivism is the idea that the existence of a mathematical object 
depend on the a valid method proving its existence. For a overview of this idea see Douglas 
Bridges, “Constructive Mathematics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 
Edition),  Edward  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  URL =  http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mathematics-con-
structive/. Charles Parsons, “Mathematics, Foundations of”, in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyc-
lopedia of Philosophy, New York: Academic Press 1977.
69
Moral facts and other ethical objects are products of our mind.92 Like in mathematics, 
moral constructivism can claim objectivity in the minimal sense. It would be absurd if 
it  could  not.  And  it  can  accept  the  idea  that  a  conception  of  objectivity  as 
independence of human nature is irrelevant. According to constructivists, the question 
about  what  moral  reasons we have is  meaningless  without  taking into account  for 
whom those reasons are. In order to address this issue, it is necessary to consider a 
variety of factual elements, such as the circumstances to which a moral conception 
applies, how people see themselves in those circumstances, a general knowledge of 
facts  of  the  world  and  so  on.93 But,  unlike  mathematics,  the  second  notion  of 
objectivity, objectivity as choice-independence, present more controversies.
5. Objectivity as Invariance
According to constructivists, moral claims are objective when they are made at 
the  light  of  general  principles  worked  out  by  a  suitably  specified  procedure  of 
construction. A procedure of construction is valid when, if suitably specified, it allows 
us to get an impartial and unbiased point of view. In this sense, we can conclude that 
objectivity  is  a  function  of  the  conclusions  reached  through  a  procedural  device. 
92 Another way of expressing this idea could be this: constructing moral facts makes them real. 
But this formulation, even if consistent with my understanding of constructivism, can be inter-
preted in a subjectivist way, according to which whatever is constructed is real. Accepting this 
formulation could imply that any value constructed by a moral agent is valid. But this is not 
my view.
93 On this point Gerald Cohen criticizes constructivists because they ground their moral views 
on factual considerations. See Gerald Cohen, “Facts and Principles”,  Philosophy and Public  
Affairs, 31, 2004. I address Cohen’s criticism in the Appendix.
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Objective, therefore, are predications of claims when they refer to the procedure. It is 
clear that the definitive test for the objectivity of our claims depends upon the way we 
define the procedure. This point will be addressed in the next chapter. Here I want to 
address  a  more  general  point:  what  are  the  formal  requirements  for  a  procedure 
(whatever its definition) in order to get an impartial point of view on moral matters.
I  argue  that  moral  claims  can  be  objective,  but  not  independent  of  us; 
nevertheless,  they are independent  of our real attitudes.  This means that whether a 
moral  claim  is  objective  does  not  depend  on  changing  one’s  attitudes  (beliefs, 
preferences,  aims  and  the  like).  Instead  of  the  three  senses  of  objectivity  as 
independence of us as stated above, I propose a view of the issue of objectivity as 
attitude-independence.
moral claims are objective if they are objective in the minimal sense and 
the standards for assessing such judgments do not depend on what we 
have  believed,  preferred,  wanted  (and  would  not  be  different  had  we 
believed, preferred, or wanted something else)
To be true, this is a minimalist conception of objectivity. All it claims is that for 
a moral claim to be objective is to be invariant with respect to one’s attitudes. People 
might  believe,  prefer,  or  want  different  things  about  a  given  state  of  affairs.  The 
rightness or wrongness of action or state of affairs does not rely upon the fact that I 
believe, prefer or want so and so. Its rightness derives from a procedure of thinking.
Nagel  argues  that  a  moral  judgment  is  objective  when  one  is  reasoning 
objectively. To reason in an objective way is to reason in such a way that it rules out 
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one’s  personal  inclinations  and preferences.  He claims  that  “ethical  thought  is  the 
process of bringing objectivity to bear on the will, and the only thing I can think of to 
say about ethical truth in general is that it must be the possible result of this process, 
correctly  carried out.”94 The process of reasoning to be correctly  carried out is the 
procedure of construction. The procedure correctly carries out its task when it issues 
moral claims that are independent of the attitudes that is accidentally happens to have. 
Namely, it has to rule out certain attitudes, the subjective ones or those who cannot be 
universalized. Note that I am not claming that a procedure of construction should rule 
out all attitudes. If it does, then a moral claim would be objective in an absolute way 
(true  in  the  ontological  sense,  as  strong  realist  would  say). As  we  said,  on  the 
ontological level constructivism is the view that there are moral facts and properties, 
and these moral facts properties and facts are constructed out of human attitudes. And, 
on the semantic level, constructivism is the view that moral claims are objective, and 
their  being  objective  is  accounted  for  the  appeal  to  human  attitudes.  But  not  all 
attitudes are good.
Ronald Milo provides an interesting way of tackling this issue, distinguishing 
between  stance-dependence  and  stance-independence.  A  moral fact  is  stance-
dependent “just in case it consists in the instantiation of some property that exist only 
if some thing or state of affairs is made the object of an intentional psychological state 
(a  stance),  such  as  a  beliefs  or  a  conative  or  affective  attitude.”95 Note  that  this 
distinction does not imply the rejection of a stance-independent reality altogether, as 
Putnam seem suggests in Reasons, Truth, and History. It is restricted to the existence 
of moral reality.  Therefore it rejects the existence of a moral reality apart from the 
94 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 139.
95 Ronal Milo, “Contractarian Constructivism”, in Journal of Philosophy, 99, 1995, p. 192.
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perspective we have toward it. Therefore, following Milo’s distinction, moral facts and 
properties are constructed out of facts about human stances. Human stances are the set 
of attitudes. Among all the possible attitudes, the constructivist procedure should be 
able to rule out those that are merely subjective attitudes. This last normative condition 
is thought in order to avoid falling into some crude subjectivist  view, according to 
which the rightness of an action, or the justice of a social institution, depends upon 
one’s desires and preferences.
For a realist such stances are evidence for independently existing moral facts 
and  properties.  Following  Milo,  a  genuine  constructivist  approach should  consider 
moral claims as representing 
correct cognitive responses to a reality that obtains independently of, and is capable of 
explaining, these responses, they nevertheless do not insist on grounding moral truths in 
[…] a  stance-independent  reality – that is, a reality that obtains independently of how 
we  are  disposed  to  respond  to  the  world  in  terms  of  our  affective  or  volitional 
responses.96
Milo reads constructivism as a hypothetical proceduralist:97 moral claims are 
expressed  by  hypothetical  individuals  in  a  suitably  specified  situation,  or,  in  the 
constructivist terminology, they derive from principles worked out a by a procedure of 
construction.  The  objectivity  of  moral  claim is  a  function  of  this  procedure:  “The 
objectivity of […] moral principles consists […] in their rational acceptability from an 
impartial point of view.”98
96 Ibid., p. 192.
97 See Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 268.
98 Ronal Milo, “Contractarian Constructivism”, p. 184-185.
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Chapter Three
Varieties of Constructivism
1. Introduction
The idea that moral norms or social and political institutions are not part of 
the fabric of the world, but they are rather the invention or creation of people, is not 
new in the history of ideas. In ancient philosophy, relativists like Protagoras claimed 
that “man is the measure of all things.” In modern political thought, social contract 
theorists grounded political obligation in the rationality of human beings as opposed 
to medieval conceptions based on the sacredness of political authority. In present-
day  moral  and  political  theorizing,  constructivism  claims  that  standards  of 
evaluation are product of a constructive process. These standards do not exist prior 
74
to, and independent of, agents constructing and endorsing them.
In  the  contemporary  philosophical  debate,  there  is  a  growing  discussion 
about  constructivism.  Constructivism  is  said  to  constitute  a  new and  promising 
approach to moral and political theorizing, and several authors define themselves as 
“constructivist” or label other's positions in that way. Nevertheless, the use of this 
label is rather controversial. One might think that constructivism is just one of the 
many -isms made up by philosophers for classifying their theories. Indeed, it is quite 
difficult to define what constructivism is about, whether it represents a justificatory 
method, a genuine metaethical theory or something else.
The meaning of a term of art is given by the way it is used, how it fits the 
general theoretical framework, which position among the several ones is supposed to 
occupy and so forth. Constructivism is one of these terms. As it usually happens in 
philosophy, it is possible to find varieties of constructivism, but no precise statement of 
what it is about. Broadly defined, constructivism is the claim that certain things – like 
moral  norms or principles  of justice – are complex because they are composed or 
constructed out  of  other  more  basic  elements.99 This  is  definitely  too  vague  a 
definition;  indeed,  so  defined,  many  philosophical  positions  can  be  identified  as 
constructivist. Merely saying that moral norms or principles of justice are constructed 
out of something else would not shed any light on the question of objectivity without 
an accompanying ontology of morals that I am trying to establish in this thesis.
Different philosophical theories have been labeled as constructivist. Let us take, 
for  example,  skeptical  approaches  such  as  conventionalism:  they  claim  that  moral 
norms are the product of socialization. On this reading, principles are constructed out 
99 See Onora O’Neill, Constructivism in Rawls and Kant, in S. Freeman, The Cambridge Com-
panion to Rawls, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, p. 347.
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of a number of judgments on particular cases, brought to a higher level of abstraction 
and presented in a more or less coherent set. Thus, a moral claim of the kind “x is right 
(or good)” is objective for a subject S if and only if S believes that x is right (or good), 
and S is a member of a social community where at least most of the people believes 
that x is right (or good). The standard of evaluation is fixed by, or constructed out of, a 
set of socially implemented and historically or instrumentally justified habits, codes, 
etiquettes,  practices,  and  so  forth.  Put  in  other  terms,  the  latter  elements  are  the 
material  of  construction  that  once  injected  in  a  process  of  generalization  and 
abstraction, lead to general principles. Thus, a moral claim is objective if it conforms 
to such principles. And principles are considered objective insofar as someone in a 
given social group endorses it.
So far we have social constructivism. In sociology, constructivism is the claim 
that there is nothing distinctive about ethics: ethical norms, like norms of etiquette, are 
nothing more than the generalization of social custom and habits. In this sense, to say 
that moral norms are constructed is tantamount to claiming that they are product of 
processes  of  historical  development  and  socialization.  So  conceived,  normative 
principles are conventional,  since they do not have any validity beyond the society 
were they originated. On this view, the justification of moral norms depends upon the 
social consensus that underwrites a community’s moral practices. But this view does 
not  get  us to  the conception  of  objectivity  that  moral  constructivists  look for.  The 
concept  of  objectivity  here  is  quite  minimal.  It  is  a  sort  of  relativized objectivity: 
something is objectively right or good according to members of the society  A, but it 
could not be so according to people belonging to the community B, where A and B are 
different societies. To say that something is right or good in this way is to say that 
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people approve of it, and to say that something is objective is to say that there is no 
more than an intersubjective agreement about it.  This would be consistent with the 
constructivist claim that judgments do not derive their validity from an a priori order 
of moral values or facts. But, even if this is a fair sociological description of reality, 
even if  it  explains  why people follow social  codes,  the question of  a more robust 
notion of objectivity remains unsolved.
Besides the origin of normative  claims,  constructivism is  a  thesis  about the 
objectivity of principles. In general, constructivism is the claim that moral norms or 
principles  of  justice  are  objective  insofar  as  they  are  the  outcome  of  a  suitably 
specified procedure of construction, and not because they refer to some order of moral 
values independent of moral agents and prior to political institutions. So conceived, 
constructivism aims at opposing moral realism (the claim that judgments are objective 
of an independent moral order),  moral  skepticism (according to which there are no 
objectivity conditions for normative statements) and moral  relativism (the view that 
there are no objective moral standards, or universally valid principles).
Constructivists  believe  in  a  conception  of  moral  objectivity  as  universal 
validity of norms, which impose categorical demand on people and it is grounded in 
people’s  capacity  of  practical  reasoning.  From a  methodological  point  of  view, 
constructivism aims at providing an account of morality that places the sources of 
normativity  within  moral  agents.  There  is  no  other  source  of  moral  rightness 
independent of moral agents as well as there is no justice outside the social  and 
political institutions that embed values worked out by moral agents. All depends on 
the kind of procedure of construction endorsed by moral agents. To account for a 
constructivist  position  it  is  necessary  to  see  what  is  constructed,  what  are  the 
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materials of construction, whether they are themselves constructed or not and, in our 
particular case, how to construct ethical objects.
Firstly, what is constructed? Moral norms and principles of justice. Moral 
and political theories have normative judgments – judgments of the kind “X has a 
reason to do  y” – as their target.  Normative judgments are expressed upon more 
general principles. According to constructivists, these principles are justified if they 
can be accounted for as the outcome of a specific procedure of construction, namely 
a procedure of practical reasoning that leads moral agents to constructed principles 
starting  from some  materials  of  construction.  The  materials  of  construction  are 
moral  agents  themselves,  who respond to  the  circumstances  in  which  they  find 
themselves. Let us see in more details the implication of this position, starting from 
a very general definition so that most of the constructivists could (hopefully) accept 
it.
2. A General Definition
Recall the general definition given and the end of Chapter One. Constructivism 
could be defined as the claims that
(C)  some facts  provide  moral  reasons  (or  reasons  of  justice)  because 
certain principles, which are worked out by a suitably specified procedure 
of construction, confer reason-giving status to those facts.
So defined, constructivism should represent an autonomous position. Neverthe-
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less, it is not a plain vanilla statement. As all philosophical positions, this definition is 
highly  controversial.  The  distinction  between  constructivism and  other  approaches 
clearly depends on the way we conceive of the procedure. To be sure, one could take a 
procedure as a heuristic device for discovering the moral values we have. Alternat-
ively, the procedure constructing principles could serve for making explicit one’s atti-
tudes towards a state of affairs. In both cases, constructivism would be anything but a 
rhetorical  move.  However,  those  who  endorse  a  constructivist  approach  generally 
claim that the procedure is something more than a mere heuristic device. In order to 
straighten out the problem, let us go into some more details.
Constructivism is a form of cognitivism. It maintains that moral claims (things 
like judgments, utterances, beliefs and propositions) can be objective, and their criteria 
of  objectivity  depend  upon  a  proper  procedure  of  moral  reasoning.  What 
constructivists are looking for is a single body of moral facts, worked out by some 
function of our reasoning. This function creates moral reality. And moral reality exists 
as far as agents of construction (reasoning creatures) exist. To  put it in other words, 
there are facts  of the matter  about morality  that  provide reasons supporting ought-
sentences, but these facts are not prior to, and independent of, our enquiring about 
them. Thus, constructivism claims that there are moral facts, and they are the product 
of our functional reasoning for solving practical problems.
I take a “fact” to be something that is definitely the case. A fact is a moral one 
if  it  provides  some considerations  about  how things ought  to  be.  And a plain fact 
becomes a moral one (that is to say, it is able to provide a reason, and so to make 
objective  a  moral  claim)  because a  principle  makes  it  so.  “Principles”  are general 
standards of evaluation of conduct or general guidelines about how social and political 
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institutions should treat people. They select which facts are relevant for the case at 
hand, but do not directly make a plain fact a moral fact. A “procedure” is the process 
of  reasoning  that  leads  moral  agent’s  practical  thinking  from  given  premises  to 
conclusions, making plain facts moral facts. “Construction” basically refers to the fact 
that certain things are composed out of other more elementary or basic parts.
Obviously, this definition needs some clarification. In the next sections I focus 
on the material construction out of which moral norms and principles of justice are 
constructed, namely the conception of person implied by a constructivist approach and 
the  factual  considerations  from  which  we  need  to  move  when  we  theorize  about 
morality.  Then,  I  move to  the  appeal  to  procedures  and  their  relation  with factual 
considerations.
3. Persons and Facts as Materials of Construction
A procedure is the theoretical device that leads moral agents’ thinking from 
basic  elements  to  constructed  principles. So,  what  are  these  basic  elements  that 
constitute  the  material  of  construction?  The  fundamental  conceptions  that 
constructivists take as theoretical starting points for laying out the procedural device 
are concerned with how we conceive of ourselves (the conception of the person) and a 
general knowledge about the world. The conception of the person can be either real or 
ideal.  Realistic  models  inject  into  the  procedural  device  considerations  about  how 
things are, taking into account natural and social differences that characterize people, 
and which depend on mere social luck.100 Ideal models, instead, leave such differences 
100 David Gauthier holds view. For a discussion of Gauthier’s constructivism see Chapter Four.
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aside,  considering them irrelevant from a moral point of view.101 Both models take 
people to be equal under some respect. They differ in the way they take equality to 
matter in moral and political theorizing.  “One approach stresses a natural equality of 
physical  power,  which  makes  it  mutually  advantageous  for  people  to  accept 
conventions that recognize and protect each other’s interests and possessions,” while 
“[t]he other approach stresses a natural equality of moral status, which makes each 
person’s  interests  a  matter  of  common  or  impartial  concern  […]  expressing  in 
agreements that recognize each person’s interests and moral status.”102
According  to  constructivists,  an  inquiry  on  the  nature  of  moral  or  political 
theory would be meaningless without taking into account  the addressees of such a 
theory. In order to address this issue, it is necessary to consider a variety of factual 
elements, such as the circumstances to which moral theory applies, how people see 
themselves in those circumstances, a general knowledge about the relevant facts of the 
world and so on.  Constructivists  want to  avoid a  very demanding characteristic  of 
many Kantian approaches, namely that theorizing about the norms that regulate our 
behaviors  toward  the  others  should be  totally  independent  of  the  circumstances  in 
which  agents  contingently  finds  themselves.103 The  fact  that  people  have  certain 
psychological  tendencies  like  a  limited  altruism,  for  instance,  or  the  facts  that  the 
amount of resources upon which members of a given society advance their claims are 
limited, should be somehow taken into account (at least, in order to avoid to come up 
with a conception of moral rightness or justice absolutely independent of who we are 
101 John Rawls holds this view. For a discussion of Rawls’s constructivism see Chapter Four.
102 Will Kymlicka, “The Social Contract Tradition,” in Peter Singer (ed.), A Companion to Eth-
ics, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991, p. 188.
103 See G. A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 31, 2003. Cohen’s 
objection to constructivism will be addressed in the Appendix.
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and what we are like).
Constructivists admit the possibility for some fact to be moral, but deny the 
existence  of  brute  moral  facts,  that  is,  of  facts  that  are  inherently  moral.  Hence 
constructivism is the claim there are facts of the matter about morality, and they are 
product  of  some function of  our reasoning.  This  view implies  a  rather  substantive 
conception of the person. Moral agents are not simply  knowers,  rather they are the 
constructors  of  moral  norms.  It  is  constitutive  of  moral  agency  the  fact  that  an 
individual  can  elaborate  norms guiding  her  behavior  and  principles  structuring  the 
social institutions in which she finds herself, without appealing to external authority. 
Then, on a constructivist view, a person should be able to work out moral norms that 
all can accept, at least hypothetically, if situated in suitably conditions. The suitability 
of these conditions is defined by the procedure of construction. We do not need to test 
the validity of the norms regulating our affairs through an order of moral values that do 
not depend on the same idea of moral agency (conceived as the capacity to elaborate 
moral  norms  and  principles  of  justice  and  regulate  one’s  behavior  accordingly). 
Indeed, constructivists claim that normative principles are the outcome of the moral 
agent’s intentional conceiving of those principles. And the procedure through which 
agent’s intentional conceiving of principles is carried out confer a reason-giving status 
to non-moral facts.
While reasons for belief are supposed to consist in some order of facts, what 
counts  as  practical  reasons,  for  constructivists,  does  not  depends upon some given 
moral reality, but on moral agents’ intentional conceiving of principles that bestow a 
reason-giving status upon a fact. On this view, the capacity to reason does not concern 
an objective realm of (either natural or non-natural) moral facts, which possess certain 
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action-guiding features. If there were, then facts that are already moral, moral agents 
would have been considered as mere knowers. And the activity of practical reasoning 
would consist in finding out these moral facts and their properties. So, the conception 
of the person here would be quite thin and the notion of moral agency would be a 
straightforward question of compliance with norms.
However, constructivists oppose this moral realist view. Constructivists think 
that moral realism is objectionable for a number of reasons. Realists claim that moral 
rightness of actions, as well as justice of social institutions, have to be assessed against 
standards of evaluation that are independent of us, independent of our own making. 
Claiming this means to postulate the existence of a moral reality that is independent of 
moral agents. If moral realists were right, then it would be difficult to explain why 
people should care about this moral independent reality, that is, why people should be 
moral. On the contrary, if these standards of moral evaluation are product of our own 
reasoning,  then  the  problem  of  compliance  does  not  apply.  Moreover,  a  realist 
conception of moral reality as mind-independent is highly problematic. First of all, it is 
not clear what this morality consists in. Second, even if we admit the existence of such 
a  reality,  it  is  not  clear  how it  can have a  bearing  on people’s  choices.  However, 
constructivists do not give up to the project of moral justification in ethics as other 
anti-realists  do.  Constructivists,  as  I  try  to  show,  have  a  better  answer  to  these 
questions, and a clearer notion of objectivity.
Constructivists conceive of practical reason as the activity of the individual will 
to intentionally guide one’s action, imposing some normative constraints on oneself.104 
104 On this my view is close to Korsgaard’s Kantian project as laid out in The Sources of Norm-
ativity  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and The Normativity of Instrumental  
Reason (in Garret Cullity and Gaut, Ethics and Practical Reason).
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This particular attitude here involved, namely intention, is different from the one of 
belief; indeed, it does not aim at representing the world as it is: if I have the intention 
to send my paper off to the up-coming conference before the deadline for submission, 
it is not that I should give up to that attitude once Friday comes and I did not finish to 
write it yet. Rather, having this intention makes me try to regulate my actions so that I 
can submit it on time. And the fact that the deadline is tomorrow gives me a reason to 
finish to write (instead of going for walk, for instance), given my aim to submit the 
paper for the conference, and my intention to do it on time and so on.105
4. The Appeal to Procedures
If moral agents have to play a real role in the formulation of principles, we 
cannot start from an order of moral reasons that is independent  from moral agents 
themselves.  Realist  says that normative principles are prior to,  and independent of, 
moral agents. They are regarded as objectively valid when they conform to ultimate 
normative truths of the matter. If we ask why a reason counts for or against something, 
all  we can do is  to offer other  reasons for showing that  is  a significant  normative 
consideration.  According  to  moral  realists,  if  a  reason  has  to  have  normative 
105 Note that on this account, practical reason does not move necessary on an agent’s “motiva-
tional set”, namely his desires, preferences, pro-attitudes and the like. The process of reasoning 
involved in having reasons does not rely merely on subjective prior motivations. In order to 
work out what it would be objectively right to do, one need to engage in a process of evaluat-
ive reasoning that considers not only the subjective motivational package, but also both norm-
ative and factual requirements on the process of reasoning. See Bernard A. O. Williams, “In-
ternal and External Reasons”, Reprinted in  Moral Luck,  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981.
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significance, its normative significance must ultimately be grounded in some fact of 
the  matter  that  is  intrinsically  normatively  significant.  Otherwise,  its  normative 
significance is not ultimate, but derived. Now, from where is it derived? According to 
moral realists,  it  rests on self-evident  normative facts  of the matter  about morality, 
namely some moral entity whose validity does not require any further ground. But, 
constructivists,  among others,  argue that  even  if  there  were self-evident  normative 
considerations, we should be able to explain why they are normative significant for us.
The constructivist appeal to procedures aims at escaping this theoretical cul de 
sac. The procedure of construction has to be defined in such a way that takes moral 
agents themselves and non-moral facts as the starting point. In this way the procedure 
can be considered as a method of justification: moral norms and principles of justice 
must be considered justified insofar as outcome of the procedure. But this might not be 
enough  for  accounting  for  the  objectivity  of  norms  so  constructed.  Indeed,  their 
objective status can depend upon other normative criteria that are given independently 
of the procedure of construction. In this case, moral norms and principles of justice 
will be objective not because of being the outcome of the procedure, but rather because 
of some ex ante criterion.
For illustration,  consider Rawls’s case for what  he calls  “perfect  procedural 
approach to justice.” In the case of perfect proceduralism, the classic example is the 
cutting of a cake that is entrusted to the last one taking a slice, so that it is possible to 
get some even-handedness in distribution:
assuming that the fair division is an equal one, which procedure, if any, will give this 
outcome? Technicalities aside, the obvious solution is to have one man divide the cake 
and get the last piece, the others being allowed their pick before him. He will divide the 
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cake equally, since in this way he assures for himself the larger share possible. This 
example illustrates  the two characteristic  features  of perfect  procedural  justice.  First, 
there is an independent criterion for what is fair division, a criterion defined separately 
from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed. And second, it is possible to 
devise a procedure that it sure to give the desired outcome.106
Perfect forms of proceduralism require that the results of choice conform to 
standards  of  evaluation  that  are  independent  of  the  procedure  itself.  Pure 
proceduralism, by contrast, requires no external criterion:
[P]ure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the right 
result: instead there is a correct  or fair procedures such that the outcome is likewise 
correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed. If 
a number of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last 
bet is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever this distribution is.107
In both cases, the justification of the outcome is achieved through the correct 
application of the procedure, but while in the pure form objectively justified outcomes 
are achieved by the simple application of the procedure, in the case of perfect forms of 
proceduralism it is required a further evaluation of the correctness of their outcomes, 
namely  some  ex  ante  criteria  of  objectivity.  Pure  proceduralism  seems  to  be  a 
promising strategy for spelling  out  a  constructivist  position.  Indeed,  if  we want  to 
106 John  Rawls,  A Theory  of  Justice,  p.  85.  Rawls  considers  as  well  cases  of  imperfect 
procedural justice. The difference between perfect and imperfect proceduralism is that, in the 
second case, we do not have a procedure able to guarantee a fair outcome. This distinction is 
not relevant here.
107 Ibid., pag. 86.
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entrust moral agents – and moral agents alone – with the capacity to come up with 
objective moral norms without relying on moral entities given prior to them, the appeal 
to the procedure can achieve this aim.
The  idea  of  proceduralism  resembles  our  way  of  adjudicating  conflicting 
claims in an impartial way. When we cannot adopt our particular point of view, what 
remains  is to entrust a procedure to fix a series of steps and a shared set of rules 
leading  parties  to  a  fair  resolution,  whatever  its  content  is.  The  fairness  of  the 
procedure  should be transferred to  the outcome,  through the  correct  application  of 
procedure. A procedure could be thought as a set of rules to be applied correctly in 
order  to  achieve  an  outcome.  Consider,  for  example,  a  game:  given  some  initial 
situation,  where  each  and  every  player  possesses  certain  initial  endowments,  the 
procedure governs their conduct until the end, when a person or a team wins. But a 
procedure  is  not  a  sort  of  algorithm that  leads  a  person at  the  right  solution  of  a 
problem by showing the logical  inferences  between one step and the other.  It  is  a 
process of reasoning that should be able to produce principles that are not themselves 
contained in the premises of the argument.108
Constructivism  is  usually  identified  with  a  form  of  “hypothetical 
proceduralism:”
[The  constructivist]  endorses  some  hypothetical  procedure  as  determining  which 
principles constitute valid standards of morality. The procedure might be one of coming 
to agreement on a social contract, or it might be, say, one of deciding which moral code 
to support for one’s society. A proceduralist, then, maintains there are no moral facts 
independent of the finding that a certain hypothetical procedure would have such and an 
108 Indeed, the set of rules of a gain regulates players’ behaviors and adjudicates conflicting 
claims. But this set does not determined who is going to win before the match has begun.
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upshot.109
So framed, constructivism plays a justificatory role in normative theorizing: 
whatever  it  is  constructed by the procedure has to be considered as justified.  This 
implies that what counts as a moral reason cannot be determined ex ante, that is, before 
the application of principles issued by the procedure of construction.
Constructivism expresses  the  attempt  to  develop  norms  through  the  use  of 
procedures of deliberation, choice, agreement or fair judgment. But the procedure is 
not  a  moral  theory;  rather,  it  is  given  to  moral  theory  from a  theory  of  practical 
reasoning to justify standards of evaluation.  It  must incorporate  relevant  criteria  of 
practical reasoning that take into account the rationality of people and their tendency to 
pursue their own interests. Constructivism, in its pure procedural version, focuses on 
the need to elaborate principles without influences of particular normative conceptions, 
whose correctness does not depend on the application of the procedure itself. This is a 
very problematic point for constructivism. To be sure, it seems that the pure form of 
proceduralism is the most appropriate way a constructivist theory should endorse: the 
absence  of  controversial  normative  considerations  apart  from  the  procedure  itself 
would make it a strong position, since there are no problematic assumption. But is it 
possible to have a pure form of proceduralism? In the last section, I develop this issue.
5. The Choice of the Procedure
As said, according to constructivists, moral norms and principles of justice are 
109 Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, “Toward a Fin de Siècle Ethics: Some 
Trends”, Philosophical Review, 101, 1992 p. 140.
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justified  if  they  can  be  accounted  for  as  the  outcome  of  a  specific  procedure  of 
construction, that is,  the theoretical device that leads moral agent’s practical thinking 
from  basic  elements  to  constructed  principles;  rather  then  being  constructed,  the 
procedure  has  to  be  chosen  on  some  further  grounds. So,  what  are  these  further 
grounds? Do these grounding elements ultimately provide the standard of correctness 
for the constructive procedure? If so, these further (normative) considerations need to 
be  somehow  justified.  The  problem  is  whether  they  can  be  justified  with  a 
constructivist maneuver.
Constructivism is the claim that there are no basic moral facts or basic moral 
properties of facts, that is, facts that are objectionably moral. Certain facts count as 
moral facts, as reason-giving facts, because a suitably specified procedure bestows a 
reason-giving status on plain facts.  Now, what sort  of procedure can guarantee the 
objectivity of our moral claims?
In his defense of moral realism, Russell Shafer-Landau draws the distinction 
between realism and constructivism on the facts that moral  realists’s account of the 
objectivity  of moral  claim does not depend on any preferred perspective (which is 
provided by the procedure of construction): “the moral standards that fix the moral  
facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or  
hypothetical perspective. That a person takes a particular attitude toward a putative 
moral standard is not what makes that standard correct.”110
On this interpretation, moral realism is said to be stance-independent, since, on 
Ronal  Milo’s  account,  it  is  the  claim  that  moral  reality  is  “a  reality  that  obtains 
independently of how we are disposed to respond to the world in terms of affective and 
110 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism. A Defence, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003, p. 15.
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volitional responses.”111 So, constructivism has to be rejected because it implies a very 
impoverished  moral  reality.112 Taking  moral  facts  as  merely  as  the  object  of  an 
intentional  a stance cannot gets  any strong conception of objectivity.  The status of 
moral  claims always depends upon people’s  subjective  way to  look at  things.  The 
procedure just play a heuristic role in carrying at higher level of abstraction what, at 
the end of the day, is a parochial approach to morality.
On  the  philosophical  level,  this  means  that  even  if  moral  agents’ attitudes 
played a role, what makes objective our moral claims does not depend upon a process 
of reasoning. Shafer-Landau’s critique of constructivism goes on arguing how heavy is 
the  burden  of  proof  on  the  constructivist  side,  by  showing  that  any  process  of 
reasoning  must  incorporate  some  theoretical  constraints  in  order  to  get  objective 
outcome. In the moral case, these constraints have to guarantee both the moral status 
and the objectivity of claims.
Now, as said, a procedure is a theoretical device that works out principles and 
describes our process of moral reasoning. This procedure is supposed to have an actual 
role in the construction of principles: it  has to produce principles going beyond the 
materials  of  construction,  and  the  same  conception  of  the  person.  Constructivists 
understand objectivity as grounded not on the existence of a moral external world, but 
on a  proper construction. What makes a construction “proper” depends heavily upon 
normative  assumptions,  which cry out for  further  arguments.  According to  Shafer-
Landau these assumptions can be moral or non-moral ones. If they are non-moral in 
111 Rondal Milo, Cotractarian Constructivism, p. 182.
112 Recall Milo’s definition: a standard of moral evaluation is stance-interdependent is “just in 
case it consists in the instantiation of some property that exist only if some thing or state of af-
fairs is made the object of an intentional psychological state (a stance), such as a beliefs or a 
conative or affective attitude.” Ronald Milo, Contractarian Constructivism, p. 190.
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kind,  “there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  the  principles  that  emerge  from  such  a 
construction  process  will  capture  our  deepest  ethical  convictions.”113 On  the  other 
hand,  if  constructivists  take  these  assumptions  to  be  moral  ones,  they  have  to 
“acknowledge  the  existence  of  moral  constraints  that  are  conceptually  and 
explanatorily prior to the edicts of the agents doing the construction. These constraints 
are  not  themselves  products of construction,  and so there would be moral  facts  or 
reasons  that  obtain  independently  of  constructive  functions.”  And  he  sarcastically 
glosses:  “This  is  realism,  not  constructivism.”114 This  critique  pressed  against 
constructivism  is  a  variation  of  the  so-called  Euthyphro  dilemma:  Are  principles 
objective  because  of  the  application  of  the  procedure,  or  because  of  some further 
objective premises upon which the procedure is selected?
On a constructivist  theory objective moral norms or principles of justice are 
constructed  out  of  materials  of  constructions  (a  conception  of  person  and  the 
circumstances in which moral agents find themselves), via a procedure of justification. 
Certain procedure of construction starts from moral premises, others do not. Now, the 
constructivist has to face the following problem. If the procedure takes as material of 
construction some moral elements like a moralized conception of the person, we can 
get moral element as its outcome. This maneuver, one might protest, is not justified on 
constructivist  ground unless we are able to provide a procedure that justifies those 
starting  elements.  But  in  this  way  we  end  up  with  a  regressum  ad  infinitum:  a 
procedure P needs a procedure P1 justifying P’s outcome; then, P1 needs a procedure P2 
justifying P1’s  outcome.  And there is no a procedure Pn that does not need further 
justification.  Even  if  we  found  such  a  procedure  Pn,  then  it  would  be  difficult  to 
113 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism. A Defence, p. 42.
114 Ibid.
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explain the need of a set of procedure {Pn-1, P}. Simpler story might be available for 
accounting for the objectivity of morals.
A possibility  could  be  to  start  theorizing  from moralized  elements  that  are 
considered sufficiently shared among moral agents. These elements could be moral 
beliefs and practices shared by people. In this case we get moral outcome. But they 
could  vary  according  to  different  moral  codes  and social  arrangements.  Therefore, 
there is  not robust objectivity.  If the procedure starts  from moral elements,  we get 
objective moral outcome; nevertheless, this is not a form of constructivism. On the 
other end, if we start from non-moral elements, we get non-moral outcome. So, is there 
any way to save constructivism?
Before proceeding in facing this  challenge and to analyze different  sorts  of 
procedure of construction, I should add that not everything could be constructed. For 
instance,  I am not endorsing any view that sees the facts of nature as an object of 
creation. Also, the way persons see themselves, what are their cognitive capacities and 
their psychological tendencies might be influenced by several elements. Nevertheless 
it is not clear how these things can be constructed. We should start theorizing from 
somewhere, and there is no possible construction to be so radical to construct even its 
own materials  of  construction.  The point  it  is  not  whether  or  not  the  materials  of 
construction can be themselves constructed; rather,  what sort of procedure leads us 
from these basic,  non-constructed,  elements  to constructed principles that bestow a 
reason-giving status on plain facts. In the next chapter,  I  critically discuss classical 
constructivist  views,  distinguishing among them according to  the kind of  premises 
from which they start.
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Chapter Four
Constructivism and Its Premises
1. Introduction
In  moral  and  political  theorizing,  constructivism is  a  view that  attempts  to 
justify morality by appealing to some suitably specified procedure. There are different 
possible formulations of constructivism. We have different definition of constructivism 
depending  on  the  way  the  procedure  is  specified.  Different  definitions  of 
constructivism have diverse philosophical aims.
All  constructivists  agree  that  moral  norms  and  principles  of  justice  are 
constructed out of more elementary elements; but they disagree on what is a correct 
procedure of reasoning. For instance, Hobbesian constructivist approaches – such as 
David Gauthier’s – conceive of practical reasoning in terms of rational choice, where 
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moral agents are to maximize the satisfaction of their desires and make up for social 
arrangements in such a way that everybody could pursue one’s aims in most rational 
and  effective  way,  given  his  or  her  own  “bargaining  powers.”  On  this  view,  the 
procedure of construction responds to non-moral considerations. Its aim is to find out 
what reasons one has or could have to abide by moral norms and principles of justice. 
Kantian versions of constructivism,  instead,  regard practical  reasoning as involving 
both rational and reasonable constraints. For constructivist like Rawls or Scanlon, the 
procedure  has  to  respond  to  moral  considerations;  while  for  constructivist  like 
Dworkin  the  procedure  express  one’s  attitudinizing  toward  facts.  This  variety  of 
constructivism  addresses  the  question  about  the  justification  of  moral  norms  and 
political  principles.  In  this  chapter  my  aim  is  to  survey  some  of  the  classical 
constructivist  views, questioning whether they really are constructivist  at all.  I  will 
distinguish  between  constructivist  theories  that  start  from non-moral  promises  and 
those that start  from moral premises. I argue that forms of “constructivism without 
moral promises” are better equipped for accounting for the metaphysical parsimony, 
but they fail in justifying moral norms and principles of justice. On the other hand, 
forms of “constructivism with moral promises” can justify moral norms and principles 
of justice, but they do not represent a real form of constructivism.
2. Constructivism Without Moral Premises: Gauthier
Hobbesian  constructivism  does  not  take  moralized  premises  as  the  starting 
elements  for selecting  the procedure of  construction.  On this  view,  a  procedure  of 
reasoning that starts from people’s actual desires and preferences as its material  of 
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construction.  So,  moral  claims  are  objective  when  made  at  the  light  of  principles 
issued  by  a  procedure,  and  the  procedure  is  objective  when  it  issues  principles 
maximizes  the  satisfaction  of  individual  desires  and  preferences  through  some 
bargaining process. Stated in other way, the grounding reasons for selecting this kind 
of  procedure  is  some form of  individual  utility  maximization.  The resulting  moral 
theory is shaped as a theory of rational choice, based upon the identification of a set of 
constraints  influencing effective mechanisms for the creation of a desirable society, 
given the preferences of its members. In order to maximize the possibility of satisfying 
their  interests,  free  and  equally  rational  individuals  agree  on  a  set  of  principles 
imposing constraints on the means that can be legitimately employed for achieving 
individual aims. Gauthier defends this view  Morals by Agreement.115In this case we 
can restate the constructivist claim (C) in the following way:
(C2) some facts provide moral reasons because certain principles, which 
are  worked  out  by  a  suitably  specified  procedure  of  construction 
responding  to  some  non-moral  considerations,  confer  reason-giving 
status to those facts.
The considerations to which a procedure is supposed to respond are some non-
moral facts. These are a conception of the person as purely a-social, self-interested and 
non-cooperating. Gauthier rules out any ex ante moral constraints, since their inclusion 
would require further justification. The question is whether Gauthier’s procedure of 
construction – a process of bargaining among individuals116 – could possibly make 
115 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1986.
116 Gauhtier procedure is the “minimax relative concession,” according to which “the equal ra-
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relevant other non-moral facts in the moral and political domain. 
For  Gauthier  has  to  make assumptions  in  order  to  make the  initial  bargain 
possible, that is, to make the procedure constructing principles work. So, even if he 
does not take any ex ante criterion of morality, the initial situation of choice has to be 
constrained in some way. First of all, he needs a  Lockean Proviso, which “prohibits 
worsening the situation of others except where this is necessary to avoid worsening 
one’s own position.”117 The market (as a morally free zone of interaction) has to be 
constrained limiting the initial acquisition of resources, in order to make cooperation 
an  available  answer  to  market  failures.  This  Proviso  does  not  concern  natural 
endowments (such as mental and physical capacities): they are seen as those elements 
able to put a person in a bargaining position. Improving one’s position does not create 
a problem in itself, but we may say that, since endowments depend on mere natural 
luck, there are morally significant differences upon bargainers: “wise” and “foolish” 
people, for instance, will reach different results because of their natural endowments.
Of course, the Proviso does not ask for an egalitarian treatment of people and 
does not require the bettering of other people’s situations even if it has no excessive 
costs. Natural endowments, as far as inherited social advantages are concerned, can be 
used  for  tailoring  principles  in  an  individual’s  favor.118 In  order  to  obtain  greater 
tionality of the bargainers leads to the requirement that the greatest concession, measured as a 
proportion of the conceder’s stake, be as small as possible.” David P. Gauthier,  Morals by 
Agreement, p. 14.
117 Ibid., p. 203.
118 Gauthier contends that “no one deserves her natural capacities. Being the person one is, is 
not a matter of desert. But what follows from this? One’s natural capacities determine what 
one gets, given one’s circumstances, in a condition of solitude. One’s natural capacities are 
what one brings to society, to market and cooperative interaction. Why should they not determ-
ine, or contribute to determining, what one gets in society? How could a principle determine 
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benefits,  each  individual  can  use all  the  available  devices;  but  such  a  cooperative 
system  is  not  impartial  at  all.  Therefore,  why  should  people  abide  by  principles 
worked out by this bargaining procedure? Impartiality is achieved through a second 
constraint:  an  “Archimedean  Point,”  the  suitable  point  of  view  for  assessing  the 
outcomes  of  the  choice.  It  consists  in  an  “ideal  actor”  evaluating  the  terms  of 
cooperation or action-guiding principles, without being aware of his own individual 
interests: “although she may identify with no one, everyone may identify with her.”119 
This actor possesses all required information for behaving rationally (i.e., maximizing 
individual utility), but she does not possess direct access to her own preferences and 
resources. So, from the Archimedean viewpoint, everyone, not just a few people, must 
be made better off. In other words, Gauthier is taking a Pareto-efficiency conception of 
economic  behavior.  This  however  does  not  fully  address  the  question  either:  the 
problem does  not  consist  in  bettering  everyone’s  condition,  but  in  conceding  that 
relevant differences affect the outcomes. What does Gauthier mean by impartiality? 
The mere “applicability to all” cannot be sufficient for achieving “acceptability 
for all.” Moreover, why should one accept Gauthier’s principles if she obtained more 
benefit  in  a  non-cooperative  society?  He  addresses  this  point  by  distinguishing 
between  “constrained  maximizer”  and  “straightforward  maximizer”,  respectively  if 
agents  maximize  utility  undertaking  a  cooperative  behavior  or  they  do  not.  In  a 
cooperative society straightforward maximizer behavior leads to sub-optimal outcomes 
impartially how persons are to benefit in interaction, except by taking into account how they 
would or could benefit apart from their interaction?”. Morals by Agreement, p. 220.
119 “[T]he ideal presents a rational actor freed, not from individuality but from the content of 
any particular individuality, an actor aware that she is an individual with capacities and prefer-
ences both particular in themselves and distinctive in relation to those of her fellows, but un-
aware of which capacities, which preferences.” Ibid., p. 233.
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(as  Prisoner’s  dilemma-like  case  shows).  Gauthier  thinks  that  if  a  constrained 
maximizer believed that all (or the majority of) the members of society would behave 
as he does, he could have reasons for cooperating. But it is trivial to say that if all 
members cooperate, they will have more advantages. Why should we expect such a 
society? Some authors criticize  this  view,  noting that  it  is  difficult  to  explain how 
people  can  choose  psychological  propensities  (such  as  respecting  rules  or  not).120 
Imagine that there is someone who could make his situation better if he refused to 
cooperate, and who is certain that nobody can discover him: is it rational to behave as 
a constrained-maximizer in this case?121 Gauthier arbitrarily assumes that if two thirds 
of the people cooperate and they do not succumb in at least four fifths of the cases to 
other straightforward-maximizers, cooperative society will have acceptable outcomes. 
The problem however still remains: if personal interests always moved us, why then 
should we accept  a  sub-optimal  outcome? This  is  completely  unjustified.  Gauthier 
adds a third normative assumption, stating that all human beings are equally provided 
with rationality in the initial situation of choice.122 This assumption does not refer just 
to the bargainers’ capacity of reasoning, considering different solutions and calculating 
consequences. He thinks that all individuals reason in the same way; but, if it were the 
case, all bargaining problems could be resolved by game theory. Maybe Gauthier has 
in mind societies made up entirely of mathematicians!
Human  beings  are  different  in  all  relevant  aspects.  They  share  only  the 
tendency  to  obtain  advantages  from  bargaining.  Thus,  differences  between,  say, 
120 Alan Nelson, “Economic Rationality and Morality”, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17, 
1988, p. 158.
121 Like in the case of the “Rational Foole” in Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651, Ch. XV.
122 David P. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Ch. IV.
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‘strong’ and  ‘weak’ people  is  a  significant  matter  in  grounding  those  norms  that 
regulate our life together. Now, Gauthier could reply that taking into account morally 
relevant  differences  involves  ex  ante  moral  conceptions  (introduced  without  any 
justification):  normative principles  would violate  “the integrity  of human beings as 
they are and as they conceive themselves.”123
A situation where bargainers have direct access to relevant information justifies 
nothing more than present inequalities among individuals. Gauthier tries to amend the 
initial situation avoiding the use of inequalities for imposing coerced consensus: he 
tries to make the situation of choice impartial ruling out any acts of predation  in the 
‘state of nature’, not admitting the improvement of one’s position by fraud and force. 
So, Gauthier’s ideal of justice as mutual advantage is achievable only by constraining 
the choice; these constraints – the premises of the constructive procedure – are the 
actual  justifying  devices.  Are these constraints  merely rational?  Or are there some 
moralized conceptions that make things better? By the end of the day, if the initial 
situation of choice is to be to everybody’s advantage, it cannot be that unfair. If they 
are not,  and normative principles can be genuinely constructed out of a process of 
bargain, one might still legitimately ask whether the outcome of the theory is really 
moral.
3.  Constructivism  With  Moral  Promises:  Rawls,  Scanlon  and 
Dworkin
When we select a constructive procedure starting from non-moral premises, we 
123 Ibid., p. 254. For a similar argument see Robert Nozick,  Anarchy, State, And Utopia, Ch. 
VII.
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run the risk to end up with principles whose foundation does not invoke any ex ante 
criterion of morality, but we might not get moral upshot. Consider then a different sort 
of grounding reason for the choice of the procedure. For this reason we might think to 
restate the constructivist claim (C2) in this way: 
(C3) some facts provide moral reasons because certain principles, which 
are  worked  out  by  a  suitably  specified  procedure  of  construction 
responding to some moral considerations, confer reason-giving status to 
those facts.
The considerations to which a procedure is supposed to respond are some facts 
of the matter about morality. Their function is to make relevant other non-moral facts 
in the moral and political domain. These moral facts are not themselves constructed; 
rather, they represent those fundamental elements to be embedded into the procedure 
constructing principles.
One might wonder whether this approach is really a form of constructivism. 
Independently of where they come from and of the way in which we know them, they 
are a priori elements of the constructive procedure. Therefore, they are prior to the 
moral principles. To be sure, this could represent just a weak form of constructivism. 
Indeed,  principles  are  constructed  out of  more elementary  components.  And,  since 
principles are outcome of a procedure, they are to be considered as justified. But their 
justification clearly depends on some non-constructed, moral premises. These premises 
can be some particular aspects of human beings, like the fact that people have a priori 
rights or fundamental basic needs. In other words, some universally shared properties. 
10
A procedure able to  take  these considerations  into account  yields  can make moral 
claims objective.
It is clear that the criteria of objectivity for the procedure are different from the 
criteria of objectivity for moral claims. (C3) considers claims as justified when they 
are  yielded  from  a  correctly  applied  procedure.  And  a  procedure  is  said  to  be 
“correctly applied” when the process of reasoning, which leads moral agents from the 
premises to conclusion, is faultless.124 But the correctness of the procedure is given by 
the capacity to respond in the appropriate way to considerations that are given prior to 
the  procedure.  Suppose,  for  example,  that  there  are  universal  rights;  then,  the 
procedure would be correct when moral claims expressed on the basis of principles 
yielded by such a procedure protected those rights. As an alternative, suppose that the 
relevant kind of considerations is based upon the fact that people suffer when subject 
to certain treatments; then, the standard of correctness for procedure of construction 
would  be  provided  by  the  responsiveness  of  the  procedure  to  the  fact  of  human 
sufferance. It is clear that the criterion of correctness for principles is given by the 
correct application of the procedure. But the criterion of correctness for the procedure 
of construction relies upon considerations that are, first, prior to the procedure itself, 
and second, independent of our conceiving of them. They are realist elements. If there 
are elements prior to the procedure itself,  we have a realist  approach rather than a 
constructivist  one.  Of  course,  for  a  constructivist  theory  not  all  elements  are 
necessarily  constructed.  However,  if  the  elements  that  make  something  right  and 
wrong are independent of moral agents’s intentional conceiving, it  follows that this 
strategy is loosely constructivist, since the procedure does not play any actual role in 
124 Of course, I am assuming that a moral agent is capable of faultless reasoning at least in 
hypothetical cases.
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making facts relevant from the moral point of view.
Let us see how this problem applies moral and political theories. Take Rawls’s 
theory as the most prominent constructivist view in contemporary debate.  My aim is 
not  to  discuss  how  the  original  position,  Rawls’s  favorite  interpretation  of  the 
constructivist procedure, is characterized. The central idea I want to point at is that 
according to Rawls, first principles of political morality are the outcome of a procedure 
of reasoning, which incorporates certain requirements of practical reasoning, such as 
the concept of a person (as reasonable and rational) and the social role of morality. The 
concept  of  a  person  serves  to  bind  ethics  to  moral  agents.  Moral  norms  are 
meaningless without their constructors. As Rawls puts it,
[constructivism] sets up a certain procedure of construction which answers to certain 
reasonable  requirements,  and within this  procedure  persons characterized  as  rational 
agents of construction specify, thought their agreement, the first principles of justice.125
Rawls’s  constructivism  aims  at  providing  a  method  of  justification:  the 
outcome of this procedure of construction has to be considered justified. The materials 
of construction are the conceptions of person and society, and the role of a conception 
of justice. Persons are characterized as having two moral powers, namely a capacity 
for a sense of justice and the capacity to have, form, revise, and pursue a conception of 
the good. The role played by a conception of justice is to provide a public basis of 
justification in a society marked by permanent disagreement about moral and political 
125 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”,  in  Journal  of  Philosophy, 77 , 
1980, p. 516.
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views. So conceived, principles are not derived from an independent order of moral 
values; rather, they are constructed out of these grounding elements. For this reason, 
Rawls labels his justificatory method as constructivist.126 Rawls’s moral constructivism 
is the claim that
the  order  of  moral  and  political  values  must  be  made,  or  itself  constituted,  by  the 
principles and conceptions of practical reason […] by the activity, actual or ideal, of 
practical (human) reason itself.127
In other words, these principles are not imposed upon them from an external 
(or  heteronomous)  source.  Principles  of  justice  are  the  outcome  of  an  agreement 
among  free  and  equal  moral  agents.  In  this  way,  principles  can  be  considered  as 
autonomously selected, since practical reason alone “constitutes” or creates the order 
of moral values (to which we refer in our practical decisions).128 The central claim of 
Rawls’s constructivism is summarized in this key passage:
Apart  from the  procedure  of  constructing  these  principles,  there  are  no  reasons  of 
justice. Put in another way, whether certain facts are to count as reasons of justice and 
what their relative force is to be can be ascertained only on the basis of the principles 
that result from the construction. […] it is important to notice here that no assumptions 
126 While in  A Theory of Justice Rawls makes reference to a liberal comprehensive view, in 
Political Liberalism he draws on implicitly shared values present in the public political life of 
a democratic society. Indeed, in the later works, his aim is to come up with a political concep-
tion of justice that could possibly be accepted by adherents of reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines, which are the many religious and philosophical beliefs characterizing a complex soci-
ety. For the reason why I do not consider Rawls’s political constructivism see Introduction. 
127 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 99
128 Ibid.
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have been made about a theory of truth.129
Larry Krasnoff argues that this is an overstatement “because there are clearly 
moral  considerations that  support Rawls’s conception of the person as rational  and 
reasonable, as well as his design of the original position as a constructive procedure. It 
could not be that these moral facts are constructed by the original position”130. Maybe 
Krasnoff  is  right.  But  there  are  other  alleged  “overstatements.”  Take  these,  for 
instance:
Whether certain facts are to count as reasons of justice and what their relative force is to 
be  can  be  ascertained  only  on  the  basis  of  the  principles  that  result  from  the 
construction.131
It  is  not  that,  being impartially  situated  [in  original  position]  they  have  a clear  and 
undistorted view of a prior and independent moral order. Rather (for constructivism), 
there  is  no  such  order,  and  therefore  no  such  facts  apart  from  the  procedure  of 
construction as a whole; the facts are identified by the principles that result.132
Elsewhere,  Rawls  declares  to  want  to  remain  agnostic  about  metaethical 
issues.133 But  in  the  above  passages  he  is  defending  a  (maybe  tentative,  but 
nonetheless)  metaethical position.  Here Rawls is arguing that it  is a procedure that 
129 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism”, p. 565.
130 Larry Krasnoff,  “How Kantian is Constructivism?”, Kant~Studien, n. 90 (1999), p. 391.
131 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism,” p. 465.
132 John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism,” p. 568. See also on this point John Rawls “Themes 
In Kant's Moral Philosophy”, in Eckart Förster (ed.),  Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Palo 
Alto: Stanford University Press, p. 101.
133 See Introduction.
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makes moral  claims objective,  and not independently  objective claims that  make a 
procedure objective. But one might ask: which procedure is the right one? To address 
this point we have to go back to the theory and its justificatory devices, namely the 
reflective  equilibrium  method.  Rawls’s  version  of  constructivism  alone  is  not 
sufficient.  If  the validity  of principles  does not depend upon a queer  metaphysical 
order of moral entities, this is not because of the constructivist approach, but rather 
because  of  other  normative  arguments.  If  constructivism  can  be  reduced  to  other 
approaches, then it does not play any role in moral theory, or just a rhetorical one.
The reflective equilibrium method represents the end of a process, when we 
revise on due reflection our system of beliefs in a given area of inquiry, evaluating its 
overall  coherence.  This  method  consists  in  working  back  and  forth  between  our 
considered moral convictions,134 moral norms and principles of justice, and relevant 
background theories (the theoretical considerations that we believe to have a bearing 
on  the  acceptance  of  these  considered  convictions  and  principles).135 When 
134 For Rawls considered convictions are “those rendered under conditions favorable to the 
exercise  of  the  sense  of  justice,  and  therefore  in  circumstances  where  the  more  common 
excuses and explanation for making a mistake do not obtain when one is well informed about 
the  matter  in  question.”  The  favorable  conditions  are  those  which  rule  out  all  irrelevant 
elements with regards to the fairness of the agreement: individuals must not be influenced by 
anger or fear, or by the possibility of winning or loosing something and so on. So, “the person 
making the judgment is presumed to reach a correct decision (or, at least, not the desire not 
to).” John Rawls,  A Theory of Justice, p. 42. See on this point the figure of the “competent 
moral  judge”  in  John Rawls,  “Outline  of  a  Decision  Procedure  for  Ethics”,  in  Collected 
Papers, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, pp. 1-19.
135 Obviously, principles of justice (as part of a moral theory) and relevant background theories 
cannot be constructed starting from the same set  of  considered convictions.  It  is  therefore 
necessary  to  assume  that  there  are  at  least  two  far  from  empty  and  distinct  subsets  of 
considered convictions, say (s1) and (s2), so that (s1) is the basis for the principles and (s2) is the 
basis for background theories. If (s1) were the same as (s2), reflective equilibrium would be 
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inconsistencies  arise, we should revise those elements.  The equilibrium is achieved 
when one is no longer inclined to revise claims, principles, and theories, since they 
have attained the highest degree of acceptability and credibility for us.136
Now, the characterization of the initial the situation of choice as laid out in the 
original position has to match our considered convictions. If it does not, we can revise 
the constraints on the initial situation, until we arrive at a stable equilibrium. Note that 
Rawls does not assume that a set (or a subset) of basic elements is foundational. There 
are  no  objective  points  as  self-evident  beliefs  or  self-justified  principles,  but  only 
starting points always under adjustments. Of course, everyone will be more confident 
in some intuitions, but they are not inalterable and foundational.
If the original position has to pass the test of the reflective equilibrium method, 
then it seems that the procedure of construction possesses just a heuristic role: it tells 
us which principles we should choose among competing ones, without justifying the 
choice.  It  can be a  device  for externalizing  and carrying our  moral  intuitions  to  a 
higher degree of abstraction. But the justification of those principles is definitely given 
by the reflective equilibrium.
One  might  object  to  this  line  of  criticism  claiming  that  the  reflective 
equilibrium  method  highlights  the  presence,  in  complex  societies,  of  competing 
trivially circular. See on this point Norman Daniels “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory 
Acceptance in Ethics”,  in  The Journal  of Philosophy,  vol.  76, ,  1979, p.  258 and Thomas 
Scanlon “Rawls on Justification”, in Samuel Freeman, The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, pp. 142-143.
136 “[b]y  going  back  and  forth,  sometimes  altering  the  conditions  of  the  contractual 
circumstances at  others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to principle,  we 
shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and 
yields  principles  which match our  considered judgments  duly pruned and  adjusted.”  John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 18.
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conceptions  of  justice;  the  original  position  procedure  chooses  among  them those 
fitting  coherence  requirements  of  reflective  equilibrium.  So,  people  comprehend 
justice in different ways,  but only in favorable conditions  they can make a correct 
deliberation. If this were a correct interpretation of Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, it 
would have weak justificatory force, since it describes, and does not select among, 
competing conceptions of justice. The choice is made in original position.137 But one 
can wonder why, at least on the epistemological level, we need reflective equilibrium 
at all.
On  a  different  interpretation,  the  reflective  equilibrium method  possesses  a 
deliberative role:138 seeking coherence, it consists in deliberating on what we ought to 
do when doubts arise. First, the procedure of construction can help us to identify those 
principles  that  best  account  for  our  intuitions.  Then,  the  method  of  reflective 
equilibrium is involved in both construction and justification. Reflective equilibrium 
gives prominence to moral intuitions. Constructing principles without such elements is 
tantamount to building them on nothing. But if our intuitions are merely the result of 
historical accident and bias, if they are just what people think, we can argue that there 
is  no  justificatory  force  to  the  procedure  of  construction  itself  if  we  model  this 
procedure  so  that  it  yields  principles  able  to  match  our  considered  convictions  of 
justice.
137 This interpretation is presented by Scanlon. On the “descriptive interpretation,”  reflective 
equilibrium gives  a  philosophical  account  of  our  moral  sensibility.  See  Thomas  Scanlon, 
“Rawls on Justification”, p. 142.
138 This is the other possible interpretation presented by Scanlon. On the “deliberating inter-
pretation,” reflective equilibrium takes considered convictions about morality or justice as the 
most  adequate  intuitions  for  moral  deliberation.  See  Thomas  Scanlon,  “Rawls  on 
Justification”, p. 142.
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Hare argues that Rawls is an intuitionist and a weak foundationalist:  at the root 
of Rawls’s theory there are normative premises (such as concepts of fairness, equality, 
and rationality) shaping the entire theory.139 So, these are the actual theoretical devices 
justifying  the  choice.  These  premises  do  not  rely  on  the  natural  world  or  a 
metaphysical  reality;  they  come from our  everyday  understanding  of  morality  and 
claiming that such premises are provided just with initial credibility does not change 
the question.140 A person under appropriate conditions (original position) opts for a set 
of principles accounting for her considered convictions; these principles have to be 
coherent with the sense of justice (reflective equilibrium); but it is the same sense of 
justice that features the procedure of construction, namely the original position. Now, 
it seems that Rawls works out a theory where he suggests how we ought to think our 
thoughts about justice: perhaps, in original position there is just Rawls, sitting on the 
throne of Kantian reason!141
Intuitions  are  not  merely  people’s  opinions,  as  Hare  could  argue,  but,  like 
scientific  hypotheses,  they  are  conjectures,  which  can  be  transformed  in  a  theory 
through a series of tests, namely theories of justification. All critics however are right 
in noting that without an egalitarian framework, Rawls’ theory collapses. Why should 
139 Richard M. Hare,  Rawls’s Theory of Justice,  in Norman Daniels (ed.),  Readings Rawls:  
critical studies on Rawls' A theory of justice,  Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975. See also  Joel 
Feinberg,  Rawls  and  Intuitionism,  in  N.  Daniels,  Readings  Rawls,  and  Gerald  Gaus 
Justificatory Liberalism – An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, especially Chapter 6.
140 See Gerald Gaus  Justificatory  Liberalism,  especially pp.  101-102,  and Brad Hooker  B. 
Hooker,  Intuitions and Moral Theorizing, in Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.),  Ethical Intuitionism.  
Re-evaluations, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2002.
141 “[T]here is no theoretical reason to posit more than one party in the original position.” Jean 
Hampton, “Contracts and Choices: Does Rawls Have a Social Contract Theory?”, The Journal  
of Philosophy, vol. 77, 1980, p. 334.
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someone  be  committed  to  Rawls’ principles  if  he  did  not  endorse  his  egalitarian 
premises?  We  can  conclude  contending  that  constructive  procedure  has  a  weak 
justificatory  force  in  Rawls’ theory,  since  reflective  equilibrium  seems  the  actual 
justificatory  device  together  with  a  substantial  interpretation  of  the  Rawlsian-
egalitarian sense of justice.
Another example of this variety of constructivism is Scanlon’s view of morality 
Scanlon tries to endorse some form of agnosticism about metaphysical issues, but there 
are  passages  where  he  seems  to  reject  moral  realism,  claiming  that  there  are  no 
interesting ontological questions about morality. His account is worked out through a 
peculiar interpretation of the social contract in order to avoid any metaphysical issue. 
The contract  here is  to be interpreted as that valid  method of reasoning,  namely a 
procedure of construction, able to yield principles that all (at least hypothetically) are 
expected to endorse without commitments to any ontology of morals. As Scanlon puts 
it,
[i]f  we  could  characterize  the  method  of  reasoning  through  which  we  arrive  at 
judgments  of  right  and wrong,  and could explain why there  is  good reason  to  give 
judgments  arrived  at  in  this  way  the  kind  of  importance  that  moral  judgments  are 
normally thought to have, then we would, I believe, have given sufficient answer to the 
question of the subject matter of right and wrong as well. No interesting question would 
remain about the ontology of morals – for example about the metaphysical  status of 
moral facts.142
When Scanlon says that there is no “interesting question,” he can mean two 
142 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1998, p. 2. 
See also Chapter 1, § 11 (especially pp. 63-64); Chapter 8, § 6 (especially p. 355).
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things. On the one side he can be interpreted as invoking a form of quietism. On the 
other side, Scanlon might be seen as a constructivist. Indeed, there are passages where 
he might suggest this reading. Discussing the property of “being wrong” he argues that
moral wrongness is not a natural kind; but it is what might be called a normative kind. 
That  is  to  say,  the  property  of  moral  wrongness  can  be  identified  with  a  certain 
normatively significant property which is shared by actions that are wrong and which 
accounts for their observed normative features, such as the fact that we have reason to 
avoid such actions, to criticize those who perform them, and so on.143
At a first, ingenuous sight, Scanlon might sound like a constructivist. Indeed, in 
order to detect the property of being right or wrong, one might focus on the role of 
agreement  invoked by Scanlon: hypothetical  agents in suitably specified conditions 
develop certain attitudes that allow them to judge things as right and wrong. Scanlon 
himself, then, might lead to think that he is endorsing a constructivist maneuver. In an 
endnote,144 he claims that his view is closer to what Korsgaard defines “procedural 
realism,” according to which “there are answers to moral questions because there are 
correct procedures for arriving at them.”145 If this were Scanlon’s view, then he would 
be a constructivist and not a realist. A moral realist would claim that “there are correct 
procedures  for  answering  moral  questions  because  there  are  moral  truths  or  facts, 
which exist independently of those procedures, and which those procedures track.”146 
Many philosophers have been reading Scanlon as a constructivist. Here I am going to 
show how Scanlon can be considered a sort of constructivist on moral principles, but 
143 Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, p. 12.
144 Note 48, p. 380.
145 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, pp. 36-37.
146 Ibid.
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not on moral reasons.
In his discussion of the nature of normativity,  Scanlon sees the difficulty in 
grounding  ethical  claims  on  objective  basis,  without  the  ontologically  demanding 
commitments of moral realism. In a recent paper, he says that:
Reasons are not a special class of entities. The kinds of things that can be reasons are 
facts  or  propositions  of  other  kinds.  So  what  is  at  issue  does  not  seem  to  be  an 
ontological question about the existence of reasons. 147
We cannot choose what reasons to have. We choose the moral principles we 
choose because we have reasons for choosing them and not vice versa. In this sense 
reasons are choice-independent. But one might wonder: what are reasons? The notion 
of  a  reason,  being  primitive,  cannot  be  explained  in  further  terms.  Reasons  are 
considerations that count in favor of something. “Counting in favor of” is qualified by 
Scanlon as a non-natural relation between facts and the wrongness of actions.
Many are mistaking in focusing on Scanlon’s notion of agreement.  The key 
notion is  “reasonable rejectability,”  which does not depend on the fact  that people 
agree or could agree if they were in ideal conditions on a set of principles telling us 
what is right and wrong. If a principle is “reasonably rejectable”, it means anything but 
that  there  are  considerations  that  reasonably  counts  against  its  (hypothetical) 
endorsement  and  that  those  considerations  hold  for  all  those  affected  by  such  a 
principle. When there are reasons for not doing something, it means that there are no 
facts of the matter that make that thing morally permissible.
If this is a fair reconstruction of Scanlon’s view, he is not a constructivist at all. 
147 Thomas M. Scanlon, “Constructivism: What? And Why?”, unpublished manuscript.
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There  are  facts  of  the  matter  about  morality  that  are  prior  to  the  construction  of 
principles. Therefore, one can say, first, that Scanlon’s approach is not contractualist in 
the classical understanding of this label, since the idea of agreement does not play any 
role. People do not make agreement for finding the reasons they have; rather, they 
already  have  reasons  for  making  an  agreement.  Moreover,  his  view  is  not 
constructivist, since what counts as reasons does not depend upon principles originated 
from the constructive procedure. If the elements that make something right and wrong 
are independent of moral agents’ intentional conceiving, it follows that this strategy is 
only loosely constructivist.
Another strategy we might consider deploys a maneuver about the elements 
upon which the procedure is selected, which is less committal  from a metaphysical 
point of view. This other approach would ground the choice of the procedure on our 
attitudinizing towards a (non-moral) state of affair. So, (C3) could be restated as the 
claim that:
(C4)  some  facts  provide  moral  reasons  because  principles,  which  are 
worked out by a suitably specified procedure of construction expressing 
one’s attitudes towards those facts confers reason-giving status to those 
facts.
This view holds the same semantic claims of the strong form of moral realism, 
but  is  obviously less  committal  from the ontological  point  of  view.  So,  the  moral 
property “F” does not exist independently of the way we know, perceive or think about 
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it; its knowledge is the outcome of an account about our attitudinizing toward x. The 
set of attitudes injected into the procedure of construction constitutes the body of truths 
of the matter about morality. As for (C3), their function is to make relevant other non-
moral facts in the moral or political domain.
In this case, we know where these grounding elements come from: they are 
expressions  of  our  attitudes  of  approval  or  disapproval.  As  in  (C3)  normative 
principles are justified when outcome of a procedure, but the question of objectivity 
remains  open. Indeed,  one might  ask: on what  ground can objectivity  be granted? 
What  if  people  affected  by  the  endorsement  of  those  normative  principles  so 
constructed, develop different attitudes towards the same state of affairs? It seems that 
all we have here, is a mere process of generalization of one’s attitude.
For  (C4),  the criteria  of  objectivity  for  the  procedure and for  moral  claims 
come to coincide: moral claims are considered as justified when they are made on the 
basis of principles yielded from a correctly applied procedure. And a procedure is said 
to  be  “correctly  applied”  when the  process  of  reasoning  correctly  expresses  one’s 
attitudes.
But  this  version  of  constructivism  can  claim  a  quite  minimal  notion  of 
objectivity: objectivity here means no more that correct representation of subjective 
attitude.  One  of  the  desiderata  of  a  constructivist  theory  is  to  hold  metaphysical 
parsimony and a robust conception of objectivity. But in this case, the metaphysical 
parsimony might be achieved at the price of a robust conception of objectivity.
Dworkin  defends  this  kind  of  view.148 According  to  Dworkin,  a  moral  or 
political  theory  has  to  work  out  a  conception  that  best  fits  our  considered  moral 
148 R. Dworkin, “The Original Position”, in N. Daniels (ed.),  Reading Rawls, Stanford: Stan-
ford University Press 1989.
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convictions. Being practical, theory has to shape our first order convictions so that they 
can  be  presented  and  defended  in  a  public  discussion.  On  this  reading  of 
constructivism, the aim consists in the acceptability of norms from a public standpoint. 
The theory provides a general framework for justification, which is represented by the 
procedure of construction. Objectivity is achieved by those moral claims that  better  
withstand public scrutiny. But, what does “better” mean here?149
“Better,” as a comparative term, needs a normative qualification. In order to 
avoid the need for a metaphysical  order,  Rawls tries to push back this question to 
normative arguments, remaining silent on second-order questions. But Dworkin seems 
to go further than Rawls’s metaethical agnosticism. He might be interpreted as saying 
not  simply  ‘leave  truth  aside,’ but  rather  ‘truth  is  not  the  appropriate  test  for  the 
objectivity of moral claims. The sole test for objectivity is given by acceptability in the 
public arena: the coherence between a moral claim and the overall system of beliefs of 
the moral  agents affected by that claim.  The objectivity  of a claim is  given by its 
capacity to solve a practical problem, by its efficacy on the practical level. If the test 
for objectivity is practical efficacy, it follows that the constructive model of moral and 
political theorizing is a non-realist position: “we could say that constructivism is the 
view that the truth of such a theory is determined solely by its ability to perform the 
practical task.”150 Unfortunately, Dworkin does not say much about this in his writings.
This  variety  of  constructivism  faces  a  problem  common  to  all  coherence 
149 As in the case of the animal mentioned above, what is the “best” possible shape?
150 Larry Krasnoff, “How Kantian is Constructivism?”, p. 391. What seems clear, anyway, it is 
the fact that he takes constructivism to be the grounding approach to practical philosophy. 
Krasnoff admits the possibility of reading Dworkin as both metaethically agnostic and anti-
realist. I think that the anti-realist reading is better-supported by textual evidence in Dworkin’s 
essay.
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theories of justification. Even if a set of moral claims were perfectly coherent in itself, 
there would be no guarantee that that set was the correct one. There could be multiple 
sets  of  claims  that  stand  up  to  public  scrutiny  equally  well  but  that  are  mutually 
exclusive, leaving us no criteria for deciding which one is correct or objective in this 
higher sense.
One might consider a further way of defining constructivism. It could be the 
naïve  claim  that some  facts  provide  moral  reasons  because  principles,  which  are 
worked out by a suitably specified procedure of construction reporting moral practices 
of a society confers reason-giving status to those facts. This form of constructivism is 
naïve since it treats moral claims in a realist-like fashion, but the notion of objectivity 
is quite minimal and, most of all, quite restricted in scope. Indeed, it is evident that 
moving from a society to another, some – if not all – of the political practices will 
change. Therefore, objective is that moral claim conforming to what people approve of 
locally. Again, this is social constructivism, not moral constructivism.
4. What Constructivism Could Possibly Be?
So far we have seen some of the main understandings of constructivism. The 
kind of constructivism underpinning Hobbesian contractarian theories starts from non-
moral premises, but does not get moral outcome. On the other side, the more Kantian 
interpretation of constructivism – as stated in  (C3) and (C4) – gets moral outcomes, 
but one might wonder whether they really are forms of constructivism (as for C3) or 
they  defensible  form  (as  for  C4).  We  should  find  a  way  to  combine  (C2)’s 
responsiveness to non-moral facts, with  (C3)’s capacity to work out moral reasons. 
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This is the aim of the next chapter.
My aim is to try to redefine constructivism as not ontologically committed but 
to the simple fact that facts are product of human actions and other kinds of events. 
These facts are not guided by an external authority, but by reflections about how to 
face matter of facts. On this interpretation constructivism could be the claim that the 
objectivity  of moral  claims is a matter  of whether or not those claims withstand a 
procedure of scrutiny from the standpoint of public discussion.  To have reasons for 
selecting a specific procedure of construction, then, should to speak about the facts that 
account  for  the  practical  activity  of  constructing  principles.  This  move  adopts  a 
constructivist device. It acknowledges that factual considerations matter in selecting 
principles  that  shape  the  way  we  think  about  how  to  regulate  our  behavior.  In 
conclusion, a final remark on the notion of objectivity. As Samuel Freeman argues in a 
recent paper,
On a constructivist understanding of moral correctness, objectivity or objective moral 
judgments are prior to morally true or correct (or the most reasonable) moral principles. 
‘Objectivity is prior to the object’ of truth. By contrast, Realism of all kinds […] says 
that […] moral facts exist prior to and independent of reason and judgment, and that 
objective judgment conforms to (corresponds to) these moral facts or prior moral truths. 
(On  a  realist  understanding,  ‘the  object  of  truth  is  prior  to  the  objectivity  of 
judgment.’).151
So, it is not because there are moral facts that we can have objective moral 
claims. Rather, it is an objective procedure that makes moral claims objective on the 
basis  of  principles  worked  out  by  a  procedure  responding  to  non-moral  facts. 
151 Samuel Freeman, “Constructivism”, unpublished manuscript.
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Constructivism claims that there are moral truths or facts, but that they do not stem 
from an independent metaphysical order of moral things. Constructivism should be an 
anti-realist position, denying a fundamental condition for moral realism, that is moral 
facts are so independently of the evidence for them. Constructivism should admit the 
possibility of objectivity in moral theory, since it presents ethics as concerned with 
matters of fact, without falling into realist argument. Constructivism should maintain 
an anti-realist because it claims that moral truths depend upon our moral beliefs. For 
constructivism, moral claims would be different if our moral claims were different. 
And our moral claims would be different if the condition to which the constructivist 
procedure is supposed to address were different.
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Chapter Five
Re-defining Constructivism
1. Constructivist Desiderata
As seen, constructivists aim at a conception of objectivity in moral and political 
theory as robust as the one held by moral realists, while holding the same ontological 
parsimony  of  moral  anti-realist  positions.  This  makes  constructivism  a  very 
problematic position.  In fact,  one could concede too much to either realist  or anti-
realist side, loosing the specificity of such a position. The aim of this final chapter is to 
highlight those realist  and anti-realist  elements that constitute a constructivist  view, 
and possibly, to find the right balance between them.
Let us recapitulate the structure of a constructivist theory. Moral and political 
theories have moral claims – claims of the kind “X has a reason to do  y” – as their 
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target. Moral claims are expressed upon more general moral principles. According to 
constructivists, these moral norms and principles of justice are justified if they can be 
accounted for as the outcome of a specific  procedure of construction.  A procedure 
constructing principles is not itself constructed; rather it has to be chosen on some 
further grounds. Now, what are these further grounds? Do these grounding elements 
ultimately provide the standard of objectivity  for the constructive procedure? If so, 
these  further  considerations,  which  are  normative  in  their  character,  need  to  be 
somehow  justified.  The  problem  is  if  they  can  be  justified  with  a  constructivist 
maneuver.
2. A Re-Definition of Constructivism
These  grounding  elements  are  those  considerations  for  the  choice  of  the 
procedure. First of all, they are  grounding because they are the most fundamental in 
moral theory. They are not constructed elements of the theory and are not the outcome 
of a procedure of construction.  Moreover,  they are not derived by other principles. 
These grounding elements are the right-makers of the procedure. How can we take the 
grounding elements to be the correct one though?
The fact that there are non-constructed elements before the procedure does not 
represent a problem for constructivist. Also, they might be moralized conception. The 
fact that are non-constructed and moralized conceptions could represent a problem just 
in the case that the moral worthiness of these grounding elements did not depends 
upon the procedure. To put the same idea in other words, if the property of being moral 
depends upon something else respect to the procedure of construction, then we do not 
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have a constructivist approach at all. This requirement comes from the idea of pure 
proceduralism – as illustrated in Chapter Three – according to which there should be 
no moral criteria given before the procedure that determine the rightness of actions or 
the justice of social institutions.
One might  object  that  if  we do not start  from moral  elements,  then we are 
necessarily starting from non-moral elements. Otherwise, we are trying to get moral 
outcome from non-moral inputs, which is an option that I rejected in the last chapter. 
This is cannot be the case. In order to address this last challenge, I need to clarify how 
these grounding elements acquire moral worth.
In general, when we judge something as right or wrong, or as just and unjust, 
we are usually driven by some sort of unreflective attitude of approval or disapproval 
toward  that  thing,  on  the  one  side,  and  in  turn  we  think  about  this  unreflective 
responses in some sort of ‘cool hour.’ This is the reflective attitude that distinguishes 
us  as  moral  agents.152 Obviously,  these  two  attitudes  might  lead  to  contrasting 
outcome. Might we immediately approve of a certain action or state of affairs when, 
upon reflection, we come to disapprove. Now, besides the issue related the change of 
one’s attitudes, we want to find out which attitudes are the correct one, so that we get 
objective moral claims.
What  happen  when we revise  our  claims?  The  answer  is  quite  simple  and 
straightforward: we are checking whether or not our claims withstand a procedure of 
scrutiny that considers our normative claims altogether. According to constructivism, 
the  criterion  that  determines  objectivity  of  our  moral  claim  is  given  by  further 
normative claims endorsed by us. For example, the claim that “the fact that a virtue is 
152 Christine M. Korsgaard,  The Sources of  Normativity,  Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, especially Lecture III. 
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difficult  to  possess makes  it  morally  worthy” entails  the claim that  “The virtue of 
honesty is morally worthy” if this virtue is difficult to possess.
In the moral  and political  domain,  this  process of control  about  the sets  of 
claims that one can possibly make is carried out by moral agents when one considers 
how a moral claim withstands some procedure of scrutiny accounts for the relation of 
entailment between the two claims in the above example. This procedure is selected on 
the  basis  of  further  normative  claims  endorsed  by  moral  agents.  Note  that  these 
grounding elements are not moral claims themselves, but rather they are claims about 
the value or moral worthiness of claims. When we morally value something we display 
a tendency to unreflectively endorse a moral claim. Then, we judge whether there are 
overriding reasons to refuse to endorse such a claim. If the moral claim passes this test, 
we have reason for endorsing the claim at hand.
On a constructivist account, moral claims are claims about what really matters. 
And what  really  matters  is  defined  by  what  one takes  to  matter.  But  crude  moral 
relativists  also  claim  this.  The  standards  for  determining  what  really  matters  are 
defined by one’s moral  claims about  what matters.  In other  words,  the criteria  for 
defining one’s moral reasons are given by the moral claims about what really matters. 
The key  point  for  constructivist  is  that  there  are  no standard apart  from this.  The 
question has to be formulated always from a point of view that is internal to the moral 
domain. It does not make any sense to ask what is like to have the capacity to have 
reasons. It cannot indeed be formulated in further terms besides in terms of reasons to 
have reasons. But this is quite pointless. What makes sense instead it to step back and 
ask us what is like to have good reasons for us. And this is possible only evaluating the 
other  moral  claims to which we are committed.  Then,  as the fundamental  step for 
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getting objective moral claims, is to step back and ask us what could be endorsed by 
all moral agents affected by those claims.
Time has come to provide a definition of constructivism. This definition will 
not provide a full-fledge description of what is going to happen once the materials of 
construction are injected into the procedure. My aim is to set up the conditions that, on 
my view, any kind of procedural approach to moral theory has to respect in order to be 
constructivist. So, constructivism claims that
i. There are facts of the matter about morality, but these facts are not prior to 
and independent of our thinking about them. Rather, they are product of a cog-
nitive constructive process of enquiring about the moral (or political) domain.
ii. These facts provide moral agents with moral reasons (or reasons of justice). 
iii-a. What counts as moral reasons (or reasons of justice) depends upon prin-
ciples worked out by a procedure of construction.
iii-b. Some facts provide moral reasons (or reasons of justice) because certain 
principles, which are worked out by a suitably specified procedure, confer reas-
on-giving status to those facts.
iii-c. These  facts  have  to  be taken  into  account  by  the  procedure.  In  other 
words, moral agents elaborate moral norms and principles of justice endorsing 
a procedure of practical reasoning that is able to respond to these facts.
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From this, it follows that
iv-a. The reasons that count as moral reasons (or reasons of justice) do not de-
pend on any ex-ante normative criterion of justification, but only on the correct 
application of the procedure.
To put it differently,
iv-b. It  is reasoning that is performed correctly that makes moral judgments 
correct; judgments are not correct in virtue of some external and superior au-
thority. (Accordingly, whatever is constructed by the appropriate procedure has 
to be regarded as justified).
Therefore
iv-c.  The  source  of  justification  of  moral  claims  relies  ultimately  on 
moral agents’ correct application of a procedure of reasoning.
In  the  first  place,  constructivism  is  the  claim  that  moral  facts  possess  an 
epistemological  relevance,  but  not  an  ontological  one.  There  are  no  moral  facts 
independent of us, of what we are like, as expressed in (i.). Moral reasons are that kind 
of considerations that we offer when we have to justify our moral claims to others. 
Moral  claims  are  expressed  on  the  basis  of  some  general  moral  principles.  These 
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principles (iii-a) are not given a priori, but are outcomes of a constructive process. And 
the principles (iii-b.) Select, through a procedure, some facts relevant from a moral 
point of view. In other words, there are no mind-independent moral facts. Some facts 
are  moral,  and so they provide us with moral  reasons,  because a certain  cognitive 
process makes them so. A procedure of construction, then, is a conceptual device that 
takes  into  account  some  factual  (non-moral)  considerations  (iii-c.).  Having  this  in 
mind, we can formulate the conclusion (iv.) that the justification of principles, upon 
which moral claims are made, does not derive from some independent order of truths, 
but from some form of practical reasoning.
Now, one might protest that (iv.) does not follow from (i.) because while (i.) is 
about the nature of moral facts, (iv-b.) is about the constructivist justificatory method. 
A strong realist, for instance, could deny (i.) while accepting (iv-b). A moral realist 
might think that the justification of moral claims is possible through the application of 
a procedure, even if they correspond to or represent some independent reality. Then, if 
one possesses the knowledge of some moral truth without the application of any pro-
cedural device, we could say that it is a mere fluke. So, what is the relation, one might 
ask, between a theory of moral truth and a theory of moral justification on a construct-
ivist account? Roughly, a constructivist would say that, at least in the moral domain, 
truth and justification coincide, because of the ontological minimalism, as expressed in 
(i.). An objective or correct moral judgment is tantamount to moral truths; and moral 
truths are no ontological but epistemic. Moral realists claim that moral claims refer to 
real, non-constructed entities. Constructivists deny this and claim that moral principles 
have normative significance for us because they are the product of our reasoning about 
practical problems.
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This way of re-defining constructivism is not ontologically committed but to 
the simple fact that facts are product of human actions and other kinds of events. These 
facts  are not guided by an external  authority,  but by reflections  about how to face 
matter of facts. To have reasons for selecting a specific procedure of construction is to 
speak about the facts that account for the practical activity of constructing principles. 
This move adopts a constructivist device. It acknowledges that factual considerations 
matter in selecting principles that shape the way we think about how to regulate our 
behavior and model the political institutions in which we live.
3. Constructivism As Non-Reductive Naturalism
This account of constructivism is close to Korsgaard’s non-reductive naturalist 
account of moral obligation. In a passage of The Sources of Normativity, she writes:
the account of obligation which I have given in these lectures is naturalistic. It grounds 
normativity in certain natural – that is, psychological and biological facts. I have traced 
the normativity of obligation to the fact  of reflective consciousness and the apparent 
normativity  […] My account does not depend on the existence of supernatural beings or 
non-natural  facts,  and it  is  consistent  with although not part  of the Scientific  World 
View. In that sense, it is a form of naturalism.153
Korsgaard  provides  an  analysis  of  different  conceptions  of  the  sources  of 
normativity or reasons, defending a Neo-Kantian conception of normativity grounded 
in  autonomy.  On  her  view we  can  accept  the  realist  idea  of  objectivity  of  moral 
153 Ibid., p. 160.
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reasons, but she reject the ontological commitments of moral realist. As already seen, 
she distinguished  between  substantive  normative  realism and  procedural  normative 
realism. According to substantive realism “there are correct procedures for answering 
moral questions because there are moral truths or facts, which exist independently of 
those  procedures,  and  which  those  procedures  track.”  Procedural  realism,  instead, 
claims that “there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures 
for arriving at them.”154 This view rejects moral naturalism, that is, the view that there 
are moral facts and properties, they do not depend on anyone’s attitudes, and they are 
natural  facts  and  properties.  For  constructivists,  instead,  there  are  moral  facts  and 
properties and they do depend on one’s attitudes. The procedure of construction then 
rules  out  from  these  attitudes  desires,  preferences  and  other  subjective  attitudes, 
granting the objectivity of moral claims. Thus, moral claims have objective values, but 
not  because  of  the  existence  of  any  ontological  moral  realm.155 Moral  claims  are 
objective because of a process for solving practical problems.
This approach is not to be confused with a form of reductive moral naturalism, 
since it does not reduce the reasons we have to natural facts (even if the procedure is 
said to respond to natural facts). In fact, the reduction operated by moral naturalists 
represents one of the main criticisms moved by constructivists to moral realism. Moral 
naturalism,  reducing  moral  facts  to  plain  facts  on  the  ontological  level,  does  not 
address the question of normativity. As already George E. Moore made clear with his 
“open  question  argument,”  the  analysis  of  the  issue  of  normativity  is  begged  and 
confused with other  issues.  Thus,  we can keep asking the same question to  moral 
naturalists. What motivates the thesis according to which the term “good” cannot be 
154 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, p. 36-37.
155 See Chapter Two.
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defined by non-moral terms and cannot be reduced to non-moral properties, is the need 
to address question of moral reasons in different way. In a similar way, Korsgaard 
argues that the question about the sources of normativity cannot be addressed by a 
reductionist  analysis.  But  constructivists  do  not  follow  Moore’s  solution:  moral 
intuitionism is not an option answer given its peculiar non-natural metaphysics.
Constructivism opposes this view, claiming that the objectivity of moral claims 
is not prior to and independent of the procedures of reasoning that get them. Thus, 
according to a metaphysical reading of constructivism, there are no actions we ought to 
done or social  and political institutions that we ought to build up independently of 
some hypothetical procedure – a procedure that scrutinizes moral claims ruling out 
subjective attitudes that might play a role in their formulation.
Constructivism is  not only an epistemological  approach. Many philosophers 
tend to agree about the fact that we employ some  epistemic tools to find out what 
moral facts are, and so what reason we have. And they even agree on the fact that a 
procedure  justifies  our  moral  convictions.  What  makes  the  difference  between 
constructivism  and  other  procedural  approaches  is  the  idea  that  according  to 
constructivism, a procedure does track objectively moral facts. Rather the procedure 
creates  moral  facts,  or  constructing  moral  facts.  For  this  reason,  constructivism 
represent  more  than  an  epistemological  thesis.  Rawls’s  method  of  reflective 
equilibrium or Dworkin’s public standpoint test might be looked as an epistemological 
reading of the constructivist procedural approach: their procedures serve to determine 
what are the relevant moral facts the ground moral claims. Nevertheless they do not go 
further then this.
Constructivism is the claim that about the objectivity in the moral domain is the 
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view that there are no moral facts that are independent of a procedure, on both the 
epistemological and ontological level.
4. A (Possible) Argument
In conclusion, I want to propose a tentative argument supporting the idea that a 
procedure has to respond to plain facts, without reducing moral facts to plain facts. As 
we have seen, moral and political theories have moral claims as their target. This task 
is  accomplished  by  a  procedure  of  construction,  selected  on  the  basis  of  further 
grounding elements. Thus, the question is, what are these elements?
It is possible to provide a strong philosophical account of these reasons without 
falling into realist-like traps. My argument can be displayed in the following steps.156
(a) We are moral agents if we can autonomously choose how to regulate 
our conduct and our affairs.
(b) Even if we are free at the metaphysical level, our practical choices 
(about  which  principles  we  should  adopt  to  behave  and  about  how 
regulate our affairs) are constrained by the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves involved into at that moment.
(c) According to constructivists,  moral norms and principles of justice 
respond to these circumstances.
156 I am indebted for this argument to a conversation with Benjamin A. Schupmann.
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(d) These circumstances are a product of the choices made in the past 
(additionally, the choices we make now will affect future circumstances 
in which we will find ourselves).
(e)  Since  principles  determine  which  facts  count  as  moral  reasons  or 
reasons of justice, it follows that the reasons we have are determined by 
the  responses  to  facts  we make.  In  turn,  those  possible  responses  are 
determined by choices we made in the past.
The first step is an assumption about the capacity of moral agents to come up 
with  norms  and  regulate  their  conducts  and  political  institutions  accordingly.  The 
second step is a classical argument about the set of possibilities we can have according 
to what we have decided in the past.157 The third step refers to the point (iii.b) in the 
above stated re-definition of constructivism, according to which what counts as moral 
facts depend upon a procedure. Then it follows the appeal to the procedure, at step four 
as in (iii.c). At fifth step is a consequence of the constructivist tenet, expressed in the 
former steps. So we can formulate the conclusion that 
(f) By embedding those reasons into a procedure of practical reasoning, 
we are not referring to any independent order of moral values, we are just 
working out principles that rely on facts that are a product of our past 
choices.
157 For this argument see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984, p. 472-5.
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Does this argument account for an anti-realist position? It does (or, at least, I 
hope so) since it is not ontologically committed but to the simple fact that facts are 
product of human actions other kinds or events, what I called “circumstances” in the 
above  stated  argument.  These  circumstances  are  not  determined  by  an  external 
authority, but by reflections about how to face matter of facts. Understood in this way, 
constructivism  serves  three  purposes:  a  normative  purpose,  since  it  tells  us  what 
morals reasons or reasons of justice there are; an epistemological purpose, providing a 
method  of  justification  of  moral  claims;  and,  finally,  a  metaphysical  purpose  by 
opposing moral realism.
In  defending  or  challenging  constructivism,  many  authors  focus  on  the 
normative and epistemological aspects of constructivism, but remain silent about the 
last and most controversial one, namely its metaphysical side. In this dissertation, I 
tried to highlight the relevance of this third aspect by showing how normative and 
epistemological  understandings of constructivism are not enough to serve the three 
above stated purposes. Of course this reading goes against a classical interpretation of 
constructivism,  which  relies  on  Rawls’s  aim  to  ground  principles  of  justice  in  a 
practical conception of objectivity. Rawls aimed to opposing a theoretical conception 
of  objectivity,  for  which  moral  claims  are  objective  if  they  refer  to  a  prior  and 
independent  order  of  truths,  known through  intuition.  Morality,  on  this  theoretical 
reading,  would be independent  of moral  agents  and its  role  in  society.  For  Rawls, 
instead,  moral  claims  are  objective  insofar  as  rational  persons  in  appropriate 
circumstances reasonably choose them. I hope to have shown that we do not need to 
set  aside  the  theoretical  or  metaphysical  debate  in  order  to  match  the  Rawlsian-
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constructivist desiderata.
Constructivism can be metaphysical.
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Appendix
Facts-Free Principles.
The Rawls-Cohen Debate on 
Constructivism
1. Introduction
In  “Facts  and  Principles”,  Cohen  proposes  a  new  criticism  concerning  the 
foundations of Rawls’s thought, namely his constructivist perspective.158 According to 
158 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31, 2003. Cohen’s 
criticism  of  Rawls’s  paradigm  covers  many  aspects.  In  A  Theory  of  Justice (rev.  ed. 
Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press,  1999)  Rawls  proposes  a  principle  of  fair 
distribution  –  the  so-called  difference  principle  –  according  to  which  differences  in  the 
distribution  of  social  primary  goods  are  admitted  only  if  they  are  to  benefit  the  most 
disadvantaged in society. From a methodological point of view, Rawls applies the principles of 
justice  to  the  basic  structures  of  a  society,  namely  the  set  of  rules  that  shape  political 
institutions,  which  in  turn  regulate  the  people’s  life.  Gerald  A.  Cohen  criticizes  Rawls’s 
paradigm. According to Cohen, a theory of justice should equalize the effects of bad luck upon 
society in the distribution of social goods, since this distribution often depends on factors (such 
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Rawls and, in general, to moral and political constructivists, fundamental principles of 
justice  are  worked  out  by  a  procedure  of  construction.  No  further  justification  is 
required about these principles, besides the correct application of this procedure, which 
is supposed to embed basic criteria of practical reasoning.
In  A  Theory  of  Justice,  Rawls  claims  that  first principles  of  justice  are 
“responses”  to  facts  of  economics  and  human  psychology.159 “To  respond”  for 
principles means that “the choice of principles is relative to these facts.”160 This set of 
factual  claims  binds  Rawls’s  political  conception  of  morality  to  existing  societies. 
Rawls goes on claiming that the choice of his principle of a fair distribution of social 
primary goods, the difference principle,
as  one’s  social  class  or  the  natural  talents  that  a  person  possesses)  that  are  arbitrarily 
distributed among people. Since people cannot be held responsible for these social and natural 
endowments, they have to be compensated when bad luck plays against them. Moreover, on 
Cohen’s view principles apply directly to interpersonal relationship.
It is impossible to summarize the debate about luck-egalitarianism here. Moreover, it 
is not my aim here to discuss Cohen’s view of distributive justice. For the definition of the 
“difference principle”, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 266. For a discussion of the dif-
ference principle see Sebastiano Maffettone, Justice and Pluralism: An Introduction to Rawls, 
Chapter 4. On Cohen’s view see Gerald A. Cohen, “Incentives, Inequality, and Community,” 
in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 13, 1992; “The Pareto Argument for Inequality”, Social  
Philosophy and Policy, 12, 1995; “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26, 1997. For criticism of Cohen’s luck egalitarianism see An-
drew D. Williams, “Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27, 
1998; Samuel Freeman, “Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism,” in Justice and the Social Contract, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006
159 “The fundamental principles of justice quite properly depend upon the natural facts about 
men in society. This dependence is made explicit by the description of the original position: 
the decision of the parties is taken in the light of general knowledge.” John Rawls, A Theory of  
Justice, p. 137.
160 Ibid.
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relies on the idea that in a competitive economy (with or without private ownership) 
with an open class system excessive inequalities will not be the rule.161
Cohen wonders what “relies” and “excessive” mean and imply in the above 
passage. Cohen argues that the nature of principles of justice lies in their ability to 
guide people’s actions. Cohen argues that the primary task of a philosophical enquiry 
is  to  analyze  purely  normative  concepts,  such  as  justice,  rather  than  to  elaborate 
substantive conceptions about which principles are just. Thus, a genuine philosophical 
question – such as “What is justice?” – will concern  justificatory principles, and not 
regulatory principles  about  “What  principles  should  we  adopt  to  regulate  our 
affairs?”162 Justificatory  principles  provide  a  normative  framework  for  regulatory 
principles and are fact-free: their validity does not depend upon factual considerations. 
It follows that problems such as difficulty of implementation of a conception of justice 
do not defeat the validity of such a conception of justice, since its impossibility to be 
realized in practice (for instance, to be implemented in a constitutional system) does 
not  affect  the  soundness  of  a  theory’s  principles.  Criticizing  Rawls's  view,  Cohen 
writes: 
Rawls  believes  that  [fundamental  principles  of  justice  reflect  facts],  because  he 
misidentifies the question “What is justice?” with the question “What principles should 
we adopt to regulate our affairs?” For facts undoubtedly help to decide what principles 
of regulation should be adopted, that is, legislated and implemented, only if because 
facts constrain possibilities of implementation and determine defensible trade-offs (at 
161 Ibid.
162 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, § S. 
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the  level  of  implementation)  among  competing  principles.  The  distinction  between 
principles of regulation and the principles that justify them illuminates what is at stake 
in normative controversy.163
On this basis, Cohen argues that Rawls by “relies” means that if conditions 
were different, the denizens of the original position would not choose the difference 
principle,  but  a  different  one.  Therefore,  Rawls’ principles  are  no  fundamental, 
justificatory principles, but principles of regulation.
To  be  true,  Rawls  does  not  deny  this  possibility.  On  Rawls’s  view,  actual 
conditions  determine  what  principles  we  would  agree  on  if  we  were  in  original 
position. Cohen might object that if it were the case, one could argue that the theory is 
affected by empirical conditions so that it results quite contingent the fact that we have 
principles we have. Rawls can easily rebut this objection. Indeed, he writes:
Some philosophers have thought that ethical first principles should be independent of all 
contingent  assumptions,  that  they  should  take  for  granted  no  truths  except  those  of 
logical and others that follow from these by an analysis of concepts. Moral conceptions 
should hold for all possible worlds. […] From the point of view of the contract theory it 
amounts to supposing that the persons in the original position know nothing at all about 
themselves or their world. How, then, can they possibly make a decision? A problem of 
choice is well defined only if the alternatives are suitably restricted by natural laws and 
other constraints, and those deciding already have certain inclinations to choose among 
them.164
If the denizens of the original position could not rely on the knowledge of those 
163 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 244.
164 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 138.
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general facts, they would not be able to decide anything at all. Hardly could somebody 
decide what principles of justice to endorse if  she does not know the condition to 
which those principles apply and, upon this consideration, why the chosen principles 
are better than others. But Cohen’s criticism goes deeper than this. It claims that the 
constructivist procedure (in Rawls’s case, the original position) is not able to justify 
anything  because  of  its  fact-sensitivity.  A constructivist  procedure  could  at  most 
provide  heuristically  help  to  select  which  facts  are  relevant  in  the  application  of 
principles of regulation. But the justification of these principles does not depend upon 
a constructivist  procedure.  Thus, constructivism is  doomed to fail  in its  main task, 
namely the justification of regulatory principles.
As far as the qualification “excessive” is concerned, Cohen notices that there 
might be a different kind of assumption – which is normative all the way down and not 
factual at all – which remains unarticulated. It is something like a general principle of 
equality, according to which we ought not to cause excessive inequality in a society.165 
According to Cohen, this assumption plays the role of a further principle – which is 
normative all the way down and whose validity does not rely on factual circumstances 
like the one that lead the denizens of the original position to choose the difference 
principle – explains why those facts of economics and psychology ground the different 
principle.
How  can  the  constructivist  face  to  this  challenge?  The  importance  of  this 
objection is not simply related to Rawls’s argument for his conception of distributive 
justice. Indeed, Cohen attacks all constructivist theories. In this Appendix, I challenge 
Cohen's view. Indeed, if moral norms and principles of justice are action-guiding, as 
165 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 236.
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Cohen  maintains  they  are,  this  means  they  have  to  satisfy  a  general  principle  of 
realizability.  In  order  to  be  realizable,  a  theory  must  take  general  fact-dependent 
elements  into  account,  like  conceiving  of  the  persons  endorsing  that  theory  and 
conceiving of the circumstances in which moral agents find themselves. However, it is 
these  fact-dependent  elements  that  Cohen tries  to  rule  out.  If  these  elements  were 
accounted  for,  it  would  remain  unclear  which  regulatory  principles  Cohen's 
justificatory principles are supposed to justify. If justificatory principles are to justify 
particular regulatory principles, can they really do so without factual considerations?
2. Cohen’s View
The constructivist maintains the idea that the justification of moral claims does 
not require a reference to an order of truths or principles that prior to, and independent 
of,  moral  agents.  Principles  of  justice  are  created  through  a  rational  choice  of 
individuals and are not present in nature or given by a deity. And the reasons for their 
construction are to be found in the need to adequately respond to what Rawls calls 
“Humean circumstances of justice,” namely scarcity of resources and limited altruism 
of people.166 According to a constructivist approach, the question “what is justice?” has 
no meaning if one does not take into account the target of a conception of justice. To 
take  into  account  the  target  of  a  conception  of  justice  means  to  consider  both 
theoretical and factual elements like what the circumstances to which such a concept 
apply, the persons as they see themselves in those circumstances, a general knowledge 
of the facts of the world and so forth.
166 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, § 22.
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Cohen,  by contrast,  argues that  this  kind of  considerations  does  not  have a 
bearing on the philosophical analysis of the question of justice. In order to address the 
question  “what  is  justice?”,  the  philosopher  should  not  consider  principles  whose 
justification depends on factual considerations.
According to Cohen, a normative principle is
a general directive that tells agent what (they ought, or ought not) to do, and a fact is, or 
corresponds to, any truth, other than (if any principles are truths) a principle, of a kind 
that someone might reasonably think supports a principle.167
Some of  the  principles  that  govern  our  social  and  political  institutions  are 
selected on non-purely normative basis, that is, on considerations sensitive to facts. 
But not all principles are sensitive to facts. Indeed,
it cannot be true of all principles that they are sensitive to fact, and that it is true of some 
principles only because it  is  false of other,  fact-insensitive, principles,  which explain 
why given facts ground fact-sensitive principles. […] a principle can reflect or respond 
to a fact only because it is also a response to a principle that is not a response to a fact. 
To  put the same point differently, principles that reflect facts must, in order to reflect 
facts, reflect principles that don’t reflect facts.168
In simpler terms, a normative principle (P) is justified by a fact (F), which is 
non-normative  by  definition,  because  another  principle  (P’)  different  from  (P) 
establishes a relationship between (P) and (F). By iterating of this way of reasoning for 
167 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 211.
168 Ibid., p. 214.
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all those principles that respond to facts, we should be able to arrive at a principle or a 
set of principles that is “pure,” that is, fact-insensitive. These pure principles or first 
principles  of  justice  justify  all  relationships  between facts  and non-pure principles. 
Pure principles possess a different epistemological status compared to other principles, 
such  as  those  of  regulation.  Principles  of  regulation  have  a  minor  counterfactual 
robustness compared to justificatory principles, since their justification depends on the 
truthfulness  of  factual  assumptions  upon  which  they  are  grounded.  Justificatory 
principles, instead, respond to a single fundamental value or a single set of values or 
moral  truths  and their  task is  the one of justifying principles  of regulation.  Cohen 
makes the example I represent in the outline below, where P1-P4 are principles, and F1-
F3 are facts in which there are grounded.169  
169 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 216-217.
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F
Only when 
promises are 
kept can 
promisees 
successfully 
pursue their 
projects

P
We should 
keep our 
promises
F1
People can 
achieve 
happiness 
only if they 
are able to 
pursue their 
own projects

P1
We should 
help people 
to pursue 
their projects
F2
Promoting 
people’s 
happiness 
expresses our 
respect for 
them

P2
People’s 
happiness 
should be 
promoted, 
absent other 
considerations
F3
People possess 
what are 
thought to be 
respect-
meriting 
characteristics

P3
We ought to 
express our 
respect for 
people
P4
One ought to 
respect beings, 
human or 
otherwise, who 
have the 
relevant 
characteristics
(P4) is not sensitive to any fact, its validity does not depend upon and it is not 
affected  by  the  existence  of  beings  who  possess  these  characteristics.  All  those 
principles, whose choice is not based on factual considerations, are first principles. The 
opposite view, according to Cohen, would be the idea that
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our beliefs about matters of normative principle (including our beliefs about the deepest 
and most general matters of principle) should reflect, or respond to, truths about matters 
of fact:  they should, that  is,  – this  is  how  I am using “reflect” and “respond to” – 
include matters of fact among the grounds for affirming them.170
As said at the outset, Cohen’s polemical target is Rawls’s theory in particular 
and, more generally, constructivism. Opponents of constructivism argue that the moral 
claims derive their objectivity from some independent order of first principles or moral 
truths.171 These first  principles  or moral  truths are self-evident:  their  validity  is  not 
derived  from any  moral  agents’s  cognitive  activity  or  practice.  In  this  theoretical 
framework,  first  principles  may  be  knowable  through  some  cognitive  faculty. 
Therefore,  no complex notion of moral  agency is required,  since the objectivity  of 
moral claims does depend neither on moral agents nor the role played by morality in a 
society.
Drawing  the  distinction  between  justificatory principles  and  regulatory 
principles, Cohen reconciles his thesis with a broader analysis of different normative 
theories.  Now, one may suppose that  two parts  form normative  theories,  each  one 
addressing different questions. The first part addresses the question “what is justice?” 
This question is logically prior to and provides the conceptual basis for the second one, 
which  addresses  the  question  “what  principles  should  we  adopt  to  regulate  our 
affairs?” The two parts might be seen as mutually enforcing: the first part, made by 
justificatory fact-free principles, justifies the second part, which expresses and realizes 
the  action-guideness  of  the  former. So,  the  regulatory  principles  should  be  the 
170 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 213.
171 See Chapter One and Chapter Two.
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necessary consequence of justificatory principles.172  However, Cohen does not seem to 
endorse this position. Indeed, a few lines below, defending luck-egalitarian views from 
Elisabeth Anderson’s criticism, Cohen claims that:
difficulties  of  implementation,  just  as  such,  do  not  defeat  luck  egalitarianism  as  a 
conception of justice, since it is not a constraint on a sound conception of justice that it 
should always be sensible to strive to implement it, whatever the factual circumstances 
may be.173
Cohen rebuts Anderson's criticism on the basis that she does not distinguish 
between justificatory principles and regulatory principles. Even if her point presents a 
challenge for regulatory (luck-egalitarian) principles, Cohen argues, her criticism does 
not undermine the validity  of justificatory (luck-egalitarian)  principles.  Justificatory 
principles  are  fact-insensitive  and  independent  of  their  supposed  implementation. 
Thus,  justificatory  fact-insensitive  principles  cannot  be  criticized  through  factual 
arguments (for instance, arguments appealing to the feasibility of principles). Leaving 
aside the question about luck egalitarianism, this passage clearly shows that factual 
elements  have  no  role  in  establishing  what  justice  requires  on  Cohen’s  view.  One 
might think that justificatory principles are logically prior but somehow linked to the 
regulatory  ones.  One  may  say,  for  instance,  that  a  fact-independent  conception  of 
justice lies at the basis of every claim of justice. But Cohen's point seems different. He 
is not only distinguishing between justificatory and regulatory principles according to 
their  functional roles, but he is keeping them separate from one another since they 
172 Mason has a similar idea about the division of labor for normative theories. See Andrew 
Mason, “Just constraints”, British Journal of Political Science, 34, 2004 pp. 265-8.
173 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 244.
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belong to two independent spheres of normative theorizing.174
As seen, on Cohen’s account for each principle whose justification appeals to 
facts, there is always a more ultimate principle that justifies the relationship between 
facts  and  less  ultimate  principles.  The ultimate  principle  (in  the  case  at  hand,  the 
grounding  ideal  of  justice)  must  be  pure.  And  the  task  of  political  philosophy  is 
therefore  to  investigate  the  pure  concept  of  justice,  while  the  task  of  normative 
political theory is to apply the concept of justice of a particular social context. This 
does not mean that factual considerations do not play any role. To be true, the facts of 
the world, the circumstances  in which to apply a certain  conception of justice,  are 
essential  to give meaning to  the same idea of justice.  Rather,  the point  is  that  the 
question of application is not a genuine  philosophical  question for Cohen. All those 
theories  that  take into account  factual  elements,  like  constructivist  theories  do,  are 
therefore unfit to provide firm philosophical grounds for a theory of justice. Recall 
Cohen’s criticism of Rawls’s difference principle: facts about human psychology and 
economics (F) justify the difference principle (P), and this justificatory relationship is 
accounted for by a principle of equality (P’), which explains why (F) can justify (P), 
and (P’)’s validity does not depend on the occurrence of (F). A general concept of 
equality is, therefore, the actual justificatory device of the theory. Thus, the principles 
of justice Rawls, in the end, justified on the circumstances of justice,  are valid not 
because of the constructivist approach, but because of a principle insensitive to facts 
(such as the idea of equality).
174 Another way of interpreting his point could be the sort of distinction between ideal and non-
ideal theory. Ideal theory would only contain justificatory, fact-independent principles, while 
non-ideal theory would be made up of regulatory, fact-dependent principles. However, even 
this interpretation does not represent Cohen's view.
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Now, I already expressed by puzzlement about Rawls’s constructivism.175 But 
Cohen’s  argument  applies  to  all  constructivist  approaches.  If  Cohen  is  right, 
constructivism is able to provide no more than a contingent and arbitrary justification. 
Cohen  could  argue  that  a  constructivist  maneuver  can  be  put  in  place  when  the 
political theorist spells out which principles should regulate the relationships between 
individuals in a society, given the circumstances. Indeed, one could hardly deny that 
the  application  of  principles  to  social  and  political  institutions  can  do  without 
considerations about how people see themselves and their historical, political, social, 
economic  and  cultural  background.  However,  when  the  question  becomes  strictly 
philosophical, that is, when we inquire into the foundations of a theory of justice, the 
purpose of the inquiry should not be the definition of some regulatory principles, but 
principles justifying regulatory principles.
It seems that here Cohen, in an old-fashioned Platonic spirit, is supporting a 
thesis of this kind: there is a higher order principle or a higher order set of principles 
that is purely normative, whose task is to justify an empirically underdetermined set of 
lower  order  principles.  Although  the  application  of  higher  order  principles  is 
determined  by  the  circumstances  in  which  these  principles  are  applied,  their 
justification  is  not  derived  from further  considerations.  Higher  order  principles  are 
self-evident. Cohen thinks to prove in this way the mistake made by constructivists, 
who think that the justification of principles depends on a process of construction that 
incorporates  certain  requirements  dependent  on  facts.  Is  Cohen’s  criticism  really 
successful? Are Rawls and constructivists really the targets of his criticism?
175 See Chapter Four.
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3. Rawlsian Objections
Outlining his conception of political philosophy, Cohen writes this view:
suppose that,  like me, you think that  political  philosophy is a branch of philosophy, 
whose  output  is  consequential  for  practice  but  not  limited  in  significance  to  its 
consequences for practice. Then you may, like me, protest that the question for political 
philosophy is not what we should do but what we should think, even when what we 
should think makes no practical difference.176
In  this  passage,  Cohen's  claim  is  twofold.  First,  he  claims  that  political 
philosophy  has  a  bearing  on  practice,  but  its  task  is  not  limited  to  the  practical 
consequences stemming from the application of a theory of justice to a given social 
reality.  Second,  Cohen  maintains  a  stronger  argument  claiming  that  political 
philosophy is not mainly concerned with what we ought to do, rather with what we 
should  think,  regardless  of  its  practical  consequences.  This  is  coherent  with  his 
distinction between justificatory and regulatory principles. But Cohen’s position is far 
from being uncontroversial.
Cohen  claims  that  the  justificatory  principles  do  not  respond  to  facts. 
Therefore,  they cannot be criticized by means of non-normative considerations (for 
example,  considerations about the feasibility of these principles, since their validity 
does not derive from their possible implementation in an actual social and political 
system) because they would be factual considerations, that is, they apply to a different 
176 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 213.
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level.  On  this  point,  it  seems  that  Cohen  is  confusing  two  different  levels:  the 
justification of a principle, from the one hand, and the application of a principle on the 
other. The justification of a principle consists in affirming its validity on the basis of an 
argument  (which,  on Cohen’s view,  is  not  sensitive  to  facts).  The application  of a 
principle, instead, requires the selection of plain (i.e. non-normative) facts that makes a 
certain principle relevant. If in the latter case, facts are always required, in the former 
case they are not (or at  least  not necessarily).  But the question of justification and 
application are not the same thing. While in the case of application facts there are no 
fact-insensitive principles, in the case of justification principles are (or could be) fact-
insensitive. Unfortunately, Cohen does not explore this distinction.
One might think that justificatory principles are logically prior to regulatory 
principles, even if the two kinds are somehow related. One could say, for example, that 
a fact-insensitive concept of justice lies  at  the basis  of every claim or principle  of 
justice. Cohen's argument seems problematic for several reasons. First, one might ask 
what role would principles of justification have but to justify principles of regulation. 
In  other  words,  what  would  be  the  sense  of  taking  principles  of  justification  as 
independent  of  facts,  if  then they  are not  practical?  Cohen explicitly  supports  this 
position: the purpose of a philosophical inquiry is primarily to define what one must be 
thinking,  not  what  one  ought  to  do.  For  instance,  one  can  argue  that  this  idea  is 
contrary to the initial assumption about the nature of normative principles (the one of 
being action-guiding). Suppose luck egalitarians (like Cohen) say that justice requires 
“to extinguish the influence on distribution of both exploitation and brute luck.”177 In 
order to know what brute luck and exploitation are, we must allow some factual notion 
177 Gerald A. Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, Ethics, 99, 1999, p. 908.
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to enter into the process of formulation of those normative principles, which provide 
standard of moral evaluation. Cohen foresees this possible criticism:
A principle can be said to  be “fact-insensitive” in a  different  use from mine of  the 
quoted  expression,  in  that,  absent  certain  facts,  the  principle  lacks  an  intelligible 
sense.178 
Even if Cohen believes “that ultimate principles are fact-insensitive [...] also is 
in [this] further sense”, unfortunately for us Cohen decides to “defend only the former 
claim in the present article”. 179
Towards the end of the essay, Cohen argues that
Justice is not the only value that calls for (appropriately balanced) implementation: other 
principles,  sometimes  competing  with  justice,  must  also  be  variously  pursued  and 
honoured. And the facts constitute the feasible set that determines the optimal point(s) 
on  a  set  of  fact-independent  indifference  curves  whose  axes  display  packages  of 
different extents to which competing principles are implemented.180
Cohen’s  idea  seems to  be  this:  firstly,  one should  define  first  principles  of 
justice independently of facts. Secondly, in conceiving of their application, one must 
face the problem of competing values, whose implementation could possibly give rise 
to opposite consequences. Facts provide a set of constraints through which we can find 
the  optimal  point  of  intersection  between  the  curves  of  values.  At  this  point,  the 
problem  of  trade-offs  arises.  On  this  point  Cohen  seems  to  think  that  political 
178 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 213, footnote 1.
179 Ibid.
180 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 244-245.
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philosophy is  not concerned with trade-offs.  Yet,  regulatory  principles  are  at  stake 
here: to evaluate whether different values come into conflict, we have to consider how 
different values raise different claims having practical relevance. Cohen might agree 
on this conceptual reconstruction of his arguments.
Again, if the role of philosophy is merely to speculate about concepts without 
considering whether they are practically conflicting,  we will infringe the normative 
requirement  about  principle  (i.e.  the  prescriptive  nature  of  normative  concepts).  If 
political philosophers do not take position about the potential or actual conflict among 
values, the theory fails to attain its action-guiding role.
By  adopting  a  rigid  separation  between  the  justificatory  principles  and 
principles  of  regulation,  Cohen  generates  confusion  on  the  very  meaning  of 
normativity. Cohen rightly argues that the justification of the principles do not coincide 
with their  application.  But the level of “purity” required for justificatory principles 
could lead to a level of abstraction from the real situation in which people live as to be 
devoid  principles  of  meaning.  Perhaps  what  Cohen  means  is  that  there  are  some 
principles that apply both to men on earth is to hypothetical moral agents who live on 
another planet. A genuinely philosophical analysis of these pure principles therefore 
cannot be based on elements linked to contingent considerations about facts  of the 
matter about the Earth. The task of political philosophy, Cohen argues, is therefore not 
to answer the question “what should we do?”. Rather, the philosophical question to 
answer is: “how should we think about what we should do?”. And the first should is 
strictly normative.
If this characterization of Cohen’s thought is correct, then one could simply ask 
from where these principles come. Cohen, however, does not want to go that far, since 
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this  would require making explicit  his metaethical view. A second set of questions 
concerns the criterion by which you can choose a pure principle over another, without 
falling into a regressum ad infinitum. But this question remains unanswered.
If one keeps the priority of the action-guiding requirement for principles, there 
will be a different set of competing claims as a result. In applying principles, or at least 
in conceiving of their mutual relations, we need some guidance. In order to solve the 
problem of  action-guiding  requirement  in  case  of  moral  uncertainty,  we have  two 
possible options. On the one hand, one might endorse a monist approach, like the one 
endorsed  by  utilitarians;  in  this  case,  different  values  can  be  reduced  to  a  single 
fundamental  value,  which  is  the  source  of  validity  for  all  practical  norms. 
Alternatively, one might adopt a priority rule, capable of ranking different competing 
normative conceptions, such as Rawls's lexicographic principles.181
Cohen takes  none of  these options.  But  in  this  way,  the implementation  of 
values runs the risk of being left to “judgments of facts”, as if the factual constraints 
turned out to be the final criteria of value priority. In this way political philosophy is 
derogatory and fails in its essential normative role.
So  far  we  have  two  kinds  of  problems.  First,  the  independence  of  the 
justification  of  normative  principles  from their  realization;  second,  the  problem of 
trade-offs,  which  displays  the  issue  of  the  relationship  between  justificatory  and 
regulatory principles.
On the first point, following Andrew Mason, it is possible to endorse Cohen’s 
position loosening the deontic basic assumption, according to which “ought implies 
181 Or one may take a mixed and pluralist principle, such as Goodin’s concrete judgment on 
weighting the possible outcomes of trade-offs. See Robert Goodin, “Political Ideals and Polit-
ical Practice,” British Journal of Political Science, 25, 1995.
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can”. There could be an abstract meaning of “ought implies can” if one claims that:
in particular  judgements  when these are intended to draw attention to some morally 
relevant feature of a situation, rather than express an all things considered judgement 
about what should be done. When this is the case, ‘A ought to do X’ means something 
like, ‘A has a moral reason to do X’. […] In a similar way it permits the claim that there 
are circumstances when we ought not to establish just institutions because of the costs in 
terms of other values of doing so […] So I think we should understand the claim that 
justice is  the first  virtue of  institutions in such a way that  it  attributes  considerable 
weight to justice but nevertheless allows that it can be traded against other values.182 
According to Mason, an account of infeasibility does not directly undermine 
the  value  of  moral  ideals,  but  makes  pointless  those  ideals  that  are  “inherently 
unworkable.” Mason’s defense is largely acceptable, and I tend to agree with Cohen on 
the assumption that moral ideals cannot be directly excluded on the basis of their non-
applicability to concrete situations. However, they would count as broad prescriptions, 
i.e. as moral reasons for endorsing a principle not related to actual circumstances. It 
would be so vague to be something like: promote the good! Nevertheless, this defense 
cannot solve Cohen’s problems. Indeed, Mason’s idea seems to be the one we have 
ascribed to Cohen: justificatory principles would be fact-insensitive,  serving logical 
justification of regulatory principles that would face the problem of factual constraints. 
This position would be an idea common to many other normative theories, according 
to which there is a division of labor between ideal and non-ideal parts of normative 
theorizing. But in this way one part of theory would still functionally serve the other, 
whereas  in  Cohen’s  paper  the  justificatory  part  seems  to  be  detached  from  the 
182 Andrew Mason, “Just constraints”, p. 257.
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regulatory  one,  and the  latter  seems to  be excluded from the  purely  philosophical 
enterprise.
Summing up, Cohen claims (i.)  normative principles are action-guiding183 but 
(ii.) political philosophy should engage only with what one should think and not with 
what one ought to do.184 (iii.) Different values call for application, but the problem of 
trade-offs  among  competing  values  is  external  to  the  philosophical  inquiry.185 This 
problem has to be solved by looking at factual constraints. One might wonder how 
Cohen  could  possibly  keep  together  claims  such  as  (ii.)  and  (iii.)  with  his  initial 
assumption about the action-goodness of principles (i.). If political philosophy does 
not show us how to face the trade-offs among values, but only that there are different 
values, how can political philosophy accomplish its prescriptive task?
Then,  Cohen  argues  that  (iv.)  impossibility  of  implementation  does  not 
undermine the soundness of fact-independent principles.186 Combining this claim with 
his conception of political philosophy (ii.), Cohen provides us with a strange idea of 
normative theory. How should philosophers conceive of a normative point of view? Is 
it just the one provided by fact-independent principles or the whole of fact-dependent 
and fact-independent principles? It is true that the soundness of a normative claim is 
not defeated by the pure inapplicability of the theory, but the theory is a complex set of 
pure and mixed normative principles, and of factual considerations. If not so, it would 
be irrelevant for us.
Other ideal theories might share the (v.) distinction between fact-independent 
183 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 211, and here footnote 168.
184 Ibid., p. 213, and here footnote 177.
185 Ibid., p. 244-245, and here footnote 181.
186 Ibid, p. 244, and here footnote 174.
15
justificatory principles  and  fact-dependent  regulatory principles.187 Per  se,  the 
distinction is not particularly problematic.  But in Cohen’s argument it results in an 
untenable position that leads us to this question: what is the role of political philosophy 
if  not  that  of  giving  regulatory  principles,  suited  to  be  a  guide  for  our  actions? 
Justificatory principles are logically prior to the regulatory ones, but what is their sense 
if they are not the basis for the latter?
Concluding, Cohen, trying to save the independent value of the normative from 
the influence of the factual, seems to leave the normative in a pure and abstract space 
in which it loses its action-guiding nature. One might ask: what is the role of justice if 
not being a criterion to criticize and promote practices for people like us, living in a 
world like ours?
4. Two Different Views
In conclusion, Cohen's position is neither a criticism of Rawls’s theory, nor a 
knock-down objection to constructivism. If anything,  it  is a different view. In fact, 
Cohen misunderstands Rawls’s view. Indeed, it is not among Rawls’s (and in general, 
in constructivist’s) aims to formulate a conception of justice that does not consider the 
circumstances in which its principles apply. Rawls reject this position. He starts from a 
Humean (and certainly not Kantian) idea about how to construct a normative theory. 
The Humean circumstances of justice, which are limited altruism (the psychological 
characterization of people) and moderate scarcity of available resources (the economic 
characterization of the world) are not mere factual considerations. Rather, for Rawls, 
187 Gerald A. Cohen, “Facts and Principles”, p. 244, and here footnote 164.
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they  are  those  elements  that  make  the  virtue  of  justice  for  social  institutions  that 
regulate people's lives necessary.
Obviously,  there is a fundamental  difference between the circumstances that 
require  justice as  a virtue  of social  and political  institutions  and the contents  of  a 
conception of justice. On this point, Cohen and Rawls diverge. According to Cohen, 
the justification of a normative theory does not depend on considerations sensitive to 
the facts. On this basis, he charges Rawls to select the relevant facts for the choice of 
his  principles  of  justice,  at  the  light  of  normative  premises  that  are  remain 
unarticulated.  In  other  words,  Rawls  is  applying  a  conception  of  justice  without 
providing a philosophical justification.
Now,  the  distinction  between  what  Cohen  calls  “regulatory  principles”  and 
“justificatory  principles”  would  not  be  denied  by  Rawls.  Quite  the  contrary,  this 
distinction can be found in Rawls’s writings. Regulatory principles are developed and 
justified  on  the  basis  of  justificatory  principles  (which,  for  Rawls,  are  the  veil  of 
ignorance,  the  five  formal  constraints  to  the  concept  of  right  and  the  concept  of 
person); these principles of justification do not directly express the content of Rawls’s 
conception of justice, they do not tell people what they should do. Rather, they provide 
normative guidance on how to think what to do in certain circumstances (they supply 
the  conceptual  framework  that  makes  the  construction  of  regulatory  principles 
possible).
Without  this  combination  of  theoretical  considerations  (the  principles  of 
justification, on Cohen’s view) and empirically oriented considerations (the Humean 
circumstances of justice) is not possible to develop a theory of justice for beings like 
us.  Cohen  might  like  the  idea  that  political  philosophy  deals  with  theoretical 
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considerations only. Even if political philosophy comes up with principles of justice 
that  are valid but not applicable (i.e.  not implementable in a system of rules for a 
particular group), for Cohen there is no problem at all. But this is not an objection to 
the thought of Rawls, simply because Rawls is making a totally different point.
Rawls, in fact, is elaborating a practical and social conception of justice. It is a 
practical conception because it provides normative guidance for people like us; it is a 
social conception because it provides the basis for discussion and public justification. 
Cohen, on the other hand, has in mind a purely theoretical conception of justice, whose 
aim is the search for and ultimate principle, that is a moral truth whose validity is not 
determined by moral agents.188 While Cohen's political philosophy must seek the truth 
beyond  its  practical  significance,  for  Rawls  we  always  need  to  start  from  the 
individuals who develop a conception of justice and from the circumstances in which 
they are. Thus Cohen and Rawls simply have to two different positions. Pace Cohen, 
his criticism is not addressing of the theory of Rawls.189
188 Samuel Freeman has a similar point in “Constructivism, Facts, and Moral Justification”, 
forthcoming.
189 For  the  arguments  criticism to Cohen’s  view contained  in  this  Appendix I  indebted to 
Federico Zuolo. The analysis presented in this appendix draws on a paper published in Italian 
titled “Principi senza fatti. Riflessioni sulla critica di G.A. Cohen a J. Rawls” (Teoria Politica, 
1,  2008)  and  a  paper  presented  at  the  Brave  New  World  Conference  2007,  Manchester 
University, titled “From 'What is Justice?' to 'For Whom is Justice?' Critical Remarks on G. A. 
Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles.’”
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